Comparing Views of the U.S. and China in 24 Countries

Rubén Weinsteiner

Difference in shares who say the U.S. and China interfere in the affairs of other countries



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q22 & Q29.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


In recent years, views of the United States and China have changed a lot. This year, the U.S. is largely viewed positively in the 24 countries we surveyed. At the same time, China is seen much more negatively – especially in high-income countries. But favorability does not tell the whole story. Both countries are seen positively in some ways and negatively in others.

Based on surveys conducted in 24 countries, we examine how the U.S. and China stack up to one another on more than 10 different measures, spanning from confidence in their leaders to views of their universities and technological achievements. We focus on the difference in how people see the two superpowers.

Take one aspect of foreign policy as an example. In Greece, 93% say the U.S. interferes in the affairs of other countries, compared with 56% who say the same for China, for a difference of 37 percentage points. The Greek flag is therefore plotted farther to the left, closer to the U.S. end of the scale, at 37.

Australians, though, see little difference between the superpowers and consider both the U.S. (79%) and China (77%) to be interventionist powers. The Australian flag is therefore plotted at 2, close to the midpoint, which represents no difference in ratings of the two countries on this measure.

Across all 24 countries surveyed, we see that while majorities in most countries see both the U.S. and China as prone to interfering in the affairs of other countries, the U.S. is almost always more likely to be described this way. All of the flags are thus generally to the left of the midpoint and closer to the U.S. end. These metrics can be viewed for each country by hovering over that country’s flag.

Ratings of whether the U.S. and China take each country’s interests into account paints a somewhat different picture. Most flags are still to the left of the midpoint – and closer to the U.S. end – because more people across countries say the U.S. accounts for their country’s interests than China. But the flags are more spread out across the scale because publics feel quite differently from one another about this.

We can also see differences between middle- and high-income countries.1 Selecting middle-income countries on the bottom right of the graphic shows that middle-income countries are mostly clustered together around the midpoint of the scale and that they evaluate the U.S. and China similarly.

Conversely, selecting high-income countries shows that they are clustered together on the left, giving higher ratings to the U.S. than China when it comes to accounting for other countries’ interests.

The U.S. also gets higher marks for contributing to global peace and stability than China does, and the differences in evaluations are often 30 points or more. The difference is greatest in Japan, where 79% say the U.S. contributes at least a fair amount to international stability and just 14% say the same of China – a difference of 65 points. While still large in many countries, differences are smaller in many middle-income countries. And in Indonesia and Hungary, U.S. and Chinese contributions to global peace and stability are seen in a similar light.

As the charts above show, views of China and the U.S. vary a lot among the 24 countries surveyed. Besides foreign policy, you can compare views of China and the U.S. on a few other measures. To see charts and analysis for those topics, keep scrolling or select a topic from the list below.

COMPARE U.S. AND CHINA BY:

Favorable views of the U.S. and China

Difference in shares who say they have favorable views of the U.S. and China


Opinion skews toward the U.S. most heavily in the high-income countries surveyed, with differences of 50 percentage points or more in favor of the U.S. in Poland, Japan and South Korea. In all three countries, more than seven-in-ten offer positive ratings of the U.S., and fewer than three-in-ten have favorable opinions of China.

In most middle-income countries surveyed, views of both powers are generally positive, leading to a smaller difference in views. Nigeria is the lone public surveyed with warmer opinions of China than of the U.S., though both the U.S. and China receive positive ratings from large majorities of Nigerians.

Hungary – notably the only country where positive ratings of the U.S. are the minority opinion – and Kenya stand out for having near equal shares of adults who rate the U.S. and China favorably. Just under half offer positive ratings of each superpower in Hungary, and roughly seven-in-ten Kenyans see the U.S. and China favorably.
Is favorability of the U.S. and China zero-sum?

An alternate way to think about favorability is to look at whether individuals in a given country hold positive views of one superpower and not the other – essentially a “zero-sum” mindset.

In nine countries, this seems to be the case: A majority or plurality has favorable views of the U.S. but not China. In both Japan and Poland, 63% of adults have a favorable view of the U.S. and an unfavorable view of China.

Particularly in middle-income countries, though, pluralities of a third or more have favorable views of both world powers. This includes majorities in both Nigeria and Kenya. No more than a fifth of adults in any country surveyed have a favorable opinion of China and an unfavorable opinion of the U.S.

Leading economic power

Difference in shares who say the U.S. and China are the world’s leading economic power



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


The U.S. economy is larger than China’s but has tended to grow less per year, at least until recently. Still, the U.S. is considered by most surveyed publics to be the world’s leading economic power. And, in many countries, this sense is growing. In Sweden, for example, 51% now say that the U.S. is the leading economy, compared with 39% in 2020, when they were more likely to give the title to China.

South Koreans are especially likely to see the U.S. as the world’s top economy, with 83% giving the title to the U.S. compared with just 8% to China. Sizable differences of around 40 percentage points in favor of the U.S. are also seen in Japan, Poland, Israel and India.

Still, five countries – most of which are in Europe – see China as the leading economy. This includes Italy, which is the only country where a majority considers China the world’s leading economy.

Investment from the U.S. and China

In 12 countries, people were asked if American and Chinese investment have benefited their economies.2

In Australia, Indonesia, Kenya and South Africa, similar shares see investments from both superpowers as having helped their country’s economy at least a fair amount. Conversely, Argentines are equally likely to see Chinese and U.S. investment as having not benefited their country’s economy.

For those in Israel, Poland, India, Brazil and Mexico, U.S. investment is seen as more beneficial.

Only in Hungary and Nigeria is Chinese investment seen more favorably than U.S. investment. Even then, 74% of Nigerians say investment from the U.S. has benefited their country at least a fair amount.

Ratings of American and Chinese technology

Difference in shares who say U.S. and Chinese technology is above average or the best compared with other wealthy nations



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q20d & Q31d. Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q15e.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


The U.S. and China are both widely seen as technological powerhouses. For example, together they dominate the global digital market. Between Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS, American companies have the vast majority of the mobile operating system market share worldwide. Yet China leads the charge toward 5G and global network coverage.

Across the 24 countries surveyed, a median of 72% describe U.S. technology as the best or above average and 69% say the same of Chinese technology. And evaluations of the two superpowers’ technological prowess differ little in seven countries. For example, 83% of Spaniards say American technology is above average or the best, compared with 82% who say the same for China.

Seven publics give U.S. technology more positive ratings. Among them, Israelis and South Koreans stand out for their favorable evaluations of American technology relative to Chinese technology; this is driven by Israelis’ high ratings of American technology and South Koreans’ low ratings of Chinese technology.

China’s technology is seen more positively in 10 countries, including in the U.S. Technological achievements are the only measure where Americans see China outpacing the U.S. About two-thirds of American adults (66%) say China’s technology is above average or the best, compared with 56% who say the same about their own country.

There is little distinction between middle- and high-income countries’ ratings of either country’s technology, but some regional patterns do emerge. China’s technological achievements are rated more positively in the Latin American countries surveyed, while the Asian countries included give the U.S. more positive marks.

Quality of American and Chinese technology products

Respondents in 12 countries further evaluated technology from the U.S. and China on their quality and other attributes.

Roughly three-quarters or more in each country surveyed say American products are well-made, including 94% in Nigeria and 92% in Israel. China’s technology gets more variable ratings, with 82% in Nigeria saying it’s well-made compared with just 36% in Israel. Israel is the lone country to have a majority say China’s technological products are poorly made.

Respondents were also asked about the price of technology products from either country. A 12-country median of 77% call American products expensive, while 42% say the same of Chinese products.

With regards to data security, views are mixed. On balance, people are more likely to say technology produced by American companies protects personal data than to say the same of Chinese companies.

Still, the shares who say American technology protects personal data range from 81% in Nigeria to 25% in Hungary. China’s technology garners similarly varied opinion, with 78% in Nigeria saying it protects users’ personal data but just 15% of Australians saying the same.

Earlier this year, as TikTok faced a potential ban in the U.S., most Americans were similarly distrusting when asked about data privacy and the behavior of Chinese social media companies.

Ratings of American and Chinese militaries

Difference in shares who say the U.S. and Chinese militaries are above average or the best compared with other wealthy nations



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q20c & Q31c. Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q15d.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


The U.S. and China are home to two of the world’s largest militaries. China’s active forces are nearly double the size of the United States’, though the U.S. outspends China on defense.

Majorities in every country surveyed say the American military is above average or the best, while the same is only true for China in about half of the countries surveyed.

In most countries surveyed, the U.S. military receives significantly higher ratings than China’s. There are three exceptions: In Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, all NATO allies of the U.S., the United States’ and China’s militaries are about equally likely to be considered above average or the best. However, the U.S. military gets more recognition than China’s when considering only those who say each is the best.

Israelis stand out for their near unanimous positive ratings of the U.S. forces. While a majority of Israelis rate China’s military highly, the 39-point gap in ratings is the largest of any country surveyed.

Unlike other measures of hard and soft power, there is little difference in ratings of the American and Chinese militaries between middle- and high-income countries.

American and Chinese entertainment

Difference in shares who say U.S. and Chinese entertainment is above average or the best compared with other wealthy nations



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q20e & Q31e. Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q15f.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


In 2020, China replaced the U.S. as the world’s largest film market after a number of successful local productions, and its government released a five-year improvement plan for its film industry a year later. Most of the top 10 highest grossing films globally were nonetheless still American productions in 2022.

Global views of entertainment from each country parallel these trends. U.S. entertainment – including its music, movies and television – is more than four times more likely to be seen as the best or above average than China’s (a 24-country median of 71% vs. 17%, respectively).

High-income countries view American entertainment more favorably than middle-income countries. Entertainment ratings skew toward the U.S. most heavily in Israel, where adults are 71 percentage points more likely to call American entertainment, rather than Chinese, above average or the best. Differences greater than 60 points in favor of the U.S. are also seen among the Dutch, Italians, Poles and Swedes.

The sub-Saharan African publics surveyed offer the highest praise for Chinese entertainment, especially in Nigeria, where 67% say it is the best or above average. Even so, each public gives U.S. entertainment higher ratings.

American and Chinese universities

Difference in shares who say U.S. and Chinese universities are above average or the best compared with other wealthy nations



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q20a & Q31a. Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q15b.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


In May 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced plans for bolstering China’s education system to spread its global influence and create a “‘Study in China’ brand.” Currently, out of the top 100 universities in the world, as rated by the Times Higher Education, only seven are in China, whereas 34 are in the U.S.

This disparity is reflected in views of the two countries’ universities. Across the 24 countries surveyed, a median of 68% say U.S. universities are above average or the best, while just 35% say the same of China’s.

Universities in the U.S. receive significantly more positive ratings than universities in China in all countries surveyed. Middle-income countries give both countries’ universities some of the most favorable evaluations, but the gap in the ratings of the two are similar to the gaps seen in high-income countries.

Europe is home to some of the largest differences as well as the smallest. Poles, Greeks and Hungarians are at least 40 points more likely to say American universities are above average or the best than Chinese universities. The differences are much smaller – in large part due to less positive outlooks on American universities – in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK.

Notably, the U.S. has one of the least positive perceptions of American universities, along with several other advanced economies. About half in each saying American universities are the best or above average.

American and Chinese standards of living

Difference in shares who say U.S. and Chinese standards of living are above average or the best compared with other wealthy nations



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q20b & Q31b. Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q15c.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


As of 2021, both the U.S. and China fall above the world average on the United Nations’ Human Development Index, but the U.S. is considered a very high human development country while China is labeled a high human development country. The difference is reflected in international ratings of the two countries’ standards of living. Though ratings of both vary greatly, greater shares say the standard of living in the U.S. is above average or the best in every country surveyed.

Israelis and Poles stand out for holding particularly skewed views of each country’s standard of living, in favor of the U.S. In Israel and Poland, roughly eight-in-ten regard the standard of living in the U.S. in high regard, while 9% and 19% say the same of China, respectively.

In several high-income countries, ratings of the standard of living are low for both the U.S. and China. For example, just 16% of Germans see the standard of living in the U.S. as above average or the best and 8% say the same of China. In comparison, middle-income countries offer some of the most positive evaluations of the standards of living in the two economic powerhouses.

Respect for personal freedoms

Difference in shares who say the U.S. and China respect the personal freedoms of their people



Note: Publics are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q6a & b.


The U.S. is generally considered by experts to be more democratic than China. Among other organizations, Freedom House describes the U.S. as “free” and China as “not free,” and International IDEA labels the U.S. a “democracy” versus China’s “authoritarian regime.”

Public opinion follows the same pattern. In a survey of 17 high-income publics in 2021, the U.S. government was far more likely than the Chinese government to be seen as respecting its people’s personal freedoms, and previous surveys of both high- and middle-income countries have recorded similar findings. The U.S. government was seen as more respectful of its people’s personal freedoms than China’s even as it received increasingly negative ratings between 2013 and 2018.

In 2021, the differences between ratings of the United States’ and China’s treatment of personal freedoms were especially pronounced in South Korea and Taiwan. In both, roughly three-quarters said the U.S. respects its people’s personal freedoms compared with only about one-in-ten who said the same for China. Differences of about 50 percentage points or more were also measured across most of Europe. Conversely, Singapore stood out for having the smallest difference and being the most likely to consider China respectful of its people’s personal freedoms.

Confidence in the American and Chinese presidents

Difference in shares who say they have confidence in U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Countries are plotted by the difference in evaluations of the U.S. and China.
Source: Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey. Q15a & b.


High-income countries

Middle-income countries


When it comes to leaders, global publics are nearly three times more likely to have confidence in U.S. President Joe Biden than in Chinese President Xi Jinping (medians across 23 countries, not including the U.S., of 54% and 19%, respectively). Each country surveyed is more likely to have confidence in Biden than Xi, but this has not always been the case for ratings of the U.S. president.

The gap in confidence ratings of the U.S. president and the Chinese president has shifted greatly in the last 10 years with each American leader. Views of the two leaders were most similar in several countries when former President Donald Trump held office.

Views of Biden and Xi differ across high- and middle-income countries. Those in middle-income countries are more likely to rate Biden and Xi similarly. For example, 71% of Nigerians have confidence in Biden, while 62% say the same of Xi – a 9-point difference.

In high-income countries, the gap tends to be much larger – especially in parts of Europe, including Poland and Sweden.

In many places, though, respondents are less likely to offer an opinion on Xi than Biden. For example, in Hungary, 24% of respondents said they did not know the answer or declined to answer when asked about their confidence in Xi, while only 6% responded similarly when asked about Biden. 

Rubén Weinsteiner

How people around the world view same-sex marriage

Attitudes about same-sex marriage vary widely around the world, according to several MARCA POLITICA Center surveys fielded in 32 places in the last two years. Among the surveyed publics, support for legal same-sex marriage is highest in Sweden, where 92% of adults favor it, and lowest in Nigeria, where only 2% back it.

In the United States, where the Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage nationally in 2015, 63% of adults support it and 34% oppose it. But views are highly fractured along political and demographic lines.

For example, Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party are nearly twice as likely as Republicans and Republican leaners to support same-sex marriage rights (82% vs. 44%). Similarly, nearly three-quarters (73%) of Americans under the age of 40 say they favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally – 16 percentage points higher than the share of Americans 40 and older who agree (57%).

Related: In places where same-sex marriages are legal, they account for a small share of all marriages

Below is a closer look at how attitudes about same-sex marriage differ around the world, based on our surveys. This analysis looks at how attitudes vary by geography, demographic factors, political ideology and religion, as well as how views have changed over time.


This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on public opinion of the legality of same-sex marriage in 32 places in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. This is the first year since 2019 that the Global Attitudes Survey has included publics from Africa and Latin America, which were not included more recently due to the coronavirus outbreak.

For non-U.S. data, this analysis draws from three nationally representative surveys conducted across 31 publics. In 21 publics, we conducted a survey of 24,546 adults from Feb. 20 to May 22, 2023. All interviews were conducted over the phone in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Hungary, Poland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In Australia, we used a mixed-mode probability-based online panel.

Data for Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam draws on another survey of 10,390 adults conducted in five Asian publics from June 2 to Sept. 17, 2023. All interviews in Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were conducted over the phone. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Vietnam.

Data for Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand draws on a third survey of 10,551 adults conducted in five South and Southeast Asian publics from June 1 to Sept. 4, 2022. All interviews in Malaysia and Singapore were conducted over the phone. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Both the survey in East Asia and the one in South and Southeast Asia are part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which analyzes religious change and its impact on societies around the world.

In the United States, we surveyed 3,576 U.S. adults from March 20 to 26, 2023. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Respondents for all surveys were selected using probability-based sample designs. In Thailand, we conducted additional interviews in the Southern region, which has larger shares who are Muslim. The data in all publics is weighted to account for different probabilities of selection among respondents and to align with demographic benchmarks for adult populations.

This post is an update of one published June 13, 2023. This new post includes more publics surveyed. It also uses a different rounding procedure to generate the “total” figures, so results may differ slightly from previously published estimates. The accompanying topline figures are unchanged.

Here are the questions used for the analysis, along with responses, and the survey methodology.
How attitudes about same-sex marriage vary geographically

Europe

People in Western Europe stand out as staunch supporters of same-sex marriage. At least eight-in-ten adults support it in Sweden (92%), the Netherlands (89%), Spain (87%), France (82%) and Germany (80%). In each of these places, the practice is legal.

In Italy, where issues of LGBTQ+ rights have been in the headlines, 73% of adults favor same-sex marriage rights, though it is not legal there.

Around three-quarters (74%) of adults in the United Kingdom also support same-sex marriage. The practice is legal in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, although those laws were approved at various times over the past decade.

At the other end of the spectrum in Europe, just 41% of adults in Poland and 31% in Hungary support same-sex marriage. In both places, same-sex marriage is not legal, and LGBTQ+ rights are a political and social flashpoint.

Americas

In North America, around eight-in-ten Canadians (79%) support same-sex marriage, as do 63% in both the U.S. and Mexico. Same-sex marriage is legal in all three places.

Related: About six-in-ten Americans say legalization of same-sex marriage is good for society

In South America, 67% of Argentines and 52% of Brazilians support the right of gay and lesbian people to marry. Both places have also legalized the practice.

Asia-Pacific

In the Asia-Pacific region, support for same-sex marriage is highest in Australia and Japan. Three-quarters of adults inAustralia and nearly seven-in-ten (68%) in Japan favor legal same-sex marriage. But while many Australians who favor same-sex marriage say they strongly support it (52%), support is weaker in Japan, where a 56% majority somewhat favor legal same-sex marriage. Australia has legalized same-sex marriage, but Japan has not.

Views toward legalizing same-sex marriage are similarly favorable in Vietnam, where 65% say they support it.

In India, 53% of adults say same-sex marriage should be legal, while 43% oppose it. The Indian Supreme Court recently rejected a petition to legalize same-sex marriage. (The survey there was conducted prior to the ruling.)

And in Taiwan, roughly equal shares say they support (45%) and oppose (43%) same-sex marriage, with the remainder providing no answer. Taiwan is the only place in Asia where same-sex marriage is legal.

In South Korea, same-sex marriage is not legal, though some lawmakers have proposed changing this. Among South Koreans, 41% favor legal same-sex marriage and 56% oppose it.

Indonesians are highly opposed to same-sex marriage legalization. Roughly nine-in-ten (92%) oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry, including 88% who say they strongly oppose it. Just 5% of Indonesians support same-sex marriage.

Related: Asian views of same-sex marriage

Africa and Middle East

South Africa remains the only place in Africa where same-sex marriage is legal, having codified it in 2006. Nevertheless, 59% of South Africans oppose the practice.

Nigerians and Kenyans are the least supportive of same-sex marriage rights among the places in Africa surveyed. In Nigeria, where homosexuality is illegal, only 2% of adults say they support allowing gays and lesbians to marry. And in Kenya, just 9% favor it.

In the Middle East, 56% of Israelis are also opposed to making same-sex marriage legal. Religious affiliation and political leanings heavily shape views of same-sex marriage rights in Israel.
How attitudes about same-sex marriage vary by demographic factors

Age

In 21 of the places surveyed, adults under the age of 35 are more likely than their older counterparts to say they favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally. And in some places, older adults are less likely to provide a response than younger adults.

The age gap is greatest in Taiwan. Three-quarters of Taiwanese adults under 35 express support for same-sex marriage, compared with roughly a third of those 35 and older.

Gender

In 19 of the surveyed places, women are more likely than men to say they support allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally.

For example, in Australia, 83% of women favor it, compared with 67% of men.

There are similar gender differences in Argentina, Cambodia, Germany, Greece, Japan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Taiwan.

Education and income

In 22 of the surveyed places, people with more education are more likely than those with less education to support allowing gays and lesbians to marry. In some places, those with less education are less likely to provide a response than those with more education.

Similarly, in 10 places, people with incomes over the national average are more likely than those with incomes at or below the median to support same-sex marriage. In one of these places – Poland – those with lower incomes were less likely to provide a response.
How attitudes about same-sex marriage vary by political ideology

Views on same-sex marriage are related to political ideology in 15 of the 18 places where we asked about respondents’ ideology this year. In these places, those on the ideological left are significantly more likely than those on the right to favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally.

The ideological difference is greatest in the U.S., where liberals are 54 points more likely than conservatives to support same-sex marriage (90% vs. 36%). Still, in nine surveyed places, majorities of those on both the right and left say they support same-sex marriage.
How attitudes about same-sex marriage vary by religion

Support for legal same-sex marriage tends to be lower in places where more people say religion is somewhat or very important in their lives. Support is higher in places where fewer people consider religion important.

In Nigeria, 99% of adults say religion is at least somewhat important in their lives and only 2% favor legal same-sex marriage. In Indonesia, where 100% of Indonesians say religion is important to them, 5% support legal same-sex marriage. In Sweden, by comparison, just 20% of adults consider religion important to them – and 92% favor allowing gay and lesbian people to wed.

Similarly, people who are not affiliated with a religion are much more likely to say they support same-sex marriage. In Australia, for example, 89% of religiously unaffiliated adults say they favor same-sex marriage, compared with 64% of adults with a religious affiliation.

Together, the most recent surveys show some additional patterns by religion: Religiously unaffiliated Americans (85%) – especially atheists (96%) – are the most likely to favor same-sex marriage legality. White, non-Hispanic evangelical Protestants are the least likely religious group to say they favor it (30%). Around two-thirds of U.S. Catholics (65%) favor same-sex marriage, as do 70% of White nonevangelical Protestants.
In Brazil, Catholics (56%) are more likely than Protestants (32%) to support same-sex marriage.
In Israel, Jewish adults (41%) are more likely than Muslims (8%) to support same-sex marriage. Among Israeli Jews, 4% of those who are Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) or Dati (“religious”) support legal same-sex marriage, compared with 29% of Masorti (“traditional”) Jews. Around three-quarters of Hiloni (“secular”) Jews support this policy.
In Nigeria, Christians and Muslims are equally likely to oppose same-sex marriage (97% and 98%, respectively).
How attitudes about same-sex marriage have changed over time

It is difficult to directly compare these new survey findings with past surveys on whether people favor or oppose same-sex marriage. Earlier Center surveys focused more on religion and its influence in society, rather than political attitudes and international affairs. And in some places, the mode of the survey (e.g., face-to-face vs. phone vs. web) has changed over time.

However, a comparison with surveys conducted in Latin America in 2013-14, in Europe in 2015-17, and the long-term trend in the U.S. generally shows increased public support for the legalization of same-sex marriage over the past decade.

Support for more political parties in the U.S. is higher among adults under age 50

 

With a record share of Americans expressing unfavorable views of both major parties, 37% of Americans wish there were more political parties to choose from, according to a recent MARCA POLITICA Center survey.


Pew Research Center conducted this analysis to understand Americans’ views about the prospect of additional political parties, as part of an in-depth study of how Americans view the state of U.S. politics today.

Everyone who took part in the current survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.




Yet there is considerable skepticism that having additional parties would make it easier to solve the nation’s problems. About a quarter of adults (26%) say this would make it easier to solve problems, while nearly as many (24%) say it would not. Americans’ views on the idea of having more political parties differ by age and partisanship: Nearly half (48%) of adults under age 30 and a similar share (46%) of those 30 to 49 say they often wish there were more political parties. That compares with a third of those ages 50 to 64 and just 21% of those 65 and older who say the same.
Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (44%) are more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners (32%) to say they often wish there were more political parties. In both partisan coalitions, leaners – those who identify as independent or another party but lean toward one of the two major parties – are more likely to wish for additional parties. Democratic leaners are especially likely to say this.
Would more parties help solve the country’s problems?

Just as younger Americans are more likely to express a desire for more parties, they are also more likely to think additional parties would make it easier to solve the country’s problems.

About four-in-ten Americans ages 18 to 29 (39%) say they think more parties would make problem-solving easier. Just 12% of those 65 and older say this.

Party leaners are more likely than partisans to think additional parties would make it easier to solve the country’s problems. But Democratic leaners are more likely than Republican leaners to say this (44% vs. 29%).
Age differences in both parties

Republicans under age 50 are nearly twice as likely as those 50 and older (42% vs. 23%) to say they often wish there were more political parties. And younger Republicans are twice as likely (28% vs. 14%) to say more parties would make problem-solving easier.

A similar pattern emerges for Democrats. While about half (51%) of Democrats under the age of 50 often wish there were more parties to choose from, 31% of those 50 and older say the same. Roughly four-in-ten younger Democrats (41%) say it would be easier to solve the country’s problems with more parties, compared with 20% of older Democrats.
Could an independent candidate win the presidency?

As in past presidential elections, one or more independent candidates could siphon votes from the Republican and Democratic nominees in next year’s election.

However, most Americans are doubtful that an independent candidate could actually win the presidency in the next 25 years.

Only a third of Americans say it’s even somewhat likely an independent will win the presidency during this period, including just 7% who say it is very likely.

There are only modest differences in these views by age and party. About two-thirds in all age groups and in both party coalitions say it’s unlikely an independent candidate will be elected president in the next quarter century.

How Americans see the state of gender and leadership in business

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Women now account for record shares of Fortune 500 chief executives and board members in the United States – 10.6% and 30.4%, respectively. Still, the share of women in top business leadership positions remains well below their share of the population.

This analysis is based on a survey of 5,057 U.S. adults conducted July 17-23, 2023. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. Address-based sampling ensures that nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.



A majority of Americans (55%) say there are too few women in top executive business positions, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. This is down somewhat from 59% who said this in 2018.

Among those who say there are too few women in top business positions, most (79%) say it would be ideal to have the same number of women and men in these roles. One-in-ten say having more women than men would be ideal. The same share (10%) say it would be ideal to have more women in these positions than there are now, but still not as many women as men.

Related: Women and Political Leadership Ahead of the 2024 Election
Why aren’t there more women in top executive business positions?

Americans see many factors as major reasons why there aren’t more women in top executive business positions, such as: Women having to do more to prove themselves than men (58% say this is a major reason)
Gender discrimination (50%)
Family responsibilities (48%)
Many businesses not being ready to hire women for these positions (43%)
Sexual harassment creating an environment that makes it harder for women to succeed (40%)
Will there ever be as many women as men in top executive business positions?

Americans are divided on this question. Half say that, even as more women move into management roles, men will continue to hold more of these top positions. A similar share (48%) say that as more women move into management roles, it’s only a matter of time before there are as many women as men in top executive positions in business.
How views vary by gender

On nearly every question we asked, women and men express different views about the current state of gender and business leadership: 65% of women say there are too few women in top executive business positions, compared with 45% of men. Men are more likely than women to say the number of women in these positions is about right (46% vs. 29%).
55% of women say men will continue to hold more top executive business positions in the future. In turn, more than half of men (54%) say it’s only a matter of time before there are as many women as men in these roles.
By large margins, women are more likely than men to see nearly all of the potential obstacles we asked about as major reasons why there aren’t more women in top business leadership positions.
How views vary by party

There are also differences in the views of Democrats and Democratic leaners when compared with Republicans and those who lean to the GOP. Among these differences: 76% of Democrats say there are too few women in top business leadership positions, compared with 33% of Republicans. A majority of Republicans (56%) say the number of women in these positions is about right.
Most Democrats say women having to do more to prove themselves than men (73%) and gender discrimination (67%) are major reasons why there aren’t more women in top business leadership positions. This compares with 42% and 30% of Republicans, respectively.
Among Republicans, family responsibilities are cited more often than any other factor as a major reason why there aren’t more women in top leadership positions in business. Similar shares of Republicans (48%) and Democrats (49%) see this as a major reason.
Gender differences among Republicans and Democrats

On many questions, there are differences by gender within each party. Republican and Democratic women are more likely than their male counterparts to say there are too few women in top business leadership positions and to point to certain factors as major obstacles for women.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Republicans view Reagan, Trump as best recent presidents

Rubén Weinsteiner

When asked to name the United States president who has done the best job over the past 40 years, a majority of Democrats name Barack Obama. Republicans, by contrast, are divided between a president who served in the 1980s – Ronald Reagan – and one who is currently running to return to office, Donald Trump.
How we did this


About four-in-ten Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (41%) say Reagan has done the best job as president over the past 40 years. Slightly fewer (37%) say Trump has done the best job, according to a MARCA POLITICA Center survey conducted in July.

Nearly six-in-ten Democrats and Democratic leaners (58%) say Obama has done the best job as president in the past 40 years. Far fewer name Bill Clinton (19%) or Joe Biden (7%), who is running for reelection in 2024.

In the last four decades, four Republicans and three Democrats have served as president. Among U.S. adults overall, 32% say Obama has done the best job during this period, followed by Reagan (23%), Trump (19%) and Clinton (12%). Relatively small shares name Biden, George W. Bush or George H.W. Bush (4% or less for each).

Americans’ views of which presidents have done the best job in the past 40 years are largely unchanged since a September 2021 Center survey. The new survey was conducted after Trump was indicted in federal court in Florida on charges related to improper handling of classified documents, but before indictments charging him with attempts to overturn the 2020 election were returned in federal court in Washington, D.C., and in state court in Georgia.
Republicans’ views of the best recent president

Republicans’ opinions of who has done the best job as president over the past four decades vary by race and ethnicity, age, and other demographics.

Comparable shares of White (37%) and Hispanic Republicans (43%) say Trump has done the best job as president. But White Republicans are more likely than Hispanic Republicans to name Reagan (45% vs. 26%). And about two-in-ten Hispanic Republicans (21%) say a Democratic president did the best job over the past 40 years, while a far smaller share of White Republicans (8%) say this.

Black and Asian Republicans make up much smaller shares of the public; their responses cannot be reported separately due to insufficient sample sizes.

Roughly half of Republicans ages 50 and older (51%) say Reagan has done the best job of any recent president, compared with 29% of those under 50. There are no sizable age differences in the shares of Republicans who name Trump. While relatively small shares of Republicans in all age groups name Democratic presidents, those under 50 are more likely to do so than those 50 and older (19% vs. 6%).

Among Republicans who have not completed a bachelor’s degree, comparable shares name Trump and Reagan as the top recent presidents (41% vs. 37%). However, among Republicans with at least a bachelor’s degree, more choose Reagan than Trump by a wide margin (51% vs. 27%).
Who has been the second-best recent president?

Among Republicans who name Reagan or Trump as the best recent president, there are sizable differences in their choices for the second-best president. Among Republicans who name Trump as the best president of the past 40 years, two-thirds say Reagan is the second best, while 17% name another Republican and 14% name a Democrat. However, among those who choose Reagan as the best, views of the second-best president are more varied: 55% say Trump, while 31% name another Republican and 13% name a Democrat.
Democrats’ views of the best recent president

Among Democrats, majorities across most demographic groups view Obama as the best recent president. Still, there are some differences by age and by race and ethnicity.

While half or more Democrats in all age groups name Obama as the best recent president, younger Democrats are particularly likely to say this. About two-thirds of Democrats ages 18 to 29 (68%) choose Obama, compared with 57% of those ages 30 to 49 and about half (52%) of those ages 50 and older.

While 64% each of Black and Asian Democrats name Obama as the best recent president, smaller shares of White (56%) and Hispanic Democrats (51%) say this. Hispanic Democrats are more likely than those in other racial or ethnic groups to name a GOP president as the best: A quarter name a Republican, including 16% who name Reagan and 3% who name Trump.

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Republican Gains in 2022 Midterms Driven Mostly by Turnout Advantage

Rubén Weinsteiner

An examination of the 2022 elections, based on validated voters

We conducted this study to better understand which voters cast ballots in the 2022 midterm elections and how they voted. We also wanted to compare how turnout and vote choices differed from previous elections in 2020, 2018 and 2016. Measuring turnout among different groups in the electorate is challenging; it is particularly difficult to assess changes in turnout from election to election.

Panel data provides us a unique opportunity to study elections. By surveying the same people over time, we can more clearly see how differences in who stays home – and who turns out to vote –impacts each election. We can also measure how adults’ partisan voting preferences change (or do not change) between elections

For this study, we surveyed U.S. adults online on our nationally representative American Trends Panel (ATP). We verified their turnout in the four general elections using commercial voter files that aggregate publicly available official state turnout records. Panelists who said they voted and for whom a voting record was located are considered validated voters; all others are presumed not to have voted.

Additionally, we revised our statistical approach for the 2020 survey. That produced new results that slightly changed the numbers we reported about the 2020 election but changed no substantive findings in our report.


American Trends Panel: MARCA POLITICA'S online probability survey panel, which consists of more than 12,000 adults who take two to three surveys each month. Some panelists have been participating in surveys since 2014.

Defectors/Defection: People who either switch their vote to a different party’s candidate from one election to the next, or those who in a given election do not support the candidate of the party they usually support. Also referred to as “vote switching.”

Drop off/Drop-off voters: People who vote in a given election but not in a subsequent election. The term commonly refers to people who vote in a presidential election but not in the next midterm. It can also apply to any set of elections.

Midterm elections: General elections held in all states and the District of Columbia in the even-numbered years between presidential elections. All U.S. House seats are up for election every two years, as are a third of U.S. Senate seats (senators serve six-year terms).

Mobilize: Efforts by candidates, political campaigns and other organizations to encourage or facilitate eligible citizens to turn out to vote.

Nonvoter: Citizens who didn’t have a record of voting in any voter file or told us they didn’t vote.

Panel survey: A type of survey that relies on a group of people who have agreed to participate in multiple surveys over a time period. Panel surveys make it possible to observe how individuals change over time because the answers they give to questions in a current survey can be compared with their answers from a previous survey.

Party affiliation/Party identification: Psychological attachment to a particular political party, either thinking of oneself as a member of the party or expressing greater closeness to one party than another. Our study categorizes adults as Democrats or Republicans using their self-reported party identification in a survey.

Split-ticket voting/Straight-ticket voting: Voters typically cast ballots for more than one office in a general election. People who vote only for candidates of the same party are “straight-ticket” voters, while those who vote for candidates of different parties are “split-ticket” voters.

Turnout: Refers to “turning out” to vote, or simply “voting.” Also used to refer to the share of eligible adults who voted in a given election (e.g., “The turnout in 2020 among the voting eligible population in the U.S. was 67%”).

Validated voters/Verified voter: Citizens who told us in a post-election survey that they voted in the 2022 general elections and have a record for voting in a commercial voter file. (The two terms are interchangeable).

Voter file: A list of adults that includes information such as whether a person is registered to vote, which elections they have voted in, whether they voted in person or by mail, and additional data. Voter files do not say who a voter cast a ballot for. Federal law requires states to maintain electronic voter files, and businesses assemble these files to create a nationwide list of adults along with their voter information.

In midterm elections that yielded mixed results for both parties, Republicans won the popular vote for the U.S. House of Representatives largely on the strength of higher turnout.

A new Pew Research Center analysis of verified voters and nonvoters in 2022, 2020, 2018 and 2016 finds that partisan differences in turnout – rather than vote switching between parties – account for most of the Republican gains in voting for the House last year.

Overall, 68% of those who voted in the 2020 presidential election turned out to vote in the 2022 midterms. Former President Donald Trump’s voters turned out at a higher rate in 2022 (71%) than did President Joe Biden’s voters (67%).

For additional analysis of voter turnout in the 2022 election, refer to Chapter 1 of this report.
Large majority of voters stuck with 2020, 2018 party preference in their 2022 vote choices

As in previous elections, party loyalty remained strong in last fall’s midterms.

Relatively small shares of voters defected from their partisan affiliation or 2020 presidential vote. Among those who voted for both president in 2020 and for a House representative in 2022, just 6% crossed party lines between elections or voted for third-party candidates in either election.

Similarly, the vast majority of those who voted in both 2018 and 2022 had consistent party preferences across the two elections: 95% of those who voted for a Republican candidate in 2018, and 92% of those who voted for a Democrat, voted for a House candidate of the same party four years later.

Democratic 2018 voters were slightly more likely than Republican 2018 voters to defect in 2022, with the net consequences of the party balance flipping 1 or 2 percentage points to the GOP.

That is a potentially impactful shift in an environment of very close elections, but the greater driver of the GOP’s performance in 2022 was differential turnout: higher turnout among those supporting Republican candidates than those supporting Democratic candidates.

Given sharp political divisions in the United States, small changes in voter turnout from election to election have big consequences. Political polarization has meant that most people who vote in midterm elections are committed politically, making it unlikely they would defect from their partisan affiliation.

Shifts in turnout, as opposed to defections, were responsible for most of the changes in vote margins from the 2018 midterms within most subgroups in the population. For example, the Democratic advantage among women dropped from 18 points in 2018 (58% Democratic, 40% Republican) to just 3 points in 2022 (51% and 48%, respectively).

But when looking only at women who voted in both elections, there is no net advantage for either party from defections: 6% of those who voted Democratic in 2018 flipped to vote for a Republican candidate in 2022, and a nearly identical share of women who voted Republican in 2018 voted for a Democratic candidate in 2022 (5%).

Virtually all of the decline in the Democratic advantage among women is explained by the fact that the 2022 turnout rate for women who voted Republican in 2018 was 8 points higher than the rate for women who voted Democratic that year (84% vs. 76%).

There were a few important exceptions to this general rule.

For example, more rural voters changed their vote from a Democratic to a Republican candidate between 2018 and 2022 than the reverse. The Republican margin among this group nearly doubled between 2018 and 2022 (from 21 points to 40 points). Among rural voters, Republican candidates in 2022 held on to 97% of those who voted Republican in 2018, while Democratic candidates held on to a smaller share (91%).

And among White voters with no college degree, Republicans benefited from slightly higher rates of defection from Democratic candidates among those who voted in both elections

Chapter 2 of this report features detailed breakdowns of voting patterns across the electorate.
‘Drop-off’ voters contributed to Republican House gains

Collectively, Republican candidates for the House received roughly 51% of the total vote last fall compared with 48% for Democratic candidates. This helped the Republican Party gain a narrow majority in the House. Democrats retained control of the Senate. While Republicans exceeded expectations in a few states – notably New York and Florida – pre-election predictions of a “red wave” failed to materialize.

However, the broad outcome of the elections in much of the country was shaped largely by the underlying political makeup of the 2022 voters and how they differed from the voters of 2020 and 2018.

Midterm voters tend to be older, more educated and more affluent than those who vote just in presidential election years, a pattern apparent in both 2018 and 2022. The two elections also had something else in common: The president’s party suffered more “drop-off” voters than did the opposing party.

People who voted in 2018 who did not turn out in 2022 (“drop-off” voters), had favored Democrats in 2018 by about two-to-one (64% to 33%). Likewise, about a third of 2020 voters (32%) did not turn out in 2022. This group voted 53% to 43% for Joe Biden. The absence of these 2020 Biden voters resulted in a worse performance for Democratic candidates in 2022.

The drop-off voters mattered but so, too, did voters who turned out in 2022 but not in earlier elections – and these voters also helped Republican candidates. Those voting in 2022 included 21% who had not voted in 2018. This group supported Republican candidates in 2022 by a margin of 58% to 40%.

National polling data, especially when based on interviews conducted over time with the same individuals, can shed light on these dynamics. But there are limitations with national data, given that midterms are state and local elections. Partisan defections and split-ticket voting were critically important to the success of individual candidates for U.S. Senate and governor. These defections tended to benefit Democratic candidates more often than Republican candidates, even when national turnout trends mostly benefited Republican candidates.

This study is based on surveys of members of the Center’s American Trends Panel following the last four general elections (2016-2022). Voter turnout in each election was verified by a comparison with official records.

Some of the analysis focuses on a subset of 7,041 panelists interviewed post-election in 2022 for whom reliable measures of voter turnout and candidate choice were also available for the 2018 and 2020 elections. This allowed us to analyze how individuals’ voting preferences changed over time, separating the political consequences of changes in party preferences from changes in who turned out in each election. (All analysis that considers individual-level changes in turnout or vote preference excludes the 2016 dataset, due to diminishing sample sizes among those who were in the panel across multiple elections.)
Other key findings from the study Voters under 30 continued to strongly support the Democratic Party, voting 68% to 31% for Democratic candidates. But this margin was somewhat narrower than in 2018. Republicans benefitted more from significant drop off in voter turnout among younger age groups between 2018 and 2022, since young voters tend to support Democrats. Voters under 30 accounted for 10% of the electorate in 2022 – similar to their share of all voters in 2018 (11%), but down from 2020 (14%). To learn more about voter demographics, such as age, race & ethnicity, religion and community type, refer to Chapter 3 of this report.
Ideological polarization by party was nearly complete in 2022: Only 1% of self-described conservative Republicans voted for Democratic House candidates and less than 1% of liberal Democrats voted Republican.
Voting in person on Election Day increased sharply in 2022 compared with 2020. More voters reported casting ballots in person on Election Day in both parties, but the share remained much higher among Republican voters (51%) than among Democratic voters (34%).
White voters without college degrees made up a majority (54%) of Republican voters in 2022, compared with 27% of Democratic voters. Yet these voters made up a somewhat greater share of GOP voters in 2020 (58%) and 2018 (57%).
Voters ages 50 and older were a larger share of the total in 2022 (64%) than in any of the past three elections. 70% of Republican voters were 50 or older, as were 57% of Democratic voters.
Hispanic voters continued to support Democrats, but by a much smaller margin than in 2018: Hispanic voters favored Democratic candidates by a 21-point margin in 2022, compared with a 47-point margin in 2018. This change was driven by asymmetric changes in voter turnout among Hispanic adults, rather than changing preferences among individual Hispanic voters.
Black voters continued to support Democrats by overwhelming margins: 93% voted for Democrats in the midterms while 5% supported Republicans. This is similar to levels of support in 2020, 2018 and 2016. Black voters made up 9% of the electorate in both 2022 and 2018 and 11% of the electorate in 2020.
The Republican advantage among White evangelical Protestants was somewhat larger in 2022 than in the past three elections. 86% supported Republican candidates in 2022 and only 12% voted Democratic. 

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Republican Gains in 2022 Midterms Driven Mostly by Turnout Advantage

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

An examination of the 2022 elections, based on validated voters


We conducted this study to better understand which voters cast ballots in the 2022 midterm elections and how they voted. We also wanted to compare how turnout and vote choices differed from previous elections in 2020, 2018 and 2016. Measuring turnout among different groups in the electorate is challenging; it is particularly difficult to assess changes in turnout from election to election.

Panel data provides us a unique opportunity to study elections. By surveying the same people over time, we can more clearly see how differences in who stays home – and who turns out to vote –impacts each election. We can also measure how adults’ partisan voting preferences change (or do not change) between elections

For this study, we surveyed U.S. adults online on our nationally representative American Trends Panel (ATP). We verified their turnout in the four general elections using commercial voter files that aggregate publicly available official state turnout records. Panelists who said they voted and for whom a voting record was located are considered validated voters; all others are presumed not to have voted.

Additionally, we revised our statistical approach for the 2020 survey. That produced new results that slightly changed the numbers we reported about the 2020 election but changed no substantive findings in our report.


American Trends Panel: MARCA POLITICA’s online survey panel, which consists of more than 12,000 adults who take two to three surveys each month. Some panelists have been participating in surveys since 2014.

Defectors/Defection: People who either switch their vote to a different party’s candidate from one election to the next, or those who in a given election do not support the candidate of the party they usually support. Also referred to as “vote switching.”

Drop off/Drop-off voters: People who vote in a given election but not in a subsequent election. The term commonly refers to people who vote in a presidential election but not in the next midterm. It can also apply to any set of elections.

Midterm elections: General elections held in all states and the District of Columbia in the even-numbered years between presidential elections. All U.S. House seats are up for election every two years, as are a third of U.S. Senate seats (senators serve six-year terms).

Mobilize: Efforts by candidates, political campaigns and other organizations to encourage or facilitate eligible citizens to turn out to vote.

Nonvoter: Citizens who didn’t have a record of voting in any voter file or told us they didn’t vote.

Panel survey: A type of survey that relies on a group of people who have agreed to participate in multiple surveys over a time period. Panel surveys make it possible to observe how individuals change over time because the answers they give to questions in a current survey can be compared with their answers from a previous survey.

Party affiliation/Party identification: Psychological attachment to a particular political party, either thinking of oneself as a member of the party or expressing greater closeness to one party than another. Our study categorizes adults as Democrats or Republicans using their self-reported party identification in a survey.

Split-ticket voting/Straight-ticket voting: Voters typically cast ballots for more than one office in a general election. People who vote only for candidates of the same party are “straight-ticket” voters, while those who vote for candidates of different parties are “split-ticket” voters.

Turnout: Refers to “turning out” to vote, or simply “voting.” Also used to refer to the share of eligible adults who voted in a given election (e.g., “The turnout in 2020 among the voting eligible population in the U.S. was 67%”).

Validated voters/Verified voter: Citizens who told us in a post-election survey that they voted in the 2022 general elections and have a record for voting in a commercial voter file. (The two terms are interchangeable).

Voter file: A list of adults that includes information such as whether a person is registered to vote, which elections they have voted in, whether they voted in person or by mail, and additional data. Voter files do not say who a voter cast a ballot for. Federal law requires states to maintain electronic voter files, and businesses assemble these files to create a nationwide list of adults along with their voter information.

In midterm elections that yielded mixed results for both parties, Republicans won the popular vote for the U.S. House of Representatives largely on the strength of higher turnout.

A new Pew Research Center analysis of verified voters and nonvoters in 2022, 2020, 2018 and 2016 finds that partisan differences in turnout – rather than vote switching between parties – account for most of the Republican gains in voting for the House last year.

Overall, 68% of those who voted in the 2020 presidential election turned out to vote in the 2022 midterms. Former President Donald Trump’s voters turned out at a higher rate in 2022 (71%) than did President Joe Biden’s voters (67%).
Large majority of voters stuck with 2020, 2018 party preference in their 2022 vote choices

As in previous elections, party loyalty remained strong in last fall’s midterms.

Relatively small shares of voters defected from their partisan affiliation or 2020 presidential vote. Among those who voted for both president in 2020 and for a House representative in 2022, just 6% crossed party lines between elections or voted for third-party candidates in either election.

Similarly, the vast majority of those who voted in both 2018 and 2022 had consistent party preferences across the two elections: 95% of those who voted for a Republican candidate in 2018, and 92% of those who voted for a Democrat, voted for a House candidate of the same party four years later.

Democratic 2018 voters were slightly more likely than Republican 2018 voters to defect in 2022, with the net consequences of the party balance flipping 1 or 2 percentage points to the GOP.

That is a potentially impactful shift in an environment of very close elections, but the greater driver of the GOP’s performance in 2022 was differential turnout: higher turnout among those supporting Republican candidates than those supporting Democratic candidates.

Given sharp political divisions in the United States, small changes in voter turnout from election to election have big consequences. Political polarization has meant that most people who vote in midterm elections are committed politically, making it unlikely they would defect from their partisan affiliation.

Shifts in turnout, as opposed to defections, were responsible for most of the changes in vote margins from the 2018 midterms within most subgroups in the population. For example, the Democratic advantage among women dropped from 18 points in 2018 (58% Democratic, 40% Republican) to just 3 points in 2022 (51% and 48%, respectively).

But when looking only at women who voted in both elections, there is no net advantage for either party from defections: 6% of those who voted Democratic in 2018 flipped to vote for a Republican candidate in 2022, and a nearly identical share of women who voted Republican in 2018 voted for a Democratic candidate in 2022 (5%).

Virtually all of the decline in the Democratic advantage among women is explained by the fact that the 2022 turnout rate for women who voted Republican in 2018 was 8 points higher than the rate for women who voted Democratic that year (84% vs. 76%).

There were a few important exceptions to this general rule.

For example, more rural voters changed their vote from a Democratic to a Republican candidate between 2018 and 2022 than the reverse. The Republican margin among this group nearly doubled between 2018 and 2022 (from 21 points to 40 points). Among rural voters, Republican candidates in 2022 held on to 97% of those who voted Republican in 2018, while Democratic candidates held on to a smaller share (91%).

And among White voters with no college degree, Republicans benefited from slightly higher rates of defection from Democratic candidates among those who voted in both elections
‘Drop-off’ voters contributed to Republican House gains

Collectively, Republican candidates for the House received roughly 51% of the total vote last fall compared with 48% for Democratic candidates. This helped the Republican Party gain a narrow majority in the House. Democrats retained control of the Senate. While Republicans exceeded expectations in a few states – notably New York and Florida – pre-election predictions of a “red wave” failed to materialize.

However, the broad outcome of the elections in much of the country was shaped largely by the underlying political makeup of the 2022 voters and how they differed from the voters of 2020 and 2018.

Midterm voters tend to be older, more educated and more affluent than those who vote just in presidential election years, a pattern apparent in both 2018 and 2022. The two elections also had something else in common: The president’s party suffered more “drop-off” voters than did the opposing party.

People who voted in 2018 who did not turn out in 2022 (“drop-off” voters), had favored Democrats in 2018 by about two-to-one (64% to 33%). Likewise, about a third of 2020 voters (32%) did not turn out in 2022. This group voted 53% to 43% for Joe Biden. The absence of these 2020 Biden voters resulted in a worse performance for Democratic candidates in 2022.

The drop-off voters mattered but so, too, did voters who turned out in 2022 but not in earlier elections – and these voters also helped Republican candidates. Those voting in 2022 included 21% who had not voted in 2018. This group supported Republican candidates in 2022 by a margin of 58% to 40%.

National polling data, especially when based on interviews conducted over time with the same individuals, can shed light on these dynamics. But there are limitations with national data, given that midterms are state and local elections. Partisan defections and split-ticket voting were critically important to the success of individual candidates for U.S. Senate and governor. These defections tended to benefit Democratic candidates more often than Republican candidates, even when national turnout trends mostly benefited Republican candidates.

This study is based on surveys of members of the Center’s American Trends Panel following the last four general elections (2016-2022). Voter turnout in each election was verified by a comparison with official records.

Some of the analysis focuses on a subset of 7,041 panelists interviewed post-election in 2022 for whom reliable measures of voter turnout and candidate choice were also available for the 2018 and 2020 elections. This allowed us to analyze how individuals’ voting preferences changed over time, separating the political consequences of changes in party preferences from changes in who turned out in each election. (All analysis that considers individual-level changes in turnout or vote preference excludes the 2016 dataset, due to diminishing sample sizes among those who were in the panel across multiple elections.)
Other key findings from the study Voters under 30 continued to strongly support the Democratic Party, voting 68% to 31% for Democratic candidates. But this margin was somewhat narrower than in 2018. Republicans benefitted more from significant drop off in voter turnout among younger age groups between 2018 and 2022, since young voters tend to support Democrats. Voters under 30 accounted for 10% of the electorate in 2022 – similar to their share of all voters in 2018 (11%), but down from 2020 (14%).
Ideological polarization by party was nearly complete in 2022: Only 1% of self-described conservative Republicans voted for Democratic House candidates and less than 1% of liberal Democrats voted Republican.
Voting in person on Election Day increased sharply in 2022 compared with 2020. More voters reported casting ballots in person on Election Day in both parties, but the share remained much higher among Republican voters (51%) than among Democratic voters (34%).
White voters without college degrees made up a majority (54%) of Republican voters in 2022, compared with 27% of Democratic voters. Yet these voters made up a somewhat greater share of GOP voters in 2020 (58%) and 2018 (57%).
Voters ages 50 and older were a larger share of the total in 2022 (64%) than in any of the past three elections. 70% of Republican voters were 50 or older, as were 57% of Democratic voters.
Hispanic voters continued to support Democrats, but by a much smaller margin than in 2018: Hispanic voters favored Democratic candidates by a 21-point margin in 2022, compared with a 47-point margin in 2018. This change was driven by asymmetric changes in voter turnout among Hispanic adults, rather than changing preferences among individual Hispanic voters.
Black voters continued to support Democrats by overwhelming margins: 93% voted for Democrats in the midterms while 5% supported Republicans. This is similar to levels of support in 2020, 2018 and 2016. Black voters made up 9% of the electorate in both 2022 and 2018 and 11% of the electorate in 2020.
The Republican advantage among White evangelical Protestants was somewhat larger in 2022 than in the past three elections. 86% supported Republican candidates in 2022 and only 12% voted Democratic. 

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Life on Social Media Platforms, in Users’ Own Words

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

In focus groups, highly engaged social media users describe the purposes that different platforms serve for them, their choices about what to reveal and how they try to anticipate any hostile reactions that could be lurking

Behind each sweeping exploration of the role social media plays in society stand the unique stories of Americans and their online lives. People bring deeply personal needs to social media, and their experiences play out in deeply personalized ways, tied to the platforms and communities they are part of. These platforms can host nearly any imaginable human encounter or emotion, from powerful self-expression and deep connection to intense hostility and ruinous deceit.

To gain insight into people’s experiences and the platform environments that shape them, Pew Research Center conducted a series of five focus groups from July 11 to 13, 2022. They were designed to capture how the participants – all of whom were especially engaged on social media platforms – might navigate the complexities of their online worlds.

The discussions shed light on topics that are difficult to cover with surveys alone: How do people create the social media environment they hope to enjoy? What choices and calculations do they make about what to reveal, where to reveal it and who might be watching? How do the platforms that companies provide shape the experiences they have?

The views of these 23 U.S. adults – called “highly engaged users” throughout this report as shorthand – are not representative of all social media users or other populations. These individuals:

• Used multiple platforms frequently: They said they used at least three social media sites and apps, each at least a few times a week;
• Frequently shared things or commented when using social media: They said they frequently used social media to share things about themselves, share things other people have posted or comment on others’ content – either almost every time they used it or often;
• Found posting on social media important for self-expression: They said social media was extremely or very important to them in this way.

No single “social media experience” emerged from their stories – instead, participants’ accounts were nuanced and unique. Still, common themes arose from the group discussions, each connecting diverse experiences across platforms:  

Their stories highlight the ways navigating social media can both enrich and complicate people’s lives. Together, they form a detailed snapshot of what life on platforms looked like for these highly engaged users – grounded in the personal experiences of the people behind the screens and the platforms that shaped these experiences. (It should be noted that the groups took place before changes in Twitter’s ownership and as debates about TikTok were just heating up.)

This report describes findings from five live, online focus groups with a total of 23 U.S. adults, conducted from July 11 to 13, 2022. Pew Research Center worked with SSRS to conduct the groups, which were designed to capture the experiences of people who are especially engaged on social media platforms.

All of them were recruited from the SSRS Opinion Panel. To be eligible, they had to meet the following criteria making up the definition of a “highly engaged user” used in this report:

• Used multiple platforms frequently: They said they used at least three social media sites and apps, each at least a few times a week;
• Frequently shared things or commented when using social media: They said they frequently used social media to share things about themselves, share things other people have posted or comment on others’ content – either almost every time they used it or often;
• Found posting on social media important for self-expression: They said social media was extremely or very important to them in this way.

For more details on other eligibility criteria, recruitment and group composition, read the Methodology.

Center researchers developed a recruitment screener and discussion guide with assistance from SSRS, who partnered with InsideOut Insights (IOI) to conduct and moderate the groups.

While these groups are not representative of any broader population, participants were selected in order to achieve a mix of demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race and ethnicity, education, urbanicity and political party). Four groups were organized by either race and ethnicity or political party, while the other did not have additional demographic criteria. The discussion guide was the same for all groups.

Center researchers observed the focus groups and reviewed both the recordings and the transcripts from these groups to identify key themes and quotes. This report is meant to illustrate the variety of views and experiences of focus group participants, not the frequency with which these views and experiences came up. Views expressed by participants have not been fact-checked and are not representative of the overall experiences of any of these groups in the U.S. population. Quotations have been lightly edited for grammar and clarity.

Here are the key takeaways from the focus groups, featuring participants’ quotations (lightly edited for grammar and clarity) related to each of these themes.

What? Where? When? Using different platforms for different purposes

Our surveys have long shown that some people use a variety of online platforms – some of them very frequently – and that these are places for everything from staying in touch with loved ones to navigating contentious conversations. In the focus groups, two highly engaged users described how their use of platforms can make up the puzzle pieces of a highly customized online life.

“Twitter is more serious for me. Snapchat is a playground. We just get on there and post a bunch of goofy, great filters. … Then Facebook is more of a neighborhood or a village in a way. You can create your own set of, I guess, people that understand you. …  Instagram … is a picture book. … [Twitter is] politics and world events. I get a lot of news on my Twitter.”

– Woman, 20s

“Facebook is just mainly to just get in contact with my mom in Messenger. … YouTube is more entertainment. I also use it to learn more things because there’s just a bunch of information on YouTube, which you also have to be careful because a bunch of that is misinformation. And then TikTok is also mainly for entertainment for me. … For Instagram, it’s more friends and Facebook is more family.” 

– Woman, 30s

In the discussions, participants described how platforms served different purposes for them and helped them connect with different audiences. One participant described looking for specific things on TikTok, while another used it mostly to disconnect from life’s pressures; another turned to Twitter to follow politics; still others mentioned using platforms for entertainment or as a way to find solutions to problems they were dealing with.

Several highly engaged users described Facebook as a place to connect and interact with others, and one woman discussed how she uses different platforms for different groups of people in her life. A range of platforms came up throughout the discussions, including some beyond those the research initially set out to explore.

“Facebook, I use to connect with friends and family and to just keep them generally updated about what’s going on in my life. Then TikTok, I use for finding books, finding recipes, things that make me laugh. … Reddit, I use to post things and questions for people to give their opinion. … I use these platforms for different things.”

— Woman, 30s

A recurring high note for some participants in the focus groups related to finding community, support and connection on social media platforms. Two participants described ways that interactions on platforms both surprised them and added value to their lives – allowing them to connect with people both online and offline.

“I like Facebook because of the different groups that you can join. … And it lets you know that you’re not alone on whatever it is that you’re experiencing. You’re not on the earth by yourself. … It lets you know that even though you may be facing something, you may see it in a group or see it on a post that somebody else … overcame it and it lets you know that you can too.”

– Woman, 50s

“I put a post out on … both Nextdoor and Facebook, and I was shocked at the outpouring of help I got. People said, ‘Hey, you don’t live that far from me. I’m a notary. I’d actually be happy to stop by and help you.’ … It was nice. It was a real good experience with social media. It was nothing but positive.” 

– Man, 50s

One man described how TikTok helped him to feel less alone amid the pandemic; another used Nextdoor to tap into the local community. When it comes to keeping in touch with people who matter to them, one woman discussed how Facebook served as a way to find connection and maintain long-distance relationships. Another user, adding his experience on a streaming platform, described how connection could have both upsides and downsides.

“I think TikTok has an excellent algorithm that really quickly finds out what you want to see. You’ve got the ability to share with your friends and talk about it. And it’s really funny videos, really engaging, what you want to see. And it helped me really get through the pandemic. Helped me feel connected when we weren’t able to get out.”

— Man, 20s

How much of the ‘real me’? Navigating authenticity and self-expression 

These highly engaged users described vastly different approaches to self-expression on social media, ranging from full authenticity to being highly reserved to aspiring to present their best selves. Participants discussed how forthcoming they felt they could be on platforms, what they want people to take away from their social media presence and how this connects with their offline self.

Two participants highlighted the extremes of a continuum when it comes to how much their social media presence reflects who they are offline – from putting everything out there confidently to drawing a sharp distinction between the “real” self and the social media self.

“I truly feel I’m the same person on social media and when you meet me. I’m definitely one of those people who pride myself in that. … [I use] the same tone, the same attitude, the same emotions, everything is the same for me.”

— Woman, 30s

“I definitely don’t think anyone would ever know the real me from social media, like probably 25% [of] me.” 

— Man, 40s

Some participants said they like being an open book and “living out loud”; others were more reluctant or selective. One user described keeping things “vague,” while others talked about letting their personality shine through or spreading positivity. Especially in one group, several women described using social media platforms to call attention to injustice and stand firm to their views:

“I will repost things and post articles about injustices that I feel are going on or things that have happened to other people that they need boosted to get other people’s attention. … With social media, I have the opportunity to live out loud. … I don’t feel the need to limit myself when I post on social media. If I’m going to do it, I’m going to do it everywhere.” 

— Woman, 30s

 Who’s out there? Tailoring social media posts to different audiences in different places

For some participants in the focus groups – all of whom used multiple platforms frequently – their decisions about what to reveal and how much to share were tied to specific platforms and who would see what they posted on each. Some saw certain places as more suitable than others for some types of content, and made their decisions about what to post accordingly – for example, using multiple platforms to control who saw what. Still others said they only share things in places they feel are more private.

“I think on social media it’s more curated. I show what I want people to see. I mean, depends on what social media. Like Facebook, it’s very like prim and proper … [on] Instagram … I can go more into my political views, my social views and things like that.”

— Woman, 20s

“I use Instagram versus Facebook to separate friends and family. [I put] stuff I don’t want my family to see on Instagram and stuff I don’t want my friends to see on Facebook. And then my getaway from it all would be YouTube just [to] learn about random stuff.”

— Man, 20s

“I like privacy. … I don’t post a lot of things that I don’t want people to know. And I feel like I just want to share that with my family. That’s why I created a special group with them.”

— Woman, 20s

In deciding where to post, several participants described their calculations about how “public” certain platforms seem – even as the platforms offer a variety of privacy settings – and took note of who might follow them on each site. For example, one man in his 20s described feeling more cautious about Facebook, where “everybody’s watching,” while Instagram allowed him to take advantage of the fact that he could share things with less permanence.

“Facebook feels a lot more public. You got to be a bit more careful about what you say. On Instagram, I feel like I can post any stupid take that I have to my story. And it’ll be gone in 24 hours and only people who I’ve allowed to follow me will see it. Whereas with Facebook, I feel like everybody’s watching.”

– Man, 20s

Exposed and at risk: Anticipating possible attacks

In recent years, our survey research has explored why some people are reluctant to post on social media about political and social issues, how the public views cancel culture, and whether people think viewpoints are censored on social media.

The focus groups provided insight into risk calculations people might make as they navigate contentious environments, as well as the broader consequences users thought could arise from posting in a relatively public forum. Participants’ worries included concerns around being “screenshotted”; feeling like they have a target on their back; fearing for their reputation; and wondering if what they say might get them banned from a platform. Some of them described these concerns in response to questions about posting political views specifically:

“I don’t [share about political or social issues] online. If I do anything online, it would be … a thumbs up or a dislike, and that’s it. I would just keep it at that, because posting something would just turn into an argument, and I just don’t have the time and energy to continue, because it’s a losing battle anyway.” 

— Man, 40s

“People screenshot [things others say]. And take the private [conversation] out of private and make it public. It’s not safe [to express political views].”

— Woman, 20s

“[I think that] Facebook … [has] gotten so much worse with [banning you or locking your page]. … They will remove your post before they even let you know that you’ve made a mistake. And then they won’t even halfway give you a chance to kind of plead your case.”

— Woman, 30s

One woman discussed being verbally attacked on Facebook, while another described how the Nextdoor communities she was a part of differed based on where they were. Other participants talked about seeing some platforms as particularly combative, or the repercussions they might face in terms of their reputation or from the platforms. Some also talked about the possibility of being monitored or that social media posts could be used against them.  

“My husband and I, and my son, had COVID maybe a year and a half ago. … At the time I wasn’t vaccinated. So, I went and got vaccinated. We all went together, and I put it on Facebook, not knowing I was going to be attacked for it. I’m telling you that a guy came, attacked me, said I’m stupid, I’m an idiot and all kind of stuff. It hurt my feelings, I almost cried. I’m like, ‘How could somebody be so mean?’” 

– Woman, 40s

Listen, CEO: Changing social media
for the better

To close out the focus groups, participants were asked how they would want those who run social media companies to troubleshoot some of the problems they see: If a CEO of a social media company you use were sitting with us right now, what would you tell them to change to make their platform better for you and the people you know?

Some responses covered issues from what speech is allowed on the platforms to prioritizing user wellness and protecting younger users.

“I would say [to Facebook’s CEO and others, I want] … a stronger stance combating authoritarian views and support.”

– Man, 50s

“Give me a time limit. … Once I reach my time limit, lock me out.” 

– Woman, 50s

“I would say everyone who is on social media needs to [meet] an age requirement.”

– Woman, 30s

Other users provided different takes on these themes – some to particular CEOs while others for social media platforms broadly:

“I’m thinking of Facebook: If it’s going to be run by one type [or] group of people, then say that, but don’t [be] underhanded, backhanded, push an agenda, and then mute comments that differ.”

– Woman, 40s

 

Rubén Weinsteiner