jueves, 24 de septiembre de 2020

Gen Z eligible voters reflect the growing racial and ethnic diversity of U.S. electorate



A student holds an “I Voted” sticker as she leaves a polling station on the campus of the University of California, Irvine, on Election Day 2018. (Robyn Beck/AFP via Getty Images)

As the presidential election fast approaches and early voting gets underway in some states, interest is building over the impact Generation Z voters – who will make up one-in-ten eligible voters this fall – will have on the outcome.


Gen Z eligible voters, who range in age from 18 to 23, are a more racially and ethnically diverse group than older generations. While a majority (55%) are non-Hispanic White, a notable 22% are Hispanic, according to a Pew Research Center analysis based on Census Bureau data. Some 14% of Gen Z eligible voters are Black, 5% are Asian and 5% are some other race or multiracial.

The share of Gen Z voters who are Hispanic is significantly higher than the share among Millennial, Gen X, Baby Boomer or Silent Generation and older voters.


How we did this


Generation Z is the fastest growing generation in the U.S. electorate. Since 2016 roughly 4.3 million citizens turned age 18 each year, boosting the ranks of the Gen Z electorate. This profile of the electorate is based on the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), which is conducted in March of every year. Conducted jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the CPS is a monthly survey of approximately 60,000 households and is the source of the nation’s official statistics on unemployment. The ASEC survey in March features a larger sample size. Data on income and poverty from the ASEC survey serve as the basis for the well-known Census Bureau report on income and poverty in the United States.

The CPS is representative of the civilian non-institutionalized population.

The COVID-19 outbreak has affected data collection efforts by the U.S. government in its surveys, especially limiting in-person data collection. This resulted in a 10 percentage point decrease in the response rate for the CPS in March 2020. It is possible that some measures of the electorate and its demographic composition are affected by these changes in data collection.

The CPS microdata used in this report are the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) provided by the University of Minnesota. IPUMS assigns uniform codes, to the extent possible, to data collected in the CPS over the years. More information about IPUMS, including variable definitions and sampling error, is available at http://cps.ipums.org/cps/documentation.shtml.

Gen Z voters are less likely than their predecessors to be foreign born: 4% were born outside the U.S., compared with 9% of Millennial voters, 15% of Gen X voters, 12% of Baby Boomer voters and 13% of Silent voters and older. This aligns with previous Center studies, which looked at a broader segment of Gen Z – not just citizens who are voting age – and found that Gen Zers are more likely than Millennials to be the children of immigrants. In 2019, 22% of Gen Zers ages 7 to 22 had at least one immigrant parent, compared with 14% of Millennials when they were a comparable age.

In raw numbers, there are more than 23 million eligible Gen Z voters this year, about 16 million more than could vote in the 2016 election – although the Gen Z voters make up significantly smaller shares of the overall electorate than other generations because many aren’t yet eligible to vote. For context, more than 63 million Millennials are eligible to vote this year.

The impact Gen Zers have on the election will depend in large part on voter turnout. Younger voters traditionally turn out to vote at lower rates than their older counterparts, as turnout tends to increase with age. Three-in-ten Gen Z eligible voters cast ballots in the 2018 midterm election – lower than the share of Millennial eligible voters who turned out (42%) and substantially below the rate for all eligible voters (53%).


How MARCA POLITICA defines the electorate


MARCA POLITICA defines the electorate as all citizens ages 18 and older living in the United States. We don’t account for those who have lost their voting rights, such as people convicted of felonies living in certain states, or those who can vote from outside the U.S., such as citizens living abroad and members of the armed forces stationed in other countries.

miércoles, 23 de septiembre de 2020

The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Electorate

 


The upcoming 2020 presidential election has drawn renewed attention to how demographic shifts across the United States have changed the composition of the electorate.

How we did this

For this data essay, we analyzed national and state-level shifts in the racial and ethnic makeup of the United States electorate between 2000 and 2018, with a focus on key battleground states in the upcoming 2020 election. The analysis is primarily based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey and the 2000 U.S. decennial census provided through Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the University of Minnesota.


Terminology

Eligible voters refer to persons ages 18 and older who are U.S. citizens. They make up the voting-eligible population or electorate. The terms eligible votersvoting eligiblethe electorate and voters are used interchangeably in this report.

Registered voters are eligible voters who have completed all the documentations necessary to vote in an upcoming election.

Voter turnout refers to the number of people who say they voted in a given election.

Voter turnout rate refers to the share of eligible voters who say they voted in a given election.

Naturalized citizens are lawful permanent residents who have fulfilled the length of stay and other requirements to become U.S. citizens and who have taken the oath of citizenship.

The terms Latino and Hispanic are used interchangeably in this report. Hispanics are of any race.

References to AsiansBlacks and Whites are single-race and refer to the non-Hispanic components of those populations.

Battleground states include Arizona, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. These states were identified by Pew Research Center using ratings from a variety of sources, see the methodology for more details.

In all 50 states, the share of non-Hispanic White eligible voters declined between 2000 and 2018, with 10 states experiencing double-digit drops in the share of White eligible voters. During that same period, Hispanic voters have come to make up increasingly larger shares of the electorate in every state. These gains are particularly large in the Southwestern U.S., where states like Nevada, California and Texas have seen rapid growth in the Hispanic share of the electorate over an 18-year period.1

These trends are also particularly notable in battleground states – such as Florida and Arizona – that are likely to be crucial in deciding the 2020 election.2 In Florida, two-in-ten eligible voters in 2018 were Hispanic, nearly double the share in 2000. And in the emerging battleground state of Arizona, Hispanic adults made up about one-quarter (24%) of all eligible voters in 2018, up 8 percentage points since 2000.

Percentage point change in the non-Hispanic White share of each state’s eligible voters, 2000 to 2018

United States
Eligible voters by race/ethnicity

2018

2010

2000

Percentage point change in the non-Hispanic White share of each state’s eligible voters, 2000 to 2018

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Percentage point increases are computed before the underlying estimates are rounded.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2018 American Community Survey and 2000 decennial census.

StateTotal eligible voter pop. 2018White eligible voter pop. 2018White share of eligible voters 2018White eligible voter pop. 2010White share of eligible voters 2010White eligible voter pop. 2000White share of eligible voters 2000Percentage point change ’00 – ‘18
Alabama3,713,0002,552,00069%2,522,00071%2,403,00073%-5
Alaska535,000351,00066%354,00070%307,00073%-7
Arizona5,042,0003,192,00063%2,968,00069%2,548,00075%-12
Arkansas2,219,0001,724,00078%1,704,00080%1,613,00082%-5
California25,869,00011,750,00045%11,950,00052%12,093,00060%-15
Colorado4,147,0003,110,00075%2,777,00078%2,431,00081%-6
Connecticut2,614,0001,917,00073%1,982,00078%1,990,00083%-9
Delaware721,000496,00069%476,00072%439,00078%-9
District of Columbia527,000220,00042%181,00040%134,00033%9
Florida15,342,0009,325,00061%8,799,00067%8,210,00074%-13
Georgia7,487,0004,358,00058%4,190,00063%3,879,00068%-10
Hawaii1,018,000259,00025%260,00027%224,00027%-1
Idaho1,254,0001,089,00087%982,00090%825,00093%-6
Illinois9,059,0006,156,00068%6,334,00072%6,315,00075%-7
Indiana4,933,0004,137,00084%4,082,00087%3,909,00089%-5
Iowa2,326,0002,114,00091%2,099,00093%2,049,00096%-5
Kansas2,100,0001,724,00082%1,722,00085%1,673,00088%-6
Kentucky3,371,0002,971,00088%2,910,00090%2,736,00091%-3
Louisiana3,464,0002,154,00062%2,142,00064%2,116,00066%-4
Maine1,072,0001,016,00095%999,00096%934,00097%-3
Maryland4,326,0002,444,00057%2,491,00062%2,485,00067%-11
Massachusetts5,042,0003,923,00078%3,894,00083%3,930,00088%-10
Michigan7,549,0005,948,00079%5,859,00080%5,824,00082%-3
Minnesota4,114,0003,539,00086%3,443,00090%3,258,00093%-7
Mississippi2,240,0001,329,00059%1,344,00062%1,322,00065%-5
Missouri4,638,0003,833,00083%3,767,00085%3,538,00086%-4
Montana828,000729,00088%687,00090%607,00092%-4
Nebraska1,381,0001,180,00085%1,165,00089%1,116,00092%-6
Nevada2,071,0001,204,00058%1,174,00066%1,006,00076%-18
New Hampshire1,071,000993,00093%951,00095%872,00097%-4
New Jersey6,196,0003,866,00062%3,998,00068%4,167,00074%-11
New Mexico1,509,000653,00043%691,00048%643,00052%-9
New York13,770,0008,544,00062%8,769,00067%8,810,00071%-9
North Carolina7,632,0005,265,00069%4,920,00072%4,385,00075%-6
North Dakota569,000499,00088%476,00092%448,00094%-6
Ohio8,871,0007,291,00082%7,272,00084%7,187,00086%-4
Oklahoma2,854,0002,044,00072%2,049,00076%1,974,00079%-8
Oregon3,108,0002,567,00083%2,399,00087%2,178,00090%-7
Pennsylvania9,786,0007,894,00081%8,035,00084%7,972,00087%-7
Rhode Island801,000627,00078%650,00085%665,00089%-11
South Carolina3,851,0002,605,00068%2,348,00069%2,053,00070%-2
South Dakota654,000562,00086%537,00089%496,00091%-5
Tennessee5,070,0003,978,00078%3,769,00080%3,469,00083%-4
Texas18,510,0009,402,00051%8,952,00056%8,308,00062%-12
Utah2,085,0001,761,00084%1,553,00088%1,293,00091%-6
Vermont503,000473,00094%468,00096%438,00097%-3
Virginia6,212,0004,175,00067%4,074,00071%3,794,00075%-8
Washington5,359,0004,096,00076%3,830,00081%3,483,00085%-9
West Virginia1,433,0001,335,00093%1,375,00094%1,329,00095%-2
Wisconsin4,396,0003,790,00086%3,735,00088%3,558,00091%-5
Wyoming435,000378,00087%376,00089%329,00091%-4

To be sure, the demographic composition of an area does not tell the whole story. Patterns in voter registration and voter turnout vary widely by race and ethnicity, with White adults historically more likely to be registered to vote and to turn out to vote than other racial and ethnic groups. Additionally, every presidential election brings its own unique set of circumstances, from the personal characteristics of the candidates, to the economy, to historic events such as a global pandemic. Still, understanding the changing racial and ethnic composition in key states helps to provide clues for how political winds may shift over time.

Black, Hispanic and Asian registered voters historically lean Democratic

The ways in which these demographic shifts might shape electoral outcomes are closely linked to the distinct partisan preferences of different racial and ethnic groups. Pew Research Center survey data spanning more than two decades shows that the Democratic Party maintains a wide and long-standing advantage among Black, Hispanic and Asian American registered voters.3 Among White voters, the partisan balance has been generally stable over the past decade, with the Republican Party holding a slight advantage.

All major racial and ethnic voter groups lean Democratic, except Whites

National exit polling data tells a similar story to partisan identification, with White voters showing a slight and fairly consistent preference toward Republican candidates in presidential elections over the last 40 years, while Black voters have solidly supported the Democratic contenders. Hispanic voters have also historically been more likely to support Democrats than Republican candidates, though their support has not been as consistent as that of Black voters.4

These racial and ethnic groups are by no means monolithic. There is a rich diversity of views and experiences within these groups, sometimes varying based on country of origin. For example, Pew Research Center’s 2018 National Survey of Latinos found that Hispanic eligible voters of Puerto Rican and/or Mexican descent – regardless of voter registration status – were more likely than those of Cuban descent to identify as Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party (65% of Puerto Rican Americans and 59% of Mexican Americans vs. 37% of Cuban Americans identified as Democrats). A majority of Cuban eligible voters identified as or leaned toward the Republican Party (57%).

Among Asian American registered voters, there are also some differences in party identification by origin group. For instance, Vietnamese Americans are more likely than Asians overall to identify as Republican, while the opposite is true among Indian Americans, who tend to lean more Democratic.

Higher voter turnout among White and Black voters in presidential elections

Given these differences within racial and ethnic groups, the relative share of different origin groups within a specific state can impact the partisan leanings of that state’s electorate. For example, in Florida, Republican-leaning Cubans had historically been the largest Hispanic origin group. However, over the past decade, the more Democratic-leaning Puerto Ricans have been the state’s fastest-growing Hispanic-origin group, and they now rival Cubans in size. At the same time, in states like California and Nevada, Mexican Americans, who tend to lean Democratic, are the dominant Hispanic origin group.

Partisan alignment does not tell the whole story when it comes to voting patterns. Voter turnout rates – or the share of U.S. citizens ages 18 and older who cast a ballot – also vary widely across racial and ethnic groups. White adults historically have had the highest rate of voter turnout: About two-thirds of eligible White adults (65%) voted in the 2016 election. Black adults have also historically had relatively high rates of voter turnout, though typically slightly lower than White adults. There was an exception to this pattern in 2008 and 2012, when Black voter turnout matched or exceeded that of Whites. By contrast, Asian and Hispanic adults have had historically lower voter turnout rates, with about half reporting that they voted in 2016.

White and Black adults are also more likely than Hispanic and Asian adults to say that they are registered to vote.

Non-White eligible voters accounted for more than three-quarters of total U.S. electorate growth since 2000

The non-White voting population has played a large role in driving growth in the nation’s electorate. From 2000 to 2018, the nation’s eligible voter population grew from 193.4 million to 233.7 million – an increase of 40.3 million. Voters who are Hispanic, Black, Asian or another race or ethnicity accounted for more than three-quarters (76%) of this growth.

Most of the growth in the electorate since 2000 has come from Hispanic, Black and Asian eligible voters

The substantial percentage point increase of voters who are not White as a share of the country’s overall electorate was largely driven by second-generation Americans – the U.S.-born children of immigrants – coming of age, as well as immigrants naturalizing and becoming eligible to vote. The increase has been steady over the past 18 years – from 2000 to 2010, their share rose by 4 percentage points (from 24% to 28%), while from 2010 to 2018, their share further grew by 5 points (up from 28% to 33%).

Hispanic eligible voters were notably the largest contributors to the electorate’s rise. They alone accounted for 39% of the overall increase of the nation’s eligible voting population. Hispanic voters made up 13% of the country’s overall electorate in 2018 – nearly doubling from 7% in 2000. The population’s share grew steadily since 2000, with similar percentage point growth observed between 2000 and 2010 (3 points) and 2010 and 2018 (3 points).

The Hispanic electorate’s growth primarily stemmed from their U.S.-born population coming of age. The 12.4 million Hispanics who turned 18 between 2000 and 2018 accounted for 80% of the growth among the population’s eligible voters during those years. The group’s sustained growth over the past two decades will make Hispanics the projected largest minority group among U.S. eligible voters in 2020 for the first time in a presidential election.

Asian eligible voters also saw a significant rise in their numbers, increasing from 4.6 million in 2000 to 10.3 million in 2018. And similar to Hispanics, their nearly two-decade growth has been relatively consistent. The population’s share in the electorate grew at similar rates from 2000 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2018 (1 point each). In 2018, Asian eligible voters made up 4% of the nation’s electorate (up from 2% in 2000), the smallest share out of all major racial and ethnic groups. Naturalized immigrants – a group that makes up two-thirds of the Asian American electorate – are the main driver of the Asian electorate’s growth. From 2000 to 2018, the number of naturalized Asian immigrant voters more than doubled – from 3.3 million to 6.9 million – and their growth alone accounted for 64% of the overall growth in the Asian electorate.

Despite notable growth in the non-White eligible voter population, non-Hispanic White voters still made up the large majority (67%) of the U.S. electorate in 2018. However, they saw the smallest growth rate out of all racial ethnic groups from 2000 to 2018, causing their share to shrink by nearly 10 percentage points.

Shares of non-Hispanic White eligible voters have declined in all 50 states

The overall decline in the shares of the non-Hispanic White eligible voter population can be observed across all states. (There hasn’t been a decline in the District of Columbia.) While this trend is not new, it is playing out to varying degrees across the country, with some states experiencing particularly significant shifts in the racial and ethnic composition of their electorate.

In total between 2000 and 2018, 10 states saw a 10 percentage point or greater decline in the share of White eligible voters. In Nevada, the White share of the electorate fell 18 percentage points over almost two decades, the largest drop among all 50 states. The decline in the White share of the electorate in Nevada has been fairly steady, with a comparable percentage point decline observed between 2000 and 2010 (10 points) and 2010 and 2018 (8 points). California has experienced a similarly sharp decline in the White share of the electorate, dropping 15 percentage points since 2000. This has resulted in California changing from a majority White electorate in 2000 to a state where White voters were a minority share of the electorate in 2018 (60% in 2000 to 45% in 2018), though they still are the largest racial or ethnic group in the electorate.

Latinos vote at a polling station in Los Angeles. (David McNew/Getty Images)
Latinos vote at a polling station in Los Angeles. (David McNew/Getty Images)

Even with declines in all 50 states, White eligible voters still make up the majority of most states’ electorates. In 47 states, over half of eligible voters are White. The only exceptions are California, New Mexico and Hawaii, where White voters account for 45%, 43% and 25% of each respective state’s electorate.

As reflected on the national level, Hispanic eligible voters have been the primary drivers of the racial and ethnic diversification of most states’ electorates. In 39 states between 2000 and 2018, Hispanic eligible voters saw the largest percentage point increase compared with any other racial or ethnic group. In three additional states – Alaska, Kentucky and Ohio – Hispanic voters were tied with another racial group for the highest increase. Five states that observed the largest growth in Hispanic shares in their electorates were California (11 percentage points), Nevada (10 points), Florida (9 points), Arizona (8 points) and Texas (8 points).

The number of Black eligible voters nationwide grew only slightly in the past 18 years. Even so, Black voters saw the largest percentage point increase out of any other racial and ethnic group in three states in the Southeast: Georgia (5 points), Delaware (4 points) and Mississippi (4 points).

As for Asian eligible voters, they saw robust growth in California (5 percentage points), Nevada and New Jersey (4 points each) between 2000 and 2018. However, their share increases paled in comparison to the Hispanic electorate’s growth in those states. Overall, Asians saw their shares increase in the electorates of every state except Hawaii, where their share dropped by 4 percentage points. Still, Hawaii has the highest percentage of Asians in its electorate – 38% of all eligible voters in the state are Asian.

Racial and ethnic change among eligible voters in battleground states

As the 2020 presidential election draws near, these demographic shifts are particularly notable in some key battleground states, where changes in the composition of the electorate could have an impact on electoral outcomes.5

Pace of racial and ethnic change varies widely across key battleground states

Nationally, Florida and Arizona saw the third- and fourth-largest declines in the shares of non-Hispanic White eligible voters. The White shares of the electorate in those states each stood at about six-in-ten in 2018, down from about three-quarters at the start of the century. Four other battleground states – Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Wisconsin and Michigan – also saw declines in the share of White eligible voters between 2000 and 2018, though to a lesser extent.

In Florida, a state that has been pivotal to every U.S. presidential victory in the last 20 years, the White share of the electorate has fallen 13 percentage points since 2000. At the same time, the Hispanic share of the electorate has gone up 9 points, rising from 11% of eligible Florida voters in 2000 to 20% in 2018. During this same period, the Black share of the electorate in Florida has increased 2 percentage points and the Asian share has increased by 1 point.

Arizona, largely seen as an emerging battleground state, has seen substantial change to the racial and ethnic composition of its electorate. Hispanic adults now make up about one-quarter of all eligible voters (24%), an 8-point increase since 2000.

Several battleground states have seen smaller – though still potentially meaningful – changes to the demographic composition of the electorate. In Pennsylvania, the White share of the electorate fell 7 percentage points while the Hispanic share of the electorate rose 3 points from 2000 to 2018. And in North Carolina, a state that voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and previously went for Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the White share of the electorate fell from 75% in 2000 to 69% in 2018. During the same time period, the Hispanic share of the electorate rose to 4% (up 3 points since 2000) and the Black share of the electorate rose to 22% (up 1 point since 2000).

Demographic changes could continue to reshape the electoral landscape in future elections. While Texas is not currently considered a battleground state, demographic shifts have led some to wonder if the state could become more competitive politically down the road. In 2018, three-in-ten eligible voters in Texas were Hispanic – that’s up 8 percentage points since 2000. During that same time, the share of White eligible voters in Texas fell 12 points, from 62% in 2000 to a bare majority (51%) in 2018.

lunes, 8 de junio de 2020

In Changing U.S. Electorate, Race and Education Remain Stark Dividing Lines


Gender gap in party identification remains widest in a quarter century


Republicans hold wide advantages in party identification among several groups of voters, including white men without a college degree, people living in rural communities in the South and those who frequently attend religious services.

Democrats hold formidable advantages among a contrasting set of voters, such as black women, residents of urban communities in the Northeast and people with no religious affiliation.

With the presidential election on the horizon, the U.S. electorate continues to be deeply divided by race and ethnicity, education, gender, age and religion. The Republican and Democratic coalitions, which bore at least some demographic similarities in past decades, have strikingly different profiles today.

A new analysis by Pew Research Center of long-term trends in party affiliation – based on surveys conducted among more than 360,000 registered voters over the past 25 years, including more than 12,000 in 2018 and 2019 – finds only modest changes in recent years.

Overall, 34% of registered voters identify as independents, 33% as Democrats and 29% as Republicans. The share of voters identifying as Republicans is now the same as it was in 2016, after having ticked down in 2017; Democratic identification is unchanged. Slightly fewer voters identify as independents than in 2017 (34% vs. 37%). See detailed tables.

Most independents lean toward one of the major parties (leaners tend to vote and have similar views as those who identify with a party), and when the partisan leanings of independents are taken into account, 49% of registered voters identify as Democrats or lean Democratic, while 44% affiliate with the GOP or lean Republican.

There have been few significant changes in party identification among subgroups of voters since 2017. Yet over a longer period, dating back more than two decades, there have been profound shifts in party identification among a number of groups as well as in the composition of the overall electorate. This is reflected in the starkly different profiles of the Republican and Democratic coalitions:

Race and ethnicity. White non-Hispanic voters continue to identify with the Republican Party or lean Republican by a sizable margin (53% to 42%). Yet white voters constitute a diminished share of the electorate – from 85% in 1996 to 69% in 2018/2019. And the growing racial and ethnic diversity of the overall electorate has resulted in a more substantial change in the composition of the Democratic Party than in the GOP: Four-in-ten Democratic registered voters are now nonwhite (black, Hispanic, Asian and other nonwhite racial groups), compared with 17% of the GOP.

Education and race. Just as the nation has become more racially and ethnically diverse, it also has become better educated. Still, just 36% of registered voters have a four-year college degree or more education; a sizable majority (64%) have not completed college. Democrats increasingly dominate in party identification among white college graduates – and maintain wide and long-standing advantages among black, Hispanic and Asian American voters. Republicans increasingly dominate in party affiliation among white non-college voters, who continue to make up a majority (57%) of all GOP voters.

Age and generations. The electorate is slowly aging: A 52% majority of registered voters are ages 50 and older; in both 1996 and 2004, majorities of voters were younger than 50. Two decades ago, about four-in-ten voters in both parties were 50 and older; today, these voters make up a majority of Republicans (56%) and half of Democrats. Looking at the electorate through a generational lens, Millennials (ages 24 to 39 in 2020), who now constitute a larger share of the population than other cohorts, also are more Democratic leaning than older generations: 54% of Millennials identify with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic, while 38% identify with or lean to the GOP.

The gender gap. The gender gap in party identification is as large as at any point in the past two decades: 56% of women align with the Democratic Party, compared with 42% of men. Gender differences are evident across a number of subgroups: For example, women who have not completed college are 11 percentage points more likely than men to identify as Democrats or lean Democratic (51% to 40%). The gap is even wider among those who have at least a four-year degree (65% of women, 48% of men).

Religious affiliation. The U.S. religious landscape has undergone profound changes in recent years, with the share of Christians in the population continuing to decline.

These shifts are reflected in the composition of the partisan coalitions. Today, Christians make up about half of Democratic voters (52%); in 2008, about three-quarters of Democrats (73%) were Christians. The share of Democratic voters who are religiously unaffiliated has approximately doubled over this period (from 18% to 38%).

The changes among Republicans have been far more modest: Christians constitute 79% of Republican voters, down from 87% in 2008. (Data on religious affiliation dates to 2008; prior to that, Pew Research Center asked a different question about religious affiliation that is not directly comparable to its current measure.)

CORRECTION (June 2, 2020): The following sentence was updated to reflect that millennials constitute a larger share of the U.S. population than other cohorts: “Looking at the electorate through a generational lens, Millennials (ages 24 to 39 in 2020), who now constitute a larger share of the population than other cohorts, also are more Democratic leaning than older generations…” The changes did not affect the report’s substantive findings.


Democratic edge in party identification narrows slightly

The balance of party identification among registered voters has remained fairly stable over the past quarter century. Still, there have been modest fluctuations: The new analysis, based on combined telephone surveys from 2018 and 2019, finds that the Democratic Party’s advantage in party identification has narrowed since 2017.

Overall, 34% of registered voters identify as independent, compared with 33% who identify as Democrats and 29% who identify as Republicans. The share of registered voters who identify with the Republican Party is up 3 percentage points, from 26% in 2017, while there has been no change in the share who identify as Democrats. The share of voters who identify as independents is 3 points lower than it was in 2017.

When independents – and those who don’t align with either major party – are included, 49% of all registered voters say they either identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party; slightly fewer (44%) say they identify with or lean toward the GOP. In 2017, the Democratic Party enjoyed a wider 8-point advantage in leaned party identification (50% to 42%).

(Across many political attitudes, there is little difference between voters who lean toward a party and those who identify with that party; this report primarily focuses on the combined measure of leaned party identification.)

Democrats have held the edge in party identification among registered voters since 2004. The current balance of leaned party identification is similar to where it stood in 2016 – when 48% of voters identified as Democrats or leaned Democratic and 44% identified with or leaned toward the GOP – and in 2012 (also 48% Democratic, 44% Republican). See detailed tables.
Gender gap in party affiliation widens

Women continue to be more likely than men to associate with the Democratic Party. The current gap in leaned party affiliation continues to be among the widest in yearly Pew Research Center surveys dating to 1994.

Among registered voters, 56% of women identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party compared with 42% of men. While the gender gap in partisanship is long-standing, it has gradually expanded since 2014 and now stands at 14 points. Between 1994 and 2014 the average gender gap in leaned party affiliation was 9 points.

Underlying the gender gap in leaned party identification is a gender difference in voters’ straight party identification: Men are more likely to identify as Republicans (31%) than Democrats (26%), while the reverse is true among women (39% identify as Democrats, 28% as Republicans).

Notably, men (39%) remain more likely than women (30%) to call themselves independents. Among men, a larger share of independent voters – and voters who don’t align with either major party – lean toward the GOP than the Democratic Party, while the balance of partisan leaning among women who identify as independents runs in the opposite direction.
Wide divides in partisanship persist by race and ethnicity

Some of the largest differences in partisanship continue to be seen across racial and ethnic groups.

The GOP continues to maintain an advantage in leaned party identification among white voters (53% to 42%). By contrast, sizable majorities of black, Hispanic and Asian American voters identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party. Among black voters, 83% identify or lean toward the Democratic Party, compared with just 10% who say they are Republican or lean toward the GOP.

The Democratic Party also holds a clear advantage over the GOP in leaned party identification among Hispanic voters (63% to 29%), though the margin is not as large as among black voters.

Among English-speaking Asian American voters, 72% identify or lean toward the Democratic Party, compared with just 17% who identify with or lean toward the GOP. (Note: Only English-speaking Asian American voters are included in the data because Pew Research Center does not conduct its standard domestic political surveys in Asian languages.)

The balance of partisanship among white, black and Hispanic voters has been generally stable over the past decade. However, English-speaking Asian American voters have shifted toward the Democratic Party.

In addition to the distinct partisan preferences expressed by different racial and ethnic groups, demographic changes in the country drive shifts in the composition of all registered voters. Since 1994, the share of white voters in the country declined from 85% to 68% today. By contrast, the share of Hispanic voters in the electorate has increased from just 4% in 1994 to 11% today. The share of black voters in the electorate has been largely stable over the past 25 years, though it’s slightly higher now than in 1994 (11% today vs. 9% then).
Democrats hold sizable advantage among college-educated voters

Over the past 25 years, there’s been a fundamental shift in the relationship between level of educational attainment and partisanship. The Democratic Party has made significant gains among voters with a college degree or more education – a group that leaned toward the GOP 25 years ago. At the same time, the GOP now runs about even with the Democratic Party among voters without a college degree after trailing among this group at the end of the George W. Bush administration. And the GOP has made clear gains in recent years among voters with the lowest level of formal education, those with no more than a high school diploma.

A majority of registered voters with at least a four-year college degree (57%) identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 37% associate with the GOP. The Democratic Party’s advantage with more highly educated voters has grown over the past decade and is wider than it was in both 2016 and 2012. In 1994, a greater share of those with at least a college degree identified with or leaned toward the GOP than the Democratic Party (50% vs. 42%).

Among voters who do not have a four-year college degree, 47% say they identify with or lean toward the GOP compared with 45% who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party. The GOP has gradually made gains among non-college voters since an ebb for the standing of their party in 2007 and 2008.

There are distinctions in party identification among voters who have at least a four-year degree and those who have not completed college.

Voters with some postgraduate experience, in addition to a four-year college degree, are especially likely to associate with the Democratic Party. About six-in-ten voters with postgraduate experience (61%) identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, while just 33% associate with the Republican Party.

The Democratic Party’s advantage over the GOP is somewhat less pronounced among voters with a four-year college degree and no postgraduate experience (53% to 40%). However, both college graduates and postgraduates have seen comparable shifts toward the Democratic Party over the past 25 years.

Republicans hold a slight 48% to 44% edge in leaned party identification among voters with no more than a high school diploma. Among voters with some college experience but no four-year degree, the Republican Party runs about even with the Democratic Party. Both groups have moved toward the GOP over the past decade, though the shift has been slightly more pronounced among those with no more than a high school diploma than those with some college experience.

These shifts in partisan preferences have taken place as the educational makeup of all registered voters has undergone change. The share of all voters with a college degree has grown from 24% in 1994 to 35% today. The share with a high school degree or less education has fallen sharply over the past 25 years, from 48% to 33% of all registered voters. And there’s been a modest increase in the share of all voters with some college experience but no four-year degree (from 27% t0 33%).

Republican gains among those without a college degree are especially visible among white voters. As recently as 2007, white voters without a college degree were about evenly divided in their leaned party affiliation. Since then, the GOP has made clear gains among this group and now holds a 59% to 35% advantage over the Democratic Party.

By contrast, white voters with a college degree have moved decisively toward the Democratic Party, with significant changes occurring in just the last several years. In 2015, college-graduate white voters were equally likely to identify with or lean toward the GOP as the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party opened up a 4-point edge among this group in 2016, and that advantage has grown to 12 points in the current data (54% to 42%). This marks a reversal from 1994, when the GOP held a 54% to 38% advantage in leaned party identification among white voters with a college degree.

As a result of these contrasting trends, there is now a 19-point gap in the shares who identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party between white voters with a college degree and those without one (54% vs. 35%). In 1994, white voters without a college degree were 2 points more likely than those with a degree to associate with the Democratic Party (40% vs. 38%).

Much of the movement toward the Republican Party among white voters without a college degree has been driven by those with the lowest levels of education – voters with no more than a high school diploma. The GOP now enjoys a two-to-one advantage over the Democratic Party among white voters with no more than a high school diploma (62% to 31%). That represents a dramatic change from the end of the George W. Bush administration, when this group was about evenly divided in leaned party identification.

There has been less change among white voters with some college experience but no four-year degree. This group continues to tilt Republican, and the current balance of leaned party identification (56% to 38%) is similar to other points in the recent past.

Among white voters with a college degree, those with some postgraduate experience stand out for their strong Democratic orientation. Overall, 60% of white voters with postgraduate experience identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, compared with 36% who identify with or lean toward the GOP. Among white voters with a college degree but no postgraduate experience, 49% identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 46% identify with or lean toward the Republican Party.

Both groups have experienced similar shifts toward the Democratic Party over the past 25 years. In 1994, white voters with at least some postgraduate experience were about evenly divided between the GOP and the Democratic Party, while those with a four-year degree were significantly more Republican than Democratic (59% to 34%). Put another way, in 1994 white voters with postgraduate experience were 12 points more likely than whites with a college degree to associate with the Democratic Party; today that gap remains about the same (11 points).

In the past 10 years, both men and women without a college degree have edged toward the GOP in their leaned party affiliation. However, gender gaps among non-college voters persist: The Republican Party holds an advantage in leaned partisanship among men without a college degree (52% t0 40%), while the Democratic Party holds an edge among women without a college degree (51% to 42%).

While the partisan preferences of both men and women without a college degree have moved toward the GOP over the past decade, this marks a return to about the same levels of partisanship seen in 1994, as the Republican Party has regained ground it had lost between the late 1990s and end of the George W. Bush administration.

By contrast, men and women with a college degree are significantly more Democratic in their orientation than 25 years ago. Still, a wide gap in leaned party affiliation remains between college-educated men and women.

Among men with a college degree, 48% identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 46% of these voters identify with or lean toward the GOP. Among women with a college degree, the Democratic Party holds a wide 35-point advantage in leaned party affiliation (65% t0 30%).

Both groups are far more Democratic in their partisan preferences than in 1994, though the movement toward the Democratic Party has been slightly greater among women than men. Women voters with a college degree are 17 points more likely to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party than they were 25 years ago, while there has been a 10-point increase among men with a college degree.

The broader trends in leaned party affiliation by gender and education can be seen among white voters. In particular, white women with a college degree have moved sharply away from the GOP. While white men with a college degree have also moved away from the GOP, the sharper movement among college-graduate white women has expanded the partisan gap between the two groups.

In 1994, white men with a college degree were somewhat more likely than those without a college education to identify with or lean toward the GOP (59% to 55%). Over the past 25 years, white male voters with a four-year degree have moved away from the GOP, while those without a degree have moved toward the party. As a result, white men without a college degree are now 11 points more likely than those with a degree to associate with the GOP (62% to 51%).

This pattern is even more pronounced among white women. In 1994, white women voters with a college degree were 2 points more likely than those without one to identify with or lean toward the GOP (48% to 46%). Today, a majority of white women without a college degree (55%) identify with or lean to the GOP, compared with just 34% of white women with a four-year college education.

The current 21-point gap in GOP affiliation between white women with and without a college degree is larger than the 11-point education gap among white men.

In addition, the partisan gap between white men and women with a college degree is wide and has grown over time. Among voters with a college degree, white men are 17 points more likely than white women to identify with or lean toward the GOP. This gap was smaller (11 points) in 1994. The current gender gap among white college graduates is much wider than the 7-point difference in GOP affiliation between white men and women without a college degree.

Among nonwhite voters, while there is a gender gap, there is very little difference in the partisanship of either men or women by level of education. Between 1994 and 2010, nonwhite men with a college degree were slightly more Republican in their partisan leanings than those without a degree, but this gap has closed in recent years.
Generational divides in partisanship

Generation continues to be a dividing line in American politics, with Millennials more likely than older generations to associate with the Democratic Party. However, over the past few years the Democratic Party has lost some ground among Millennials, even as it has improved its standing among the oldest cohort of adults, the Silent Generation. Gen Xers and Baby Boomers have seen less change in their partisan preferences and remain closely divided between the two major parties. (Note: The youngest registered voters – those 18 to 23 in 2020 – are now members of Generation Z; however, due to the relatively small share of this generation in adulthood, this generational analysis does not include them.)

Overall, 54% of Millennial registered voters say they identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, compared with 38% who identify with or lean toward the GOP. In 2017, the Democratic Party held a wider 59% t0 32% advantage among this group. However, the Democratic Party’s standing with Millennials is about the same as it was at earlier points, including 2014.

Voters in the Silent Generation are now about equally likely to identify with or lean toward the GOP as the Democratic Party (49% to 48%). This marks a change from 2017, when the GOP held a 52% to 43% advantage in leaned party identification among the oldest voters. Still, the partisan leanings of Silent voters have fluctuated over the past few decades, and there have been other moments where the two parties ran about even – or the Democratic Party held a narrow advantage – since 1994.

Gen Xers and Baby Boomers are closely divided in their partisan leanings. Among Gen X voters, the Democratic Party holds a narrow 48% to 45% advantage in leaned party affiliation. Among Baby Boomer voters, 47% identify with or lean toward the GOP, while 46% identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party. Both generations have been about evenly split in their partisan leanings for most of the past decade.

When looking at straight party identification – and not taking the partisan leaning of independents into account – younger voters continue to be more likely to identify as independent than older voters. Among Millennials, 42% identify as independents, compared with 35% of Gen Xers, 30% of Baby Boomers and 25% of Silents.

Across all generations, women remain more likely than men to associate with the Democratic Party.

For instance, among Millennial voters, women are 12 points more likely than men to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party (60% to 48%). The gap between the shares of women and men who associate with the Democratic Party is 18 points among Gen Xers, 10 points among Baby Boomers and 7 points among Silents.

However, there have been notable shifts in leaned party affiliation within generations by gender in recent years.

Millennial women voters are 10 points less likely to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party than they were in 2017. While the Democratic Party still holds a wide 60% to 31% advantage among this group, it’s significantly smaller than it was in 2017 (70% to 23%), which was a high-water mark for the party among this group.

Millennial men have edged toward the GOP in recent years, but the shift in their leaned partisanship has been much smaller than among Millennial women.

Among Gen X voters, the partisan leanings of men and women have moved in opposite directions in the past few years. Gen X women are 3 points more likely to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party than they were in 2017, while Gen X men have become 4 points more likely to associate with the GOP. As a result, the gender gap in leaned Democratic Party affiliation between Gen X men and women has grown from 11 points in 2017 to 18 points in combined 2018-2019 data. And Gen X women are now almost as likely as Millennial women to associate with the Democratic Party (57% to 60%).

There has been little change in the partisan leanings of men and women Baby Boomers in recent years. Among Silent Generation voters, the Democratic Party has improved its standing somewhat with both men and women.

Across all generations, the Democratic Party now holds an edge among women in leaned party affiliation (though the size of their advantage is larger among younger than older generations). Among men, the GOP has an advantage among Gen Xers, Baby Boomers and Silents, but trails the Democratic Party in leaned party affiliation by 4 points among Millennial men.

As with voters overall, there are wide divides in leaned partisanship by race and ethnicity across generations.

White voters in all generations are significantly more likely to identify with or lean to the GOP than nonwhite voters. However, the size of the partisan gap by race and ethnicity is wider among older generations than among younger ones.

Among white Millennial voters, the Democratic Party holds a narrow 48% to 45% advantage in leaned party identification. A clear majority of nonwhite Millennials (64%) identify with or lean to the Democratic Party; just 26% identify with or lean to the GOP.

The Republican Party holds an advantage among white voters in older generations. Comparable majorities of white Gen X (54%), Baby Boomer (55%) and Silent (56%) voters identify with or lean toward the GOP.

Among nonwhite voters, about two-thirds or more identify with or lean to the Democratic Party. The size of the majority associating with the Democratic Party tends to be larger among older nonwhite generations than younger ones: 78% of Silents, 70% of Baby Boomers, 66% of Gen Xers and 64% of Millennials identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party.

As a result of these patterns, the gap in Democratic affiliation between white and nonwhite voters is 16 points among Millennial voters, but rises to 26 points among Gen Xers, 31 points among Baby Boomers and 37 points among Silents.
Religious divides in partisanship

Partisanship has become increasingly tied to religious identification over the past quarter century.

White evangelical Protestants have seen one of the largest moves toward the GOP over the past 25 years. In 1994, 61% of white evangelical Protestant voters leaned toward or identified with the Republican Party, while 31% leaned toward or identified with the Democratic Party. Today, the GOP has opened up an overwhelming 78% to 17% advantage in leaned partisanship among white evangelicals, making them the most solidly Republican major religious grouping in the country.

The GOP holds somewhat narrower advantages in leaned party identification among white non-evangelical Protestants (54% to 39%) and white Catholics (57% to 38%). Both groups of voters have moved toward the Republican Party over time, though the shift has been more pronounced among white Catholics.

Hispanic Catholics stand out from their white counterparts in their association with the Democratic Party. Roughly two-thirds of Hispanic Catholics (68%) identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party. The partisan leanings of Hispanic Catholics have not changed much in recent years.

Among those who do not affiliate with an organized religion, 67% identify with or lean to the Democratic Party, compared with just 24% who identify or lean toward the GOP. Religiously unaffiliated voters have been trending steadily toward the Democratic Party over the past few decades and represent a growing share of all registered voters (See Chapter 2 for more on the changing profile of the electorate).

Voters who attend religious services more frequently are generally more likely than those who attend less often to identify with or lean toward the Republican Party. This gap is especially pronounced among Jewish voters.

Overall, the Democratic Party holds a 68% to 27% advantage in leaned party identification over the GOP among all Jewish voters. However, nearly half (47%) of Jewish voters who attend religious services at least a few times a month identify with or lean toward the Republican Party, compared with a much smaller share (22%) of those who attend services less often.

This same pattern is seen among several other religious groups, including white evangelicals, though it is not as pronounced as among Jewish voters.

Eight-in-ten white evangelicals who attend religious services at least a few times a month associate with the GOP, compared with 70% of those who attend services less often. A similar sized gap exists among white Catholics.

Among other religious groups, there is little relationship between religious attendance and partisanship. Among both white non-evangelical Protestants and black Protestants, there are only small differences in partisanship between those who attend church monthly and those who attend less frequently.
Geographic divisions in partisanship

Voters living in urban counties and those living in rural counties have grown further apart in their partisan preferences over the last few decades.

Among voters living in urban counties, the Democratic Party holds a tw0-to-one advantage in leaned party identification (62% to 31%). By contrast, 58% of voters living in rural counties identify with or lean toward the GOP; 35% identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party.

In 1999, the first year for which Pew Research Center surveys have county-level data, rural counties were about evenly divided in their partisanship. Since then, GOP affiliation among voters in rural counties has increased 13 points, with much of this movement occurring over the past 10 years or so. Voters in urban counties already tilted Democratic in 1999 (53% to 35%); still, the Democratic Party’s standing among these voters has increased 9 points over the past two decades.

Voters in suburban counties are about evenly divided in their leaned party affiliation, as they have been for much of the past 20 years.

Across different regions of the country, voters living in urban counties are substantially more likely than those living in rural counties to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party.

For example, 72% of voters in the Northeast who live in urban counties associate with the Democratic Party, compared with 49% of Northeastern voters who live in rural counties.

Southern voters in urban counties are less likely than their Northeastern counterparts to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party (55% vs. 72%). Still, urban voters in the South are much more likely than rural Southern voters to align with the Democratic Party (55% vs. 33%).

While there is an urban-rural gap in leaned partisanship across regions, the trajectory of changes over time varies. For instance, the current gap in the South is far larger than it was 20 years ago and has been driven by a sharp move away from the Democratic Party among rural voters. In the Northeast, the urban-rural gap is roughly the same size as it has been for most of the past two decades, and rural voters there have become more likely to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party over time.



The changing composition of the electorate and partisan coalitions

The demographic profile of voters has changed in important ways over the past two decades. Overall, the electorate is getting older, and this is seen more among Republican voters than among Democrats.

In addition, the electorate, like the U.S. population, has become much more racially and ethnically diverse. This shift is reflected much more in the demographic profile of Democratic voters than among Republicans.

A majority of all registered voters (52%) are ages 50 and older. This is little changed from 2012 (51%), though is much higher than in 2004 (44%) or 1996 (41%).

The shares of both parties’ voters who are ages 50 and older have increased over the past two decades.

However, while a majority of Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters are ages 50 and older (56%), a smaller share of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters are in that age group (50%). In 1996, the age composition of the two parties looked more similar. Roughly four-in-ten voters in both parties were at least 50 years old (41% of Democrats, 39% of Republicans).

Nearly a quarter of voters (24%) are ages 65 and older, up from 20% eight years ago; by comparison, the share of voters who are under age 30 has remained relatively stable (17% currently). Voters who are 65 and older make up larger shares in both parties than do voters under age 30. However, the difference is much larger among Republican voters (25% are 65 and older, while 13% are under 30) than among Democrats (23% and 19%, respectively).

Over the past two decades, the median age of all voters has increased, from 44 in 1996 to 50 in 2019. Among Republicans, the median age has increased by nine years, from 43 to 52, while the median age of Democrats has risen from 45 to 49.
Electorate has become more ethnically diverse, better educated

Non-Hispanic white voters make up a steadily decreasing share of the electorate. In 1996, white non-Hispanics constituted an overwhelming majority (85%) of registered voters. Today, 69% of voters are non-Hispanic white. Over this period, the share of voters who are black, Hispanic or another race has risen from 15% to 30%.

Hispanic voters have nearly tripled since 1996 as a share of the electorate, and they make up 11% of all registered voters today, compared with 4% in 1996. Voters who describe their race as “other” have also become a larger share of the electorate, making up 8% of voters today, compared with just 1% of voters in 1996.

Black Americans make up 11% of registered voters, a similar share to 1996, when they were 9% of all registered voters.

The growing racial and ethnic diversity has changed the composition of both parties, but the change has been starker among Democrats.

While white registered voters make up a majority of the Democratic Party, their share has declined. In 1996, white voters constituted 76% of all Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters; today, they make up 59%. Four-in-ten Democratic voters are nonwhite, an increase from nearly one-in-four in 1996.

An overwhelming majority of Republican and Republican-leaning voters continue to be white. Today, whites make up roughly eight-in-ten (81%) Republican voters, down from 94% in 1996. Still, the share of nonwhite voters in the Republican Party has more than doubled in that time (6% in 1996, 17% in 2019).

The educational landscape of the U.S. has changed dramatically since 1996, when Bill Clinton was seeking his second term as president.

At that time, nearly half of registered voters (47%) had never attended college; another three-in-ten (29%) had some college experience but no four-year degree, and roughly a quarter (24%) had at least a four-year college degree.

Today, only 32% have never attended college, while another third have some college experience and no degree and 36% have at least a four-year degree.

The educational profile of Democratic voters has changed dramatically since 1996. At that time, voters with no college experience made up about half of Democratic voters (51%); today, just 28% have not attended college. The share of Democratic voters with at least a four-year degree has increased from 22% to 41%.

During the same period, the share of Republican voters with a four-year college degree is mostly unchanged (27% then to 30% today) and is down from 2012, when 34% of Republicans had a four-year college degree.

As a result, college graduates make up a much larger share of Democratic than Republican voters (41% vs. 30%). In 1996, Republican voters were more likely than Democrats to have at least a four-year degree (27% vs. 22%).

The rise in educational attainment among voters, combined with the growing ethnic diversity of the electorate, has had very different impacts on the Democratic and Republican coalitions.

In 1996, 63% of all registered voters, including majorities of Republicans (68%) and Democrats (58%), were whites who did not have a four-year college degree.

Since then, the share of non-college white voters has declined 20 percentage points. But while this group still constitutes a 57% majority of Republican voters – a share that has changed little since 2004 – non-college whites only make up 30% of Democratic voters.

The Democratic coalition is now a mix of non-college whites, whites with at least a four-year college degree (28%), nonwhites who have not completed college (also 28%) and nonwhites with at least a four-year degree (12%). The largest share of Republican voters are non-college whites (57%), followed by whites with a college degree (25%), nonwhites who do not have a degree (12%) and those who have completed college (4%).
Fewer voters identify as Christians as share who are religiously unaffiliated grows

The religious landscape of the United States has undergone major changes since 2008. As the share of registered voters who are religiously unaffiliated has increased, the share who identify as Christian has declined. More than one-quarter (28%) of voters identify as religiously unaffiliated today, up from 15% in 2008; those who identify as Christian decreased from 79% to 64% in that same period. (Data on religious affiliation dates to 2008; prior to that, Pew Research Center asked a different question about religious affiliation that is not directly comparable to its current measure.)

The largest declines among Christian voters have come from among white Christians. The shares of voters who are white evangelical Protestants (21% in 2008 vs. 18% today), white non-evangelical Protestants (19% vs. 13%) and white Catholics (17% vs. 12%) have all declined.

Religiously unaffiliated voters make up 38% of Democratic voters. This has roughly doubled since 2008, when this group made up 18% of Democrats. Over this period, the share of Democratic voters who are Christians has declined from 74% to 52%. White non-evangelical Protestants accounted for 17% of Democratic voters in 2008 but 11% today. There have also been similar declines in the shares of Democrats who are white evangelical Protestants, black Protestants and white Catholics.

White Christians continue to make up a large majority of Republican voters. White evangelical Protestants are about a third (32%) of Republican voters, unchanged from 2008. However, the shares who are white non-evangelical Protestants (22% in 2008 vs. 16% today) and white Catholics (18% vs. 15%) have decreased.

While religiously unaffiliated voters do not make up as large a share of Republicans as Democrats, they do make up a growing share of GOP voters. Today 15% of Republican voters do not identify with a religion, up from 9% in 2008.

Director
Rubén Weinsteiner

domingo, 7 de junio de 2020

While America Struggles for its Soul, Biden Struggles for Relevance


There are many voices who see the violence and despair sweeping America this spring as the natural result of everything President Donald Trump stands for—of his divisive language and policies and worldview.

It is easy to miss, but embedded in these condemnations is a perverse form of praise: The critics do not doubt the efficacy of Trumpian politics. To the contrary, the condemnations assign the president an undeniable agency. There is a clear link between ideas and consequences. People excoriate Trump, and in so doing ratify his relevance.

Relevance is the quality needed most urgently now by Joseph R. Biden Jr.

This is a moment that challenges more than his limited stylistic range. The obstacles for the former vice president are more daunting than the logistics of being housebound in a pandemic. The crisis calls into question the earnest, cheerful, incremental brand of progressivism that animated Biden’s career for a half-century.

The picture of American cities aflame across the continent, in response to what African Americans credibly regard as widespread police brutality and racism, is a soul-depleting return to an earlier age.

As it happens, it is an age the 77-year-old Biden knows well. He told an audience last year he decided to organize his life around politics during the violent traumas of 1968—the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, and the racial and anti-war riots that ensued across the country that spring and summer.

Biden’s own words make the year a useful prism for viewing both his present circumstances—even a few weeks ago they would have seemed beyond belief—and the broader premises on which a lifetime in politics have rested.

Biden was 25 years old for most of 1968, working as a clerk at a Delaware law firm. Forty years would pass, all but four of them in the U.S. Senate, until Biden was tapped as running mate by Barack Obama on his way to becoming the nation’s first African American president. There was an event that affirmed the essence of Biden’s steady, temperate liberalism—striking evidence that the system is on the level, that history moves toward light, that people of goodwill can overcome America’s original sin of racism.

Could Biden, or even Obama, possibly have imagined 12 years ago how perishable those gains would seem today? How profoundly many African Americans, and others, believe many institutions are simply not on the level and are not getting gradually better? And how, in such a climate, the voice of a divisive but omnipresent performer like Trump could make Biden seem almost inaudible in the storm?

As it happens, 1968 also offers another vivid example of a progressive but conventional politician out of step with the urgencies of the moment. Although Biden, like many Democrats of his generation, often invoked the Kennedys as a political figure, he more closely resembles another tragic leader of that time: Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey.

Humphrey that year was defending President Lyndon B. Johnson’s unpopular war in Vietnam, a problem Biden thankfully does not have. But like Biden (who later served with Humphrey in the Senate before his 1978 death), the vice president was a garrulous man whose personal decency and progressive instincts were genuine and widely respected, even by Republicans. And like Biden—at least as 2020 has unfolded so far—Humphrey had trouble finding the right emotional pitch during a year of national anguish.

When he announced his candidacy in late April 1968—a few weeks after King’s murder and not quite six weeks before Kennedy’s—he spoke of wanting to infuse his party with a “politics of joy.”

It was a line that flowed naturally from his own ebullient personality—and seemed shockingly disconnected to the country’s reality. Kennedy mocked him in reply: “It is easy to say this is the politics of happiness—but if you see children starving in the Delta of Mississippi and despair on the Indian reservations, then you know that everybody in America is not satisfied.”

Humphrey, who had been a leader on civil rights since the 1940s, would have regarded the problems of 2020 as at least a partial failure of his own legacy. Minneapolis—that genial, sensible, sturdy city which Humphrey once served as mayor—was the same place where Officer Derek Chauvin put his knee on George Floyd’s neck and wouldn’t take it off.

If changing circumstances have left Biden with trouble finding his voice, they of course also present him with new opportunities if he can find it. Here is a country simultaneously battling economic depression that, at least temporarily, evokes the 1930s and psychic depression—the result of rage disconnected from hope—that evokes the 1960s. Surely a man who has lived so much history has some lessons to offer.

The former vice president, wearing a mask and taking notes, met on Monday with African American religious leaders at the Bethel AME Church in his hometown of Wilmington, Del. It was his most extended in-person event in weeks.

He told the group that in coming weeks he would address the problems of “institutional structures” and “institutional racism” in a series of “very serious national speeches.”

Well, there’s something to wait for. Until then, if he wants to avoid sounding like Humphrey in 1968, Biden might do well to recall what he himself was thinking and feeling in that year of violence and fragility.


lunes, 1 de junio de 2020

TikTok: A Look at China’s #1 Up And Coming Social Media




TikTok, is the global version of a social media app released in September 2016 named Douyin. This music and video platform was created by the now famous Chinese internet technology company, ByteDance, an AI media company that has recently beaten Uber to become the most valuable startup worldwide.

TikTok describes itself as a “Global Video Community,” with users sharing and creating videos on nearly any topic you can imagine. The app includes a wide array of tools, filters, and music to make user-created videos appear incredibly professional, encouraging users to create content themselves and further engage with the platform.

TikTok was able to reach a major milestone last year with it becoming the most downloaded app on both The Google Play and Apple App Store, placing it above even Facebook and Instagram! So, what’s the secret behind this creative filming app rise over the past two years? Will it be able to keep up its growth with the platform now seeing over 250 million daily users in 2019?

What TikTok Has Accomplished Since its Release

App Store Rankings & Downloads

TikTok has had an incredible performance in terms of total downloads for an up and c0ming social media platform. One of the largest issues new social media platforms face is getting users to actually download and try the app. User acquisition is considered to be one of the most expensive forms of marketing, with many companies spending millions of dollars on marketing to acquire users.

TikTok and Douyin were no different, and it is well known that they spent an incredible sum of money marketing both TikTok and Douyin. However, their success has paid off with TikTok receiving the following achievements in 2018:

The most downloaded app in the Apple Store Q1 2019

No.6 of the most downloaded app globally Q1 2019

The most downloaded app on Google Play by November 2019








User Engagement On TikTok

Both TikTok and Douyin have managed to retain and engage their users effectively. While TikTok is still growing, Douyin has already achieved tremendous growth and has seen its daily active users skyrocket.

Within six months the DAU of Douyin grew 493.1% from 17.4 million in December 2017 to 103.2 million in June 2018. In June 2019 TikTok hit its next milestone with the Chinese version of the app seeing its DAU shoot up to over 250 million!

People also aren’t just watching videos, there is a ton of new content being uploaded to the platform. In its first year, Tik Tok saw over 1 million videos added to the platform per day!






So Who are TikTok’s Users?

The main users of TikTok and Douyin skew on the younger side with most users in their teens and mid-twenties. Geographically speaking, four-fifths of the total users are from mainland China, with the remaining fifth made up of users from around the world. Let’s take a look at a few statistics and what they tell us about TikTok and Douyin’s user base.

41% of users are aged 16 to 24

TikTok has a similar user base like Musical.ly due to the huge numbers of users brought over when the companies merged in August 2018. Musical.ly also had a very young user base so so this was likely a significant contributing factor.

66% of users are females on Douyin

66.4% of users on Douyin are females, presenting a good opportunity for brands looking to target younger female users for advertising. There’s a wide range of content specifically catered toward female users on the platform. Many of the more popular KOLs on TikTok are also female.







The Daily Usage Of TikTok Among Users 14-22 Years Old Is Over 1.5 Hours/Day

This is a bit of a scary statistic, but it shows how engaged younger users have become on the TikTok platform. Few social media platforms are able to match these kinds of numbers. With this much time spent on the platform, it’s likely these users have very little time for other apps and social media channels, meaning that if this is your target audience it might be your best option.

What are TikTok’s Unique Features?

A Full-Screen Vertical Viewing Experience

TikTok’s entire user interface is built around the vertical screen, with users never needing to flip their phones into a horizontal position. From a psychological standpoint, the full-screen video experience allows users to connect with the creator and feel as if they are a part of the video themselves.



A Massive Music Library At Your Disposal

Users creating videos on the platform have access not only to filters and editing tools but also the ability to add music to their videos. On the”discover” page, TikTok provides users with a diverse choice of music that you can use as background music in your videos.

This is one feature that makes TikTok truly unique as compared to Western social media apps like Snapchat, Facebook, or Instagram. None of these platforms allow users to add music to their videos, giving TikTok a serious advantage for short video creati0n.



Special Effects and Filters Let You Create Like a Professional



It might seem like every app has its own set of special effects and filters nowadays. However, the variety of special effects that you can use in your videos on TikTok is amazing. There are way more than you can find on other apps like Snapchat or Instagram, and more are being added all the time!

All of these options give users the ability to create unique and interesting content without investing massive amounts of time or requiring a high degree of skill. While it isn’t a professional photo/video editing app, it gives everyday users the power to create unique, creative, and engaging content!


TikTok’s Recommendation Algorithm

Automatic recommendations and newsfeeds are essential parts of social media apps, both in China and abroad. Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Weibo, and WeChat, all have developed algorithms to serve users with content based on their interests and internet activity.

However, the algorithm on TikTok works differently in that it gives you a playlist based on your past behavior, but it also includes popular and trending videos that you might not see to ensure you know what’s going on throughout the platform.




TikTok’s Daily Challenge System

TikTok recognized that they needed to keep their audiences engaged. However, they recognized that the average user often doesn’t have enough ideas or materials for shooting videos. TikTok solved this difficult problem with a brilliant idea, the daily challenge system.

Most of the challenges are very interesting, like the face-changing challenge, the dancing in public area challenge, wall squat challenge, etc. Below you can see the “Karmas a Bitch” challenge. TikTok’s algorithm also gives more reach to users participating in challenges increasing the likelihood that users can go viral.

There is usually a wide variety of challenges going on at any one time on the platform, giving users both a choice and ideas for what to create in their videos.



If a user achieves the top rank on one of these challenges it’s likely they’ll receive thousands of likes and comments from other users. However, it isn’t easy to achieve the top rank with so many participants. Creating a video to meet the challenge requires a significant investment of time, energy, and creativity to film and edit your own 15-second video.

The difficulty and the chance of reward for challenges on TikTok is one reason users keep coming back for more!

#2 Why is TikTok So Popular?

Let’s take a few psychological factors into account to understand how TikTok attracts and retains its users. There are five primary reasons TikTok’s users can’t seem to stay away from the app!


1. Unpredictable & Unique Content




The unpredictable videos hosted on TikTok are designed to surprise you and make you keep watching without thinking about how much time has passed. The unpredictable videos on its curated playlists give users a feeling of a reward when they discover something new and unique. This keeps users hunting for good videos and encourages them to keep swiping and stay within the app.

Even when the videos don’t match the user’s expectations they only last 15 seconds, making users more willing to continue the search for better content rather than giving up. This minimizes the negative feelings associated with seeing poor content while still providing positive feelings when users find content that matches their interests.

2. Automatic Play



A unique feature of TikTok is that videos continue playing without any interaction from the user. As long as the app is open videos will continue playing. The design of TikTok is it can automatically play videos by itself as long as you open the app.

With videos being only 15 seconds, it’s very easy for users to simply keep watching. With videos starting and ending so quickly it’s very easy to watch video after video with users having little to no concept of how long they’ve been watching.

Before you can even find out what you want to do next, another video has already started encouraging you to just keep watching rather than take some other action.


3. The Zeigarnik Effect



The Zeigarnik effect is a psychological term that describes how people tend to remember incomplete or interrupted tasks with greater detail and how incomplete actions create a form of tension that can only be relieved upon the task’s completion. Since the length of every TikTok videos is only 15 seconds users get the feeling that their video watching experience was not complete.

The Zeigarnik Effect encourages the user to keep watching to complete their experience in the app and remember each short video in greater detail. Users will also often repeat videos until they are fully able to comprehend what they just watched.

While The Zeigarnik Effect can have a positive influence by causing people to feel nervous due to their inability to finish a task and motivate them to complete it, it can also turn put people into a state of near-unlimited procrastination, encouraging people to sideline more important life tasks to keep watching videos on TikTok.

4. Craving for likes











Likes and engagement from other users on TikTok grant a sense of accomplishment to not only the receivers but also the givers. Getting likes from other users can increase a user’s satisfaction and bring about a sense of approval for their actions. The design of the like button on TikTok is right below the profile picture of the user, giving the users the illusion that they are directly rewarding the user for their content.

Hitting the like button also triggers a dancing heart animation on the screen which triggers a positive emotion for the givers and encourages them to like other user’s content and communicate with other users on the platform.

The adorable design of a dancing heart showing on the screen promotes the positive emotion to the like givers to be more willing to giving like giving a compliment and a way of communication to other people on this social platform.


#3. Too Popular, Too Fast: TikTok’s Fumbles in the US and India


Along with all the excitement and entertainment TikTok has brought to their users, and the attention and profits it has gained all over the world, TikTok has also faced some negative pushback from governments and parents alike. Social media apps have long been plagued with problems of cyber-bullying, privacy, and confidentiality.

TikTok faced one major challenge in the U.S. when the US Federal Trade Commission found that the app was illegally collecting underaged children’s private information (names, email addresses, and geographic locations.) In truth, most of the violations were perpetrated by Musical.ly, but since its merger with Bytedance, the blame was shifted to TikTok. Bytedance was fined USD $5.7 million by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which was the highest fine ever recorded for illegally collecting personal information on children in the U.S.



Another incident occurred in India, one of TikTok’s largest markets in terms of users (making up around 27% of TikTok’s downloads in 2018). One of the issues TikTok has faced with its platform is the prevalence of users uploading pornographic or generally “risqué” content.


Given its popularity with younger demographics, the Indian government saw this as a major issue. A High Court in Madras requested the app to be banned for “encouraging pornography.” The court ordered the app removed from both the Google Play and Apple App stores. However, the ban was short-lived with TikTok being reinstated to the app stores one month after the ban.





For more on why the app was removed check out Timeline of TikTok Controversy: Major Events That Led To Removal Of TikTok App From Play Store, App Store and for its reinstatement and reaction to the situation read this article from Techcrunch: Indian court lifts ban on TikTok in India


However, all these controversies have not been able to stop TikTok and it has continued to grow into 2019. Now that you’ve gotten a complete picture, let’s take a look at how to use TikTok for Business!


#4. 3 Examples Of Brands Using TikTok Marketing

If you know your customers well enough and have an awesome creative marketing team behind you it should be easy for you to adapt to TikTok. A huge number of brands are jumping on the TikTok hype train and beginning to use it for marketing.

F&B companies, like Haidilao and CoCo Milk Tea, Sports Companies, like Adidas Neo, and even luxury brands are beginning to use TikTok for marketing. Before stressing out on where to start, let’s take a look at some real examples of marketing on TikTok to give you some ideas.

1. Adidas Neo


A subsidiary of Adidas started marketing on TikTok to catch young people’s attention. Within a month, Adidas Neo has gained millions of followers on TikTok. The total views of its videos are over 1.5 billion and it earned over 2.8 million likes, subscriptions, and comments within this short period of time. So, what strategies did they use for marketing on TikTok?

->Collaboration with Celebrities and KOLs
->Promoting interaction between users and the brand

If you go to the TikTok page of Adidas Neo, you will see some very recognizable and popular celebrities in Mainland China in its videos advertising the products. The influence of these celebrities was powerful enough to bring millions of business opportunities to Adidas Neo.

However, the cost of paying for this advertisement was certainly not cheap! Moreover, besides the smart usage of celebrities, the styles of the videos were incredibly important. Some KOLs in China charge over RMB 300,000/video, and given that these were some top tier celebrities this campaign was certainly pretty expensive. Adidas Neo was criticized by some users for essentially just creating a standard advertising campaign and not fully making use of the functions available on TikTok.

Many users complained that these videos could have been posted on any social media platform and were not specifically created for TikTok’s audience. There are a ton of special effects, filters, and styles in TikTok to use when filming, and using them encourages other users to try and replicate the videos and further engage with the campaign.


2. Haidilao


Haidilao is an incredibly popular restaurant in China known for its Sichuan flavored hotpot and top-tier service. The viral video that went on fire on TikTok of Haidilao showed innovative ways to eat Hot Pot in Haidilao.


Users started mimicking and creating their own new ways of eating Haidilao, which resulted in more customers going to Haidilao in order to participate in the campaign. Here are the three strengths of Haidilao used for marketing on TikTok:

->Inspired user curiosity and encouraged participation

->Easy to imitate and get attention

->More natural than a standard advertisement

Bringing entertainment into meals can be extremely beneficial for businesses in the food and beverage industry. Ultimately, Haidilao got pretty quite lucky with this campaign going so viral, but their recognition of the trend helped propel it to greater heights.




3. Michael Kors

The worldwide boutique company, Michael Kors, is a great example of how to use TikTok to access the Chinese market and increase its brand awareness among younger consumers. Michael Kors created a challenge on TikTok and within just a week the challenge attracted 30 thousand users on TikTok to participate, gaining over 200 million views and 8.5 million likes on TikTok. Here are the three strategies Michael Kors to craft its successful campaign.

->Create challenges to increase interaction with users

->Use the influence of KOL on generating its popularity

->Cooperate with TikTok official to create its own Michael Kors stickers


Never underestimate the influence KOLs have on Chinese social media. KOLs on TikTok helped the Michael Kors campaign reach millions of users’ attention on TikTok. Moreover, with the customized stickers that could be used as special effects filters when making their videos, it increased the likelihood that users would recognize the Michael Kors brand and its products.

However, KOLs can be expensive so this might not be the right strategy for every kind of business. Do your research before working with KOLs! For more information on KOL Marketing check out this post:


#5. How To Use TikTok For Business

7 Key Methods for Marketing on TikTok

Every kind of business has its own methods for selling their products and promoting them effectively. However, businesses should always be open to experimenting with new strategies to see what delivers the highest ROI. Below we’ll cover seven methods you can use for marketing on TikTok, how to create a great short video, and how TikTok has linked up with popular e-commerce platforms Taobao and T-Mall to help drive e-commerce sales.


1. Showcase Your Products Through Short Video

If your products are cutting-edge and visually appealing using TikTok can be quite an easy experience. Short videos give brands a chance to show off their products without being overly pushy, spammy, or annoying. A well-crafted short video that clearly outlines the benefits of a given product and stands out from other advertisements can have an incredibly strong effect. This has been a common practice among brands and influencers on the Chinese version of TikTok, Douyin.





2. Add a Little Pizazz

Making sure that users understand what you are selling is essential. However, a little flashiness and differentiation is also incredibly important in helping you stand out from a crowd. Below we see a video of a user bragging about the capacity of their car by showing how many people can be seated within the car. While not an advertisement this video shows how a little exaggeration and flashiness can bring attention to the useful features of the product. With only 15 seconds to market your products, exaggerating a bit can help highlight the benefits and features of your products.


3. Inspire Curiosity and Drive Engagement


One of the best methods for getting noticed on TikTok is to provide unique, interesting, and engaging content. Lifehacks particularly tend to do very well on the platform, as you’ll see in our case study of how Haidilao encouraged users to show how they eat hot pot on TikTok.

This campaign went viral and encouraged other users to participate and try some of the methods other users shared, resulting in tons of customers flocking to Haidilao restaurants across China. Businesses should always strive to engage their audiences as this increases the chances of a campaign going viral and dramatically expanding its reach on the platform.





4. Product Placement


This is an old marketing tactic that is still effective today. Since movies first became popular brands have always wanted to place their products throughout the production to increase brand awareness and drive sales. Just like its previous use, brands can place products throughout videos on TikTok. This method is less direct than the traditional advertorials done by KOLs in China, where they directly encourage users to buy a product.

This is less intrusive and has a little negative impact on the user experience, making it one of the safer advertising methods. However, simply placing your product in the background or somewhere not noticeable, there is a chance users might not even notice it at all. If this is the strategy you plan to use, make sure your product is somewhere noticeable at the very least since users only have 15 seconds to fully take in the surroundings of the video.

Filming people lined up in front of your store to buy your products, reviews from people who have been using your products, or showing the excitement of people who just bought your products after an hour waiting in a queue can all be the effective word of mouth marketing strategies. An example of a company using this strategy on TikTok is “Answer Tea.”



6. Cross-Promotion

If you have already started marketing your products on other social media platforms or have developed your reputation in other markets, it could be a good strategy to try promoting your products again on TikTok. Given that the audience on TikTok is quite different from other social media platforms you’ll have the potential to open your brand up to a completely new market.

Every platform has its own main users, with TikTok’s being teenagers and those in their mid-twenties. If there’s any chance this demographic could convert into customers for your business marketing on TikTok is certainly worth a try! Brands can even repurpose content from other channels and convert them into short videos for use on TikTok.







7. Be Human!

With the market getting more and more competitive, consumers nowadays not only care about the quality of your products or the services you provide but also your company values. Showcasing your values or company culture makes a brand seem more human which can have a big impact on building trust among Chinese consumers.

You can start by sharing how your products are made, some funny and interesting conversations around the office, company events, or what the day-to-day is like in the brand offices.



TikTok E-Commerce: Driving Sales Through Short Video


In March 2018, TikTok’s parent company Bytedance signed a partnership agreement with China’s largest E-Commerce Provider Alibaba. After the partnership, a shopping cart logo was added to the profile of TikTok certain high-profile user’s profiles allowing them to sell products directly on the platform. The feature was originally only made available to users with more than 1 million followers on the platform.


Through clicking the shopping cart users can purchase goods on Taobao and Tmall without leaving the app! This provides a seamless experience for brands and KOLs to promote and sell products on TikTok!



In December of 2018, TikTok significantly lowered the barrier to entry for the shopping cart function by allowing users with over 8,000 followers and 10 stores to link their Taobao/T-Mall accounts and start selling on the platform. It lowered the barrier again in April to only 3,000 fans! This has been wildly successful to the point that there are now over 1 million users on TikTok that have activated the shopping cart function according to China Internet Watch!


However, selling on TikTok isn’t all easy. TikTok is first an foremost an entertainment app, so purchase intention is not incredibly high on the platform. Live-Streaming apps, in theory, should be much more effective for driving sales as the host has the ability to actually sell the product. Short videos need to be created with the goal of entertaining the user rather than promoting a product, which can make it a bit more difficult to drive product sales.

To see what the purchasing experience is like check the video below to see how a user can purchase on TikTok (ignoring the weird domestic violence). After watching the video the user can click further into the account, click the shopping cart and go directly to the creator’s Taobao store.



Selling on TikTok requires significant investment in the creation of good and entertaining content to attract a large audience given it’s theorized lower conversion rates. TikTok is also mostly used for those selling products that are suited towards impulse purchases rather than high-end products, so be sure to note that before investing in the platform. It will be interesting to see how brands make use of TikTok for the Double 11 shopping holiday in 2019!


Lu Zhenwang, CEO of Wangquing Consultancy, a consulting firm focusing on e-commerce and digital companies, stated that “Short video has become a powerful force in China’s social scene by providing 15-second entertainment to grab mobile users’ attention. It can be a strong weapon for e-commerce, especially for Alibaba and Tencent, which want to reach to younger consumers and those living in smaller cities.”






How to Create a High-Quality Short Video on TikTok





While the seven methods above are all great strategies for promoting your products the most important factor is creating high-quality videos that can truly captivate your audience.




Be Unique!



Being unique is incredibly important on TikTok, with users watching 15-second video after 15-second video it can be hard to stand out from other competitors. Being creative and unique encourages users to want to give a challenge, product, or service a try despite potential consequences. TikTok users come to the app to have fun, and being unique is one sure-fire way to entertain your viewers.





For example, when was the last time you saw someone playing piano underwater? The video below is very unique which is why it was able to go viral. While it wasn’t promoting a specific brand or working with a company the video captured user attention effectively. To promote on TikTok you need to keep in mind why users are on the platform and how to stand out from the competition.


Don’t Get Too Complicated

One of the strengths and differences of TikTok comparing to other social media platforms is the ability for users to mimic o produce more videos on TikTok. There are many videos on TikTok that utilize fancy and professional film editing, special effects, and filters. While these videos are amazing, the time and effort needed to make videos like this are way too difficult for the majority of TikTok’s users. Therefore, many of the most popular videos are relatively simple, allowing other users to replicate the videos and increase campaign participation!


Expandable


Being expandable means once you have your original idea to show on TikTok, users are able to expand on your idea to generate more and more videos about the original idea. Expandable campaigns can easily go viral if they get enough traction and allow users to truly engage with your brand.


For example, Jimmy Fallon created the #TumbleweedChallenge with his original idea he made in the video. After posting hundreds or thousands of his fans did the same challenge and included the hashtag, causing it to go viral on the global version of TikTok.