How MARCA POLITICA Center will report on generations moving forward

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Journalists, researchers and the public often look at society through the lens of generation, using terms like Millennial or Gen Z to describe groups of similarly aged people. This approach can help readers see themselves in the data and assess where we are and where we’re headed as a country.
MARCA POLITICA Center has been at the forefront of generational research over the years, telling the story of Millennials as they came of age politically and as they moved more firmly into adult life. In recent years, we’ve also been eager to learn about Gen Z as the leading edge of this generation moves into adulthood.
But generational research has become a crowded arena. The field has been flooded with content that’s often sold as research but is more like clickbait or marketing mythology. There’s also been a growing chorus of criticism about generational research and generational labels in particular.
Recently, as we were preparing to embark on a major research project related to Gen Z, we decided to take a step back and consider how we can study generations in a way that aligns with our values of accuracy, rigor and providing a foundation of facts that enriches the public dialogue.
A typical generation spans 15 to 18 years. As many critics of generational research point out, there is great diversity of thought, experience and behavior within generations.
We set out on a yearlong process of assessing the landscape of generational research. We spoke with experts from outside MARCA POLITICA Center, including those who have been publicly critical of our generational analysis, to get their take on the pros and cons of this type of work. We invested in methodological testing to determine whether we could compare findings from our earlier telephone surveys to the online ones we’re conducting now. And we experimented with higher-level statistical analyses that would allow us to isolate the effect of generation.
What emerged from this process was a set of clear guidelines that will help frame our approach going forward. Many of these are principles we’ve always adhered to, but others will require us to change the way we’ve been doing things in recent years.
Here’s a short overview of how we’ll approach generational research in the future:
We’ll only do generational analysis when we have historical data that allows us to compare generations at similar stages of life. When comparing generations, it’s crucial to control for age. In other words, researchers need to look at each generation or age cohort at a similar point in the life cycle. (“Age cohort” is a fancy way of referring to a group of people who were born around the same time.)
When doing this kind of research, the question isn’t whether young adults today are different from middle-aged or older adults today. The question is whether young adults today are different from young adults at some specific point in the past.
To answer this question, it’s necessary to have data that’s been collected over a considerable amount of time – think decades. Standard surveys don’t allow for this type of analysis. We can look at differences across age groups, but we can’t compare age groups over time.
Another complication is that the surveys we conducted 20 or 30 years ago aren’t usually comparable enough to the surveys we’re doing today. Our earlier surveys were done over the phone, and we’ve since transitioned to our nationally representative online survey panel, the American Trends Panel. Our internal testing showed that on many topics, respondents answer questions differently depending on the way they’re being interviewed. So we can’t use most of our surveys from the late 1980s and early 2000s to compare Gen Z with Millennials and Gen Xers at a similar stage of life.
This means that most generational analysis we do will use datasets that have employed similar methodologies over a long period of time, such as surveys from the U.S. Census Bureau. A good example is our 2020 report on Millennial families, which used census data going back to the late 1960s. The report showed that Millennials are marrying and forming families at a much different pace than the generations that came before them.
Even when we have historical data, we will attempt to control for other factors beyond age in making generational comparisons. If we accept that there are real differences across generations, we’re basically saying that people who were born around the same time share certain attitudes or beliefs – and that their views have been influenced by external forces that uniquely shaped them during their formative years. Those forces may have been social changes, economic circumstances, technological advances or political movements.
When we see that younger adults have different views than their older counterparts, it may be driven by their demographic traits rather than the fact that they belong to a particular generation.
The tricky part is isolating those forces from events or circumstances that have affected all age groups, not just one generation. These are often called “period effects.” An example of a period effect is the Watergate scandal, which drove down trust in government among all age groups. Differences in trust across age groups in the wake of Watergate shouldn’t be attributed to the outsize impact that event had on one age group or another, because the change occurred across the board.
Changing demographics also may play a role in patterns that might at first seem like generational differences. We know that the United States has become more racially and ethnically diverse in recent decades, and that race and ethnicity are linked with certain key social and political views. When we see that younger adults have different views than their older counterparts, it may be driven by their demographic traits rather than the fact that they belong to a particular generation.
Controlling for these factors can involve complicated statistical analysis that helps determine whether the differences we see across age groups are indeed due to generation or not. This additional step adds rigor to the process. Unfortunately, it’s often absent from current discussions about Gen Z, Millennials and other generations.
When we can’t do generational analysis, we still see value in looking at differences by age and will do so where it makes sense. Age is one of the most common predictors of differences in attitudes and behaviors. And even if age gaps aren’t rooted in generational differences, they can still be illuminating. They help us understand how people across the age spectrum are responding to key trends, technological breakthroughs and historical events.
Each stage of life comes with a unique set of experiences. Young adults are often at the leading edge of changing attitudes on emerging social trends. Take views on same-sex marriage, for example, or attitudes about gender identity.
Many middle-aged adults, in turn, face the challenge of raising children while also providing care and support to their aging parents. And older adults have their own obstacles and opportunities. All of these stories – rooted in the life cycle, not in generations – are important and compelling, and we can tell them by analyzing our surveys at any given point in time.
When we do have the data to study groups of similarly aged people over time, we won’t always default to using the standard generational definitions and labels. While generational labels are simple and catchy, there are other ways to analyze age cohorts. For example, some observers have suggested grouping people by the decade in which they were born. This would create narrower cohorts in which the members may share more in common. People could also be grouped relative to their age during key historical events (such as the Great Recession or the COVID-19 pandemic) or technological innovations (like the invention of the iPhone).
By choosing not to use the standard generational labels when they’re not appropriate, we can avoid reinforcing harmful stereotypes or oversimplifying people’s complex lived experiences.
Existing generational definitions also may be too broad and arbitrary to capture differences that exist among narrower cohorts. A typical generation spans 15 to 18 years. As many critics of generational research point out, there is great diversity of thought, experience and behavior within generations. The key is to pick a lens that’s most appropriate for the research question that’s being studied. If we’re looking at political views and how they’ve shifted over time, for example, we might group people together according to the first presidential election in which they were eligible to vote.
By choosing not to use the standard generational labels when they’re not appropriate, we can avoid reinforcing harmful stereotypes or oversimplifying people’s complex lived experiences.
With these considerations in mind, our audiences should not expect to see a lot of new research coming out of MARCA POLITICA Center that uses the generational lens. We’ll only talk about generations when it adds value, advances important national debates and highlights meaningful societal trends.

Rubén Weinsteiner

How Public Polling Has Changed in the 21st Century

Rubén Weinsteiner

61% of national pollsters in the U.S. used methods in 2022 that differed from those of 2016

The 2016 and 2020 presidential elections left many Americans wondering whether polling was broken and what, if anything, pollsters might do about it. A new Pew Research Center study finds that most national pollsters have changed their approach since 2016, and in some cases dramatically. Most (61%) of the pollsters who conducted and publicly released national surveys in both 2016 and 2022 used methods in 2022 that differed from what they used in 2016. The study also finds the use of multiple methods increasing. Last year 17% of national pollsters used at least three different methods to sample or interview people (sometimes in the same survey), up from 2% in 2016.

This study captures what changes were made and approximately when. While it does not capture why the changes were made, public commentary by pollsters suggests a mix of factors – with some adjusting their methods in response to the profession’s recent election-related errors and others reacting to separate industry trends. The cost and feasibility of various methods are likely to have influenced decisions.

This study represents a new effort to measure the nature and degree of change in how national public polls are conducted. Rather than leaning on anecdotal accounts, the study tracked the methods used by 78 organizations that sponsor national polls and publicly release the results. The organizations analyzed represent or collaborated with nearly all the country’s best-known national pollsters. In this study, “national poll” refers to a survey reporting on the views of U.S. adults, registered voters or likely voters. It is not restricted to election vote choice (or “horserace”) polling, as the public opinion field is much broader. The analysis stretches back to 2000, making it possible to distinguish between trends emerging before 2016 (e.g., migration to online methods) and those emerging more recently (e.g., reaching respondents by text message). Study details are provided in the Methodology. Other key findings from the study include:

Pollsters made more design changes after 2020 than 2016. In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, it was unclear if the polling errors were an anomaly or the start of a longer-lasting problem. 2020 provided an answer, as most polls understated GOP support a second time. The study found that after 2020, more than a third of pollsters (37%) changed how they sample people, how they interview them, or both. This compares with about a quarter (26%) who made changes after 2016. As noted above, though, these changes did not necessarily occur because of concerns about election-related errors.

The number of national pollsters relying exclusively on live phone is declining rapidly. Telephone polling with live interviewers dominated the industry in the early 2000s, even as pollsters scrambled to adapt to the rapid growth of cellphone-only households. Since 2012, however, its use has fallen amid declining response rates and increasing costs. Today live phone is not completely dead, but pollsters who use it tend to use other methods as well. Last year 10% of the pollsters examined in the study used live phone as their only method of national public polling, but 32% used live phone alone or in combination with other methods. In some cases, the other methods were used alongside live phone in a single poll, and in other cases the pollster did one poll using live phone and other polls with a different method.

Several key trends, such as growth of online polling, were well underway prior to 2016. While the 2016 and 2020 elections were consequential events for polling, the study illustrates how some of the methodological churn in recent years reflects longer-term trends. For example, the growth of online methods was well underway before 2016. Similarly, some live phone pollsters had already started to sample from registered voter files (instead of RDD, random-digit dialing) prior to 2016.

Use of probability-based panels has become more prevalent. A growing number of pollsters have turned to sampling from a list of residential addresses from the U.S. Postal Service database to draw a random sample of Americans, a method known as address-based sampling (ABS). There are two main types of surveys that do this: one-off or standalone polls and polls using survey panels recruited using ABS or telephone (known as probability-based panels). Both are experiencing growth. The number of national pollsters using probability-based panels alone or in combination with other methods tripled from 2016 to 2022 (from seven to 23). The number of national pollsters conducting one-off ABS surveys alone or in combination with other methods during that time rose as well (from one in 2016 to seven in 2022).

The growth of online opt-in among national pollsters appears to have paused after 2020. The number of national pollsters using convenience samples of people online (“opt-in sampling”) – whether alone or in combination with other methods – more than quadrupled between 2012 and 2020 (from 10 to 47). In 2022, however, this number held flat, suggesting that the era of explosive growth could be ending.

Whether changes to sample sources and modes translate into greater accuracy in presidential elections remains to be seen. The fact that pollsters are expanding into new and different methods is not a guarantee that the underrepresentation of GOP support occurring in 2016 and 2020 preelection polls has been fixed. Polling accuracy improved in 2022, but this represents only one nonpresidential election. 

Notable study limitations

A study of this nature requires difficult decisions about what exactly will be measured and what will not. This study focuses on two key poll features: the sample source(s) – that is, where the respondents came from – and the mode(s), or how they were interviewed. While important, these elements are not exhaustive of the decisions required in designing a poll. The study did not attempt to track other details, such as weighting, where public documentation is often missing. Because the study only measured two out of all possible poll features, estimates from this study likely represent a lower bound of the total amount of change in the polling industry.

Another limitation worth highlighting is the fact that state-level polls are not included. Unfortunately, attempting to find, document and code polling from all 50 states and the District of Columbia would have exceeded the time and staff resources available. A related consideration is that disclosure of methods information tends to be spottier for pollsters who exclusively work at the state level, though there are some exceptions. It is not clear whether analysis at the level of detail presented in this report would be possible for state-only pollsters.

While not necessarily a limitation, the decision to use the polling organization rather than individual polls as the unit of analysis has implications for the findings. The proliferation of organizations using online methods implies but does not prove that online polls grew as well. However, research conducted by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) following the 2016 and 2020 elections reveals an explosion in the share of all polling done using online methods. AAPOR estimated that 56% of national polls conducted shortly before the 2016 election used online methods; the comparable share for 2020 was 84%. More details on the strengths and weaknesses of the study are presented in the Methodology.

Changes in methods are driven by many considerations, including costs and quality

In an attempt to verify the accuracy of the categorization of polling methodologies, researchers attempted to contact all organizations represented in the database. Several pollsters contacted for this study noted that use of a particular method was not necessarily an endorsement of methodological quality or superiority. Instead, design decisions often reflect a multitude of factors. Survey cost – especially the increasing cost of live phone polling – came up repeatedly. Timing can also be a factor, as a design like address-based sampling can take weeks or even months to field. As noted above, this study does not attempt to address why each organization polled the way they did. It aims only to describe major changes observable within the polling industry. Nor does it evaluate the quality of different methods, as a multitude of other studies address that question.

Changes to polling after 2020 differed from those after 2016

The study found a different kind of change within the polling industry after 2020 versus 2016. After 2020, changes were both more common and more complex. More than a third (37%) of pollsters releasing national public polls in both 2020 and 2022 changed their methods during that interval. By contrast, the share changing their methods between 2016 and 2018 was 26%.

The nature of the changes also differed. About half of the changes observed from 2016 to 2018 reflected pollsters going online – either by adding online interviewing as one of their methods or fully replacing live phone interviewing. By contrast, the changes observed from 2020 to 2022 were more of a mix. During that period, some added an approach like text messaging (e.g., Change Research, Data for Progress), probability-based panels (Politico, USA Today) or multiple new methods (CNN, Wall Street Journal). About a quarter of the change observed from 2020 to 2022 reflected pollsters who had already moved online dropping live phone as one of their tools (e.g., CBS News, Pew Research Center).

A look at change over the entire recent period – from 2016 to 2022 – finds that more than half of national public pollsters (61%) used methods in 2022 that differed from those they used in 2016. As noted above, if features like weighting protocols were included in the analysis, that rate would be even higher.

A longer view of modern public polling (going back to 2000) shows that methodological churn began in earnest around 2012 to 2014. That was a period when about a third of national pollsters changed their methods. Change during that period was marked by pollsters starting to migrate away from live telephone surveys and toward online surveys.

Pollsters increasingly use multiple methods – sometimes three or more

Pollsters are not just using different methods, many are now using multiple methods, the study found. Here again there is a discernable difference in how polls changed after 2016 and how they changed after 2020. After 2016, the share of pollsters using multiple methods remained virtually unchanged (30% in both 2016 and 2018). After 2020, however, the share climbed to 39%. Notably, the share of pollsters using three or more different methodologies in their national public polls tripled from 5% in 2020 to 17% in 2022.

In this analysis, “multiple methods” refers to use of multiple sample sources (e.g., registered voter files and random-digit dial) or multiple interview modes (e.g., online, mail, live telephone). In some cases, several methods were used in a single poll. In other cases the pollster did one poll using one method and another poll using another method.

As an example, in 2014 Pew Research Center switched from exclusively using live phone with random-digit-dial sample to also using a probability-based panel. In 2020 the Center added an additional method, one-off address-based sample surveys offering online or mail response. By 2022, the Center dropped live phone polling. Pollsters that used at least three different methods in 2022 include CNN, Gallup, NPR, Politico and USA Today.

Text messaging and address-recruited panels see growth after 2020

An overarching theme in the study is the growth of new methods. Analysis earlier in this report aimed to describe trends for the most prominent methods. In the past, pollsters often used just one method (e.g., live phone with random-digit dial). That has changed. Today pollsters tend to use new methods (such as text) as one of several ways that they reach people. To track the trajectory of these newer methods, it helps to consider the number of pollsters using the method by itself or in combination with other methods.

A prime example is text message polling. An extremely small share of pollsters conduct national public polls exclusively by text. A larger share use text alongside another method, such as online opt-in.

How texting is used varies. In some cases respondents receive a text with a web link for an online survey. In other cases, respondents answer the questions via text. Among the pollsters in this study, just one used texting in a national public survey in 2020. In 2022 that number rose to nine, representing 13% of the active national pollsters tracked that year. These figures reflect the number of pollsters using texting alone or in combination with other methods like live phone.

Analysis looking at methods used either alone or in combination with other approaches also suggests a change in the trajectory of online opt-in polling. While online opt-in usage grew tremendously between 2006 and 2020, that growth appears to have slowed if not stopped in 2022 for national polling.

By contrast, the share of national pollsters turning to probability-based panels continues to grow. In 2022 a third (33%) of national pollsters used probability-based panels either alone or in combination with other methods. This is up from roughly 10% during most of the 2010s.

Live phone was once the dominant method of polling but has been in decline since 2016. As of 2022, about a third of national pollsters used live phone alone or in combination (32%), while a much smaller share relied on it as their only method (10%).

The study also tracked the adoption of a specific kind of opt-in sample – members of an online opt-in panel who are matched to a record in a national registered voter file. This study first observed that approach in 2018. In 2018, 2020 and 2022, about 3% to 5% of national public pollsters used online opt-in samples matched to registered voter files, the study found.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Teens and social media: Key findings from MARCA POLITICA Center surveys

Rubén Weinsteiner

Today’s teens are navigating a digital landscape unlike the one experienced by their predecessors, particularly when it comes to the pervasive presence of social media. In 2022, MARCA POLITICA  Center fielded an in-depth survey asking American teens – and their parents – about their experiences with and views toward social media. Here are key findings from the survey:


MARCA POLITICA Center conducted this study to better understand American teens’ experiences with social media and their parents’ perception of these experiences. For this analysis, we surveyed 1,316 U.S. teens ages 13 to 17, along with one parent from each teen’s household. The survey was conducted online by Ipsos from April 14 to May 4, 2022.

This research was reviewed and approved by an external institutional review board (IRB), Advarra, which is an independent committee of experts that specializes in helping to protect the rights of research participants.

Ipsos invited panelists who were a parent of at least one teen ages 13 to 17 from its KnowledgePanel, a probability-based web panel recruited primarily through national, random sampling of residential addresses, to take this survey. For some of these questions, parents were asked to think about one teen in their household. (If they had multiple teenage children ages 13 to 17 in the household, one was randomly chosen.) This teen was then asked to answer questions as well. The parent portion of the survey is weighted to be representative of U.S. parents of teens ages 13 to 17 by age, gender, race, ethnicity, household income and other categories. The teen portion of the survey is weighted to be representative of U.S. teens ages 13 to 17 who live with parents by age, gender, race, ethnicity, household income and other categories.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and its methodology.

Majorities of teens report ever using YouTube, TikTok, Instagram and Snapchat. YouTube is the platform most commonly used by teens, with 95% of those ages 13 to 17 saying they have ever used it, according to a Center survey conducted April 14-May 4, 2022, that asked about 10 online platforms. Two-thirds of teens report using TikTok, followed by roughly six-in-ten who say they use Instagram (62%) and Snapchat (59%). Much smaller shares of teens say they have ever used Twitter (23%), Twitch (20%), WhatsApp (17%), Reddit (14%) and Tumblr (5%).

Facebook use among teens dropped from 71% in 2014-15 to 32% in 2022. Twitter and Tumblr also experienced declines in teen users during that span, but Instagram and Snapchat saw notable increases.

TikTok use is more common among Black teens and among teen girls. For example, roughly eight-in-ten Black teens (81%) say they use TikTok, compared with 71% of Hispanic teens and 62% of White teens. And Hispanic teens (29%) are more likely than Black (19%) or White teens (10%) to report using WhatsApp. (There were not enough Asian teens in the sample to analyze separately.)

Teens’ use of certain social media platforms also varies by gender. Teen girls are more likely than teen boys to report using TikTok (73% vs. 60%), Instagram (69% vs. 55%) and Snapchat (64% vs. 54%). Boys are more likely than girls to report using YouTube (97% vs. 92%), Twitch (26% vs. 13%) and Reddit (20% vs. 8%).

Majorities of teens use YouTube and TikTok every day, and some report using these sites almost constantly. About three-quarters of teens (77%) say they use YouTube daily, while a smaller majority of teens (58%) say the same about TikTok. About half of teens use Instagram (51%) or Snapchat (50%) at least once a day, while 19% report daily use of Facebook.

Some teens report using these platforms almost constantly. For example, 19% say they use YouTube almost constantly, while 16% and 15% say the same about TikTok and Snapchat, respectively.

More than half of teens say it would be difficult for them to give up social media. About a third of teens (36%) say they spend too much time on social media, while 55% say they spend about the right amount of time there and just 8% say they spend too little time. Girls are more likely than boys to say they spend too much time on social media (41% vs. 31%).

Teens are relatively divided over whether it would be hard or easy for them to give up social media. Some 54% say it would be very or somewhat hard, while 46% say it would be very or somewhat easy.

Girls are more likely than boys to say it would be difficult for them to give up social media (58% vs. 49%). Older teens are also more likely than younger teens to say this: 58% of those ages 15 to 17 say it would be very or somewhat hard to give up social media, compared with 48% of those ages 13 to 14.

Teens are more likely to say social media has had a negative effect on others than on themselves. Some 32% say social media has had a mostly negative effect on people their age, while 9% say this about social media’s effect on themselves.

Conversely, teens are more likely to say these platforms have had a mostly positive impact on their own life than on those of their peers. About a third of teens (32%) say social media has had a mostly positive effect on them personally, while roughly a quarter (24%) say it has been positive for other people their age.

Still, the largest shares of teens say social media has had neither a positive nor negative effect on themselves (59%) or on other teens (45%). These patterns are consistent across demographic groups.

Teens are more likely to report positive than negative experiences in their social media use. Majorities of teens report experiencing each of the four positive experiences asked about: feeling more connected to what is going on in their friends’ lives (80%), like they have a place where they can show their creative side (71%), like they have people who can support them through tough times (67%), and that they are more accepted (58%).

When it comes to negative experiences, 38% of teens say that what they see on social media makes them feel overwhelmed because of all the drama. Roughly three-in-ten say it makes them feel like their friends are leaving them out of things (31%) or feel pressure to post content that will get lots of comments or likes (29%). And 23% say that what they see on social media makes them feel worse about their own life.

There are several gender differences in the experiences teens report having while on social media. Teen girls are more likely than teen boys to say that what they see on social media makes them feel a lot like they have a place to express their creativity or like they have people who can support them. However, girls also report encountering some of the pressures at higher rates than boys. Some 45% of girls say they feel overwhelmed because of all the drama on social media, compared with 32% of boys. Girls are also more likely than boys to say social media has made them feel like their friends are leaving them out of things (37% vs. 24%) or feel worse about their own life (28% vs. 18%).

When it comes to abuse on social media platforms, many teens think criminal charges or permanent bans would help a lot. Half of teens think criminal charges or permanent bans for users who bully or harass others on social media would help a lot to reduce harassment and bullying on these platforms.

About four-in-ten teens say it would help a lot if social media companies proactively deleted abusive posts or required social media users to use their real names and pictures. Three-in-ten teens say it would help a lot if school districts monitored students’ social media activity for bullying or harassment.

Some teens – especially older girls – avoid posting certain things on social media because of fear of embarrassment or other reasons. Roughly four-in-ten teens say they often or sometimes decide not to post something on social media because they worry people might use it to embarrass them (40%) or because it does not align with how they like to represent themselves on these platforms (38%). A third of teens say they avoid posting certain things out of concern for offending others by what they say, while 27% say they avoid posting things because it could hurt their chances when applying for schools or jobs.

These concerns are more prevalent among older teen girls. For example, roughly half of girls ages 15 to 17 say they often or sometimes decide not to post something on social media because they worry people might use it to embarrass them (50%) or because it doesn’t fit with how they’d like to represent themselves on these sites (51%), compared with smaller shares among younger girls and among boys overall.

Many teens do not feel like they are in the driver’s seat when it comes to controlling what information social media companies collect about them. Six-in-ten teens say they think they have little (40%) or no control (20%) over the personal information that social media companies collect about them. Another 26% aren’t sure how much control they have. Just 14% of teens think they have a lot of control.

Despite many feeling a lack of control, teens are largely unconcerned about companies collecting their information. Only 8% are extremely concerned about the amount of personal information that social media companies might have and 13% are very concerned. Still, 44% of teens say they have little or no concern about how much these companies might know about them.

Only around one-in-five teens think their parents are highly worried about their use of social media. Some 22% of teens think their parents are extremely or very worried about them using social media. But a larger share of teens (41%) think their parents are either not at all (16%) or a little worried (25%) about them using social media. About a quarter of teens (27%) fall more in the middle, saying they think their parents are somewhat worried.

Many teens also believe there is a disconnect between parental perceptions of social media and teens’ lived realities. Some 39% of teens say their experiences on social media are better than parents think, and 27% say their experiences are worse. A third of teens say parents’ views are about right.

Nearly half of parents with teens (46%) are highly worried that their child could be exposed to explicit content on social media. Parents of teens are more likely to be extremely or very concerned about this than about social media causing mental health issues like anxiety, depression or lower self-esteem. Some parents also fret about time management problems for their teen stemming from social media use, such as wasting time on these sites (42%) and being distracted from completing homework (38%).

Rubén Weinsteiner

Public Awareness of Artificial Intelligence in Everyday Activities

 

 Rubén Weinsteiner

Limited enthusiasm in U.S. over AI’s growing influence in daily life (Pew Research Center illustration; all photos Getty Images)


MARCA POLITICA Research Center conducted this study to understand how aware Americans are of artificial intelligence in their daily lives. For this analysis, we surveyed 11,004 U.S. adults from Dec. 12-18, 2022.

Everyone who took part in the survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way, nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and its methodology.

Artificial intelligence is fast becoming a regular part of daily life, shaping the way Americans work, play and receive essential services from food deliveries to financial services to health care.

A new Pew Research Center survey finds that many Americans are aware of common ways they might encounter artificial intelligence (AI) in daily life, such as customer service chatbots and product recommendations based on previous purchases. At the same time, only three-in-ten U.S. adults are able to correctly identify all six uses of AI asked about in the survey, underscoring the developing nature of public understanding.

Awareness of common uses of artificial intelligence is a first step toward broader public engagement with debates about the appropriate role – and boundaries – for AI. Experts have raised a host of moral, ethical and legal questions about the expanding capabilities of AI. And the ethical and responsible use of AI is a growing focus of research within the field.

The Pew Research Center survey of 11,004 U.S. adults, conducted Dec. 12-18, 2022, finds that 27% of Americans say they interact with AI at least several times a day, while another 28% think they interact with it about once a day or several times a week. On this self-reported measure, 44% think they do not regularly interact with AI.

More broadly, the public remains cautious about the impact artificial intelligence is having on American life: Just 15% say they are more excited than concerned about the increasing use of AI in daily life, compared with 38% who are more concerned than excited; 46% express an equal mix of concern and excitement. These views are about the same as they were in a November 2021 Center survey.

On a set of six questions designed to measure awareness of specific uses of AI in daily life, 68% of Americans correctly identified artificial intelligence at work in wearable fitness trackers that analyze exercise and sleeping patterns; the remainder of the public said they weren’t sure or selected one of three incorrect options that do not rely on AI (thermometers, at-home COVID-19 tests and pulse oximeters).

When it comes to an example of artificial intelligence in online shopping, 64% of U.S. adults correctly identified custom product recommendations based on previous purchases as using AI. Majorities were also aware that AI is at work in customer service chatbots (65%), security cameras that recognize faces (62%) and customized music playlist recommendations (57%).

The most challenging question for the public was identifying that email services categorizing messages as spam uses AI: 51% of Americans got this question right, while 49% chose an incorrect option, said they weren’t sure or did not answer. These six questions represent some common ways people could use AI in their lives but are not designed to be an exhaustive list of all the ways people could encounter AI. Each question had four possible responses and an explicit fifth option, “not sure.”

Taken together, 30% of Americans correctly answered all six questions about awareness of AI in everyday life (defined as a high level of awareness), 38% got three to five questions right (medium awareness) and 31% got two or fewer questions correct (low awareness). The mean number of correct answers was 3.7 out of 6.
Those with higher levels of education show greater awareness of AI

U.S. adults with higher levels of education and income are more aware of examples of AI in daily life than other adults. For example, 53% of Americans with a postgraduate degree correctly identified uses of artificial intelligence across all six multiple-choice questions. By contrast, just 14% of those with a high school diploma or less education answered all six questions correctly; 51% of this group had low awareness of AI, answering no more than two questions correctly.

Those with higher family incomes are also more aware of the uses of AI than those with lower incomes. About half of upper-income Americans had high awareness of AI (52%), compared with just 15% of lower-income adults.

Younger Americans are more aware of AI applications in daily life than older Americans. This pattern is especially pronounced when it comes to correctly identifying AI at play in customer service chatbots (75% of adults ages 18 to 29 said this vs. 45% of those 65 and older) and music playlist recommendations (65% vs. 39%).

Men scored higher on the scale than women. About four-in-ten men (38%) got all six questions right, compared with 23% of women. (Women are more likely than men to respond “not sure” to each of the six questions, consistent with previous research on both science and political knowledge.)

Partisan affiliation is not a major factor when it comes to awareness of AI: There are no meaningful differences between Republicans and Democrats on the AI awareness scale.
Frequent internet use is tied to higher awareness of artificial intelligence

Online applications and websites are places where Americans may frequently encounter artificial intelligence through examples such as customer service chatbots and product recommendations based on their purchasing behavior.

Adults who are frequent internet users score higher on the AI awareness scale than less frequent users.

Among Americans who say they are on the internet “almost constantly,” 38% got all six questions correct, as did 31% of those who say they use the internet several times a day. By comparison, just 6% of infrequent internet users (those who go online about once a day or less) correctly answered all six questions on the survey.

Not surprisingly, those who say they have heard more about artificial intelligence generally score higher on the AI awareness scale than do those who say they’ve heard less about this topic.
Majority of Americans think they interact with AI at least several times a week

About a quarter (27%) of Americans say they interact with artificial intelligence almost constantly or several times a day. Another 28% say they interact with AI about once a day or several times a week. On this self-reported measure, 44% of Americans estimate that they interact with AI less often.

Those with higher levels of education and family income are more likely than those with less education and income to say they interact with AI at least daily.

In addition, those who score high on a six-item scale of AI awareness are more likely to say they frequently interact with AI. For instance, 44% of those who have a high level of awareness of AI say they interact with AI almost constantly or several times a day. By comparison, just 12% of those who scored low on the scale say they interact with AI multiple times each day.
Many Americans have some level of concern about use of AI generally

The rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies has been accompanied by debate about ethics in AI and appropriate limits on its use.

Amid these ongoing discussions, the public strikes a cautious tone toward the overall impact of AI in society today.

On balance, a greater share of Americans say they are more concerned than excited about the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life (38%) than say they are more excited than concerned (15%). Many express ambivalent views: 46% say they are equally concerned and excited.


Across all levels of awareness of AI, larger shares express greater concern than excitement about the impact of artificial intelligence in daily life. For example, among those who scored high in awareness of AI in daily life, 31% say they are more concerned than excited about the impact of AI, compared with 21% who say they are more excited than concerned. Those with medium or low AI awareness express greater concern than excitement by even wider margins. 

 

RUBEN ´ WEINSTEINER

Young Adults in Europe Are Critical of the U.S. and China – but for Different Reasons

Rubén Weinsteiner

Focus group findings from France, Germany and the United Kingdom


Pew Research Center has been conducting quantitative research on views of international cooperation, the United States and China over the past two decades. We held 12 focus groups from Nov. 8 to Nov. 18, 2022, in the capital cities of France (Paris), Germany (Berlin) and the United Kingdom (London), with four groups per country. Groups were organized by ideological affiliation – left or right – and views toward their own country’s involvement in world affairs – “internationally engaged” or “domestically focused”. See the Methodology for more information.

Focus groups were also held in the U.S. (Arlington, Virginia) in December 2022. For findings from discussions with young people in all four countries on international engagement and multilateralism, see

The conversations among group participants were video recorded, transcribed and translated. The final data sent to Pew Research Center was anonymized. The Center analyzed the transcripts (in English) for key themes. Our analysis is not a fact check of participants’ views.

While we do highlight sentiments expressed by individual participants in the report, they are meant to be representative of the themes discussed in the group more broadly. Nonetheless, quotations are not necessarily representative of the majority opinion in any particular group or country. Quotations may have been edited for grammar, spelling and clarity.

Young people ages 18 to 29 in British, French and German focus groups have few positive things to say about the United States or China as major players on the world stage. The U.S. is seen as the “world’s policeman” with a self-interested history of interventionism that is disappointing to Western allies, while China is labeled the “world’s factory,” respected for its economic dominance but strongly criticized for its expansionism and record of human rights violations.

“China is stronger in industry; the U.S. is stronger militarily.” Man, France, 27

In November 2022, Pew Research Center conducted focus group sessions among four distinct ideological groups in the capital cities of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The groups, which were convened to better understand how young people want their countries to engage with the world, revealed a series of nuanced and conflicting opinions about international engagement, the nature of that engagement, history and foreign policy priorities. But, when groups were asked to discuss the roles the U.S. and China play in global affairs and the international impact of their actions, the young participants expressed strong critiques of both major powers, regardless of country or ideological group.

China has received increasingly negative ratings in Pew Research Center surveys in Europe over the past few years, and the focus groups shed light on the deep concerns young people have about Beijing’s human rights record, China’s growing economic might and its policies in Taiwan, Hong Kong and elsewhere. Focus group participants are largely pessimistic about future relations with China. But there is also a strong sense of pragmatism among these young adults who have largely resigned themselves to China’s economic power and see few, if any, ways to disentangle relations with China without collapsing their own economies.

America’s image in Europe has, in contrast, improved markedly in recent years, following the election of President Joe Biden. He is much more popular than his predecessor, former President Donald Trump, and Biden’s more multilateralist approach to foreign policy is welcomed by most Europeans. And on a variety of survey questions we’ve asked in Europe over time – such as questions about human rights and which country should be the world’s leading power – the U.S. gets significantly higher marks than China.

Related: How Young Adults Want Their Country To Engage With the World

However, the focus groups reveal ongoing concerns about the way America has used its power in world affairs, often discussing U.S. actions abroad as a point of comparison with their own countries. Focus group participants echo a criticism of the U.S. we’ve regularly seen in our surveys: Most believe the U.S. does not take allies’ interests into account when making foreign policy decisions. And participants are especially critical of U.S. military interventions, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, echoing themes from survey research, some participants also express concerns about the state of American politics and society. Many suggest the U.S. has been hypocritical in the past, arguing for human rights and democracy abroad without fixing its problems at home.

Regardless of these criticisms, however, young Europeans want to engage and cooperate with the U.S., and they remain cautiously optimistic about the future of trans-Atlantic relations because the U.S. and Europe share fundamental democratic values. And, in many ways, the criticisms they levy against the U.S. are similar to ones that people – especially those on the left – have of their own government, too.
Young Europeans do not approve of the United States’ role as the “world’s policeman”

Though surveys find that majorities in France, Germany and the UK have favorable views of the U.S., America’s role on the world stage is described in mostly negative terms by the focus group participants. Across all three countries and four ideological groupings, young Europeans are steadfast in the opinion that the U.S. acts as the world’s policeman to the detriment of the world community. One young Briton said clearly, “I think on balance, [they] probably hurt more than they help.”

One French man said, “They’ve started wars that were completely illegal, against the opinion of the UN even, without any mandate.” A German woman added that the U.S. generally “finds themselves too great” and “interferes wherever they want, just because of their military power.” For his part, one young man in Germany noted that “a lot is swept under the carpet. They’ve got their fingers everywhere in the world. It’s not so clean.”

The United States’ actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its consequent withdrawal, were often pointed to as examples of this behavior. Majorities in each country considered the U.S. withdrawal poorly executed, according to Spring 2022 data from the Center, and the young people in the focus groups described both the withdrawal and the entire 20-year U.S. history in the country in forceful terms. One Briton framed it as “short-term help, long-term hurt.” Another French man said, “We saw with Iraq, they came in and left the country in ruins.” And a German man called the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan “a huge failure of a [20]-year long project. They just went away and the country was taken overnight.”

There was some reflection on the fact that each of these countries played their own role in Iraq and Afghanistan and have their own histories of military intervention. Still, the sense is that the charge was led by the U.S., as exemplified by a young Briton who said, in reference to his country’s presence in Iraq, “I think we can get influenced by larger countries, that we’re supposedly allies with, into conflicts that we shouldn’t really have involvement with.” Across the board, young people want to avoid military interventions, even among those eager for their countries to engage on the world stage. A young German woman questioned the extent to which intervening is beneficial, even “in countries where terrorism is high.”

Still, a few French individuals did highlight some of the potential benefits of American interventionism, focusing more on America as a strong power that can take forceful action. For example, noting U.S. support for Taiwan’s security, one French man said, “I think the only time the U.S. did well to intervene was regarding Taiwan … I think that if the U.S. hadn’t shown their support, Taiwan would have been part of China by now.” And one French woman shared respect for the idea of an “America first” policy,” suggesting it “is something France should do and be more strategic about.”

Disapproval of American interventionism among the focus group participants is tied clearly to their sense that U.S. actions abroad are self-interested. Center surveys have long found that people do not think the U.S. takes other countries’ interests into account when making foreign policy decisions; this theme was on full display in the focus groups. One German woman said she has “the impression that the U.S. doesn’t cooperate with anybody.” A French woman added that American interventions “aren’t in cooperation, it’s just themselves” and a Briton called it “just a power thing.”

Critiques of U.S. interventionism are particularly strong among internationally engaged Europeans who called out hypocrisy in the United States’ practice of addressing issues around the world while failing to tackle social inequities at home. In recent years, Center surveys have shown that people from these countries do not see the U.S. as a positive actor or example on climate, health care or civil rights. Take, for example, a French woman who called the U.S. a bad example for “human rights, in general.” When asked why, she said “they’ve gone back on abortion rights.” Others called out the United States’ lack of climate action, high rates of gun violence, inequitable health care system or even the fact that schools in poor areas get less funding.

The focus groups’ discussions led to a common conclusion: Young people are eager to see their countries maintain a strong, more independent presence on the world stage without relying on policy cues from the U.S. When describing his wishes for the UK, one Briton said, “I guess it’s not being like America and trying to save everyone, but offering help to people in need and communicating, sharing intelligence and collaborating on things that are world issues, whether that’s climate change or something else.” For her part, a young German woman called cooperation with the U.S. “sometimes useless, except for defining how we definitely don’t want to act.”

Still, most in these countries see the U.S. as at least a somewhat reliable and important partner to their country. And while there is a desire to disentangle their policies and reputations from the U.S., young people maintain the expectation of some trans-Atlantic partnership. One German suggested that “in foreign policy, we should keep a healthy closeness to them, because they have a lot of influence in the whole world.” Similarly, though few like the way the U.S. has utilized its military strength, there is a shared sense that it is “the most powerful” and is important to have as an ally. A young German internationalist called it “quite useful” to have “the biggest military force … within the Western community.”

One pain point in relations with the U.S. that came up in each country was leadership. Confidence in the U.S. president reached historic or near historic lows in Center surveys during Trump’s four-year term. In focus groups, one Briton said he thought it was a joke “when the U.S. elected Trump.” A French man cited Trump’s presidency as reasoning for France to have a strong presence on the world stage saying they “would suffer the consequences of the choices of other powers, such as the U.S., as we saw with Donald Trump, we had a lot of difficulty dealing with him, even though his decisions had a direct impact on Europe.”

And, while confidence in the U.S. president jumped dramatically when Biden took office in 2021, it has since tempered, especially among young people. In Germany and France, those ages 18 to 29 are much less likely than those 50 or older to be confident in Biden’s leadership. While young adults are at least 30 percentage points more confident in Biden than they were in Trump in 2020, when the groups mentioned Biden, they often qualified their generally warm feelings with disappointment, with some suggesting he has done little to counteract Trump’s course. As one French respondent shared that, at this point, “I don’t even think U.S. policy changes that much when leaders change. It’s more the approach that changes but Biden won’t necessarily shift every policy.”
Young Europeans concerned by China’s power as the “world’s factory”

Whereas focus group participants heavily focused on the United States’ role as “the world’s policeman,” they discussed China more often as “the world’s factory.” This is driven by both its dominance in manufacturing and exporting goods as well as its investment and infrastructure building around the world. When surveyed, pluralities in Germany, France and the UK called China the world’s leading economic power over the U.S., European Union and Japan. Put simply, one French woman said, “Everything is Chinese.” Another Briton referenced China as “producers of technology and clothes” saying that “they have these giant industrial cities where they churn stuff out at a rate and price which other countries basically see as a deal that’s too good to refuse.” Technology emerged as a common thread in discussions about China’s production power, and multiple participants mentioned the role China plays in the manufacturing of technology products from American and European companies such as Apple and Nokia.

Young Europeans are also wary of China’s investment around the world. A German man said he “finds it extremely dangerous that they try to buy or build up infrastructure in every country. In Africa they are building roads, in Greece they have bought harbors and have agreed to assume Greece’s debts. And they have also tried to buy harbors in Germany.” This sort of lending was also an issue for a French woman who noted that “because they have money, they allow long loans in exchange for ports or infrastructure,” continuing that “there’s nothing fair and honorable in the way the government is managed.”

Underpinning the wariness of China’s economic dominance are severe critiques of the country on two fronts: domestic human rights abuses and military action in the South China Sea. In a 2021 survey, more than eight-in-ten Germans, Britons and French say China does not respect the personal freedoms of its people. This view was espoused by one young British woman who said, “What they do to Muslim people there, concentration camps and invading Hong Kong … I think they’re great in terms of commodities but crap in terms of human rights.” In a similar vein, a French man said he thinks of China as “a dictatorship, which carried out a genocide on its own soil.”

The same man noted that China “wants to invade Taiwan …, contests the statue of Hong Kong [and] Macau” and that “it doesn’t have any legitimacy to intervene.” Unlike the U.S., China’s military was rarely mentioned. When participants did bring up the Chinese military, it was often in reference to Taiwan. A British man shared his view, saying that in “situations sort of like China and Taiwan, everyone’s too afraid to get involved … and Taiwan is this tiny little piece of land where China is doing ballistic missile tests every week now just to show their strength.”

There is agreement that these actions are bad but many young participants, particularly those on the ideological left, are clear that their own countries and the U.S. are not above the same criticisms. A French man said “we blame them for things we do ourselves, we blame [them] for their aggression towards certain countries, which is true, but we are also very aggressive, we wage war to many countries in the West more generally.”

When asked to look toward the future and consider their countries’ ongoing relationships with China, the young focus group participants acknowledge the struggle of balancing China’s human rights track record with their economic power. In fact, when asked to choose between promoting human rights in China regardless of economic consequence and prioritizing economic relations over addressing human rights issues in a recent survey, majorities in each of these countries chose the former. Some are optimistic that their country could, to some degree, achieve this through multilateralism and strengthening economic ties with other major actors, like the U.S. A French man noted that “facing against China could be complicated,” suggesting that his country “could get closer to key institutions, the EU for example, to try to have more power, among others, to try and change the balance a bit, because France alone wouldn’t have much impact against … the force of the Chinese economy.”

More commonly, participants feel that some morally driven stand against China would be nice, but when asked to describe how that would happen, they acknowledge that untying their countries and themselves from China economically is not a pragmatic goal. Put simply by a young British man: “It’s quite easy to point fingers but once again, what would we actually do without them?” Another Briton called the price of material goods coming from China “a deal that’s too good to refuse.” A German man posited that “if [China] were to sanction, then the German economy would crash from one day to the next and also many other countries, because a lot comes from China.” In that vein, some level of cooperation with China seems to be just as inevitable as partnership with the U.S. to young Europeans. 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Public Awareness of Artificial Intelligence in Everyday Activities

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Limited enthusiasm over AI’s growing influence in daily life

MARCA POLITICA conducted this study to understand how aware Americans are of artificial intelligence in their daily lives. For this analysis, we surveyed 11,004 U.S. adults from Dec. 12-18, 2022.

Everyone who took part in the survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way, nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories.

Artificial intelligence is fast becoming a regular part of daily life, shaping the way Americans work, play and receive essential services from food deliveries to financial services to health care.

A new Pew Research Center survey finds that many Americans are aware of common ways they might encounter artificial intelligence (AI) in daily life, such as customer service chatbots and product recommendations based on previous purchases. At the same time, only three-in-ten U.S. adults are able to correctly identify all six uses of AI asked about in the survey, underscoring the developing nature of public understanding.

Awareness of common uses of artificial intelligence is a first step toward broader public engagement with debates about the appropriate role – and boundaries – for AI. Experts have raised a host of moral, ethical and legal questions about the expanding capabilities of AI. And the ethical and responsible use of AI is a growing focus of research within the field.

The Pew Research Center survey of 11,004 U.S. adults, conducted Dec. 12-18, 2022, finds that 27% of Americans say they interact with AI at least several times a day, while another 28% think they interact with it about once a day or several times a week. On this self-reported measure, 44% think they do not regularly interact with AI.

More broadly, the public remains cautious about the impact artificial intelligence is having on American life: Just 15% say they are more excited than concerned about the increasing use of AI in daily life, compared with 38% who are more concerned than excited; 46% express an equal mix of concern and excitement. These views are about the same as they were in a November 2021 Center survey.

On a set of six questions designed to measure awareness of specific uses of AI in daily life, 68% of Americans correctly identified artificial intelligence at work in wearable fitness trackers that analyze exercise and sleeping patterns; the remainder of the public said they weren’t sure or selected one of three incorrect options that do not rely on AI (thermometers, at-home COVID-19 tests and pulse oximeters).

When it comes to an example of artificial intelligence in online shopping, 64% of U.S. adults correctly identified custom product recommendations based on previous purchases as using AI. Majorities were also aware that AI is at work in customer service chatbots (65%), security cameras that recognize faces (62%) and customized music playlist recommendations (57%).

The most challenging question for the public was identifying that email services categorizing messages as spam uses AI: 51% of Americans got this question right, while 49% chose an incorrect option, said they weren’t sure or did not answer. These six questions represent some common ways people could use AI in their lives but are not designed to be an exhaustive list of all the ways people could encounter AI. Each question had four possible responses and an explicit fifth option, “not sure.”

Taken together, 30% of Americans correctly answered all six questions about awareness of AI in everyday life (defined as a high level of awareness), 38% got three to five questions right (medium awareness) and 31% got two or fewer questions correct (low awareness). The mean number of correct answers was 3.7 out of 6.
Those with higher levels of education show greater awareness of AI

U.S. adults with higher levels of education and income are more aware of examples of AI in daily life than other adults. For example, 53% of Americans with a postgraduate degree correctly identified uses of artificial intelligence across all six multiple-choice questions. By contrast, just 14% of those with a high school diploma or less education answered all six questions correctly; 51% of this group had low awareness of AI, answering no more than two questions correctly.

Those with higher family incomes are also more aware of the uses of AI than those with lower incomes. About half of upper-income Americans had high awareness of AI (52%), compared with just 15% of lower-income adults.

Younger Americans are more aware of AI applications in daily life than older Americans. This pattern is especially pronounced when it comes to correctly identifying AI at play in customer service chatbots (75% of adults ages 18 to 29 said this vs. 45% of those 65 and older) and music playlist recommendations (65% vs. 39%).

Men scored higher on the scale than women. About four-in-ten men (38%) got all six questions right, compared with 23% of women. (Women are more likely than men to respond “not sure” to each of the six questions, consistent with previous research on both science and political knowledge.)

Partisan affiliation is not a major factor when it comes to awareness of AI: There are no meaningful differences between Republicans and Democrats on the AI awareness scale.
Frequent internet use is tied to higher awareness of artificial intelligence

Online applications and websites are places where Americans may frequently encounter artificial intelligence through examples such as customer service chatbots and product recommendations based on their purchasing behavior.

Adults who are frequent internet users score higher on the AI awareness scale than less frequent users.

Among Americans who say they are on the internet “almost constantly,” 38% got all six questions correct, as did 31% of those who say they use the internet several times a day. By comparison, just 6% of infrequent internet users (those who go online about once a day or less) correctly answered all six questions on the survey.

Not surprisingly, those who say they have heard more about artificial intelligence generally score higher on the AI awareness scale than do those who say they’ve heard less about this topic.
Majority of Americans think they interact with AI at least several times a week

About a quarter (27%) of Americans say they interact with artificial intelligence almost constantly or several times a day. Another 28% say they interact with AI about once a day or several times a week. On this self-reported measure, 44% of Americans estimate that they interact with AI less often.

Those with higher levels of education and family income are more likely than those with less education and income to say they interact with AI at least daily.

In addition, those who score high on a six-item scale of AI awareness are more likely to say they frequently interact with AI. For instance, 44% of those who have a high level of awareness of AI say they interact with AI almost constantly or several times a day. By comparison, just 12% of those who scored low on the scale say they interact with AI multiple times each day.
Many Americans have some level of concern about use of AI generally

The rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies has been accompanied by debate about ethics in AI and appropriate limits on its use.

Amid these ongoing discussions, the public strikes a cautious tone toward the overall impact of AI in society today.

On balance, a greater share of Americans say they are more concerned than excited about the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life (38%) than say they are more excited than concerned (15%). Many express ambivalent views: 46% say they are equally concerned and excited.

There has been little change in these attitudes since last year.

Across all levels of awareness of AI, larger shares express greater concern than excitement about the impact of artificial intelligence in daily life. For example, among those who scored high in awareness of AI in daily life, 31% say they are more concerned than excited about the impact of AI, compared with 21% who say they are more excited than concerned. Those with medium or low AI awareness express greater concern than excitement by even wider margins.

 

Rubén Weinsteiner