jueves, 6 de diciembre de 2018

Teens’ Social Media Habits and Experiences


Teens credit social media for helping to build stronger friendships and exposing them to a more diverse world, but they express concern that these sites lead to drama and social pressure

 
(Hero Images/Getty Images)

Amid growing concern over social media’s impact and influence on today’s youth, a new Pew Research Center survey of U.S. teens finds that many young people acknowledge the unique challenges – and benefits – of growing up in the digital age.

Today, social media use is nearly universal among teens.1 While notable shares say they at times feel overwhelmed by the drama on social media and pressure to construct only positive images of themselves, they simultaneously credit these online platforms with several positive outcomes – including strengthening friendships, exposing them to different viewpoints and helping people their age support causes they care about.

Roughly eight-in-ten teens ages 13 to 17 (81%) say social media makes them feel more connected to what’s going on in their friends’ lives, while around two-thirds say these platforms make them feel as if they have people who will support them through tough times. And by relatively substantial margins, teens tend to associate their social media use with positive rather than negative emotions, such as feeling included rather than excluded (71% vs. 25%) or feeling confident rather than insecure (69% vs. 26%).

Young people also believe social media helps teens become more civically minded and exposes them to greater diversity – either through the people they interact with or the viewpoints they come across. Roughly two-thirds of teens say these sites help people their age interact with individuals from diverse backgrounds, find different points of view or show their support for causes or issues. And they see digital environments as important spaces for youth to connect with their friends and interact with others who share similar interests. For example, 60% of teens say they spend time with their friends online on a daily or nearly daily basis, and 77% say they ever spend time in online groups and forums.

The survey also illustrates the ways in which teens navigate social norms around what – and how often – they post to these sites. It is much more common for young people to post about their accomplishments or family life than to discuss their personal problems or political beliefs on social media. And while Millennials – some of whom are just older than teens – have been deemed the “selfie generation,” roughly half of today’s teens say they rarely (25%) or never (26%) post selfies on social media.

For some teens, sharing their life online can come with added social burdens: Around four-in-ten say they feel pressure to only post content on social media that makes them look good to others (43%) or share things that will get a lot of likes or comments (37%).

At the same time, the online environment for today’s teens can be hostile and drama-filled – even if these incidents may fall short of more severe forms of cyberbullying. Some 45% of teens say they feel overwhelmed by all the drama on social media, with 13% saying they feel this way “a lot.” And a similar share of teens (44%) say they often or sometimes unfriend or unfollow others on social media. When asked why they’ve digitally disconnected from others, 78% of this group report doing so because people created too much drama, while 52% cite the bullying of them or others.

These are some of the key findings from the Center’s survey of 743 teens, ages 13 to 17, conducted March 7-April 10, 2018. Throughout the report, “teens” refers to those ages 13 to 17.


Teens and their experiences on social media

Social media has given teens the ability to instantly connect with others and share their lives through photos, videos and status updates. Teens themselves describe these platforms as a key tool for connecting and maintaining relationships, being creative, and learning more about the world. But they also must contend with more negative aspects of social media use, such as drama and bullying or feeling pressure to present themselves in a certain way.

Teens post about a range of topics on social media, with posts about their accomplishments or family playing an especially prominent role

While about half of teens post their accomplishments on social media, few discuss their religious or political beliefsOlder girls especially likely to post a variety of subjects on social mediaWhen asked what topics they post about on social media, roughly half of teens say they post about their accomplishments on social media, while 44% say they post about their family. Around one-third (34%) say they share things related to their emotions and feelings on these sites, while 22% report posting about their dating life. Relatively few teens – around one-in-ten – say they share things related to their personal problems or their religious or political beliefs on social media.
There are some age and gender differences in the topics teens share on social media. Older teens are more likely than their younger counterparts to post about their romantic relationships: 26% of teens ages 15 to 17 say they post about their dating life on social media, compared with 16% of 13- to 14-year-olds.
Meanwhile, girls are more likely than boys to say they post about their family (53% vs. 36%), their emotions and feelings (40% vs. 29%) or their religious beliefs (14% vs. 7%). And older girls are especially likely to post about a variety of subjects – including their dating lives, their family, their emotions and their religious or political beliefs, compared with older boys or younger teens.

Selfies may be popular on social media, but around half of teens say they rarely or never post these images

Although the proliferation of smartphones has given teens the ability to constantly share different aspects of their lives, this survey finds that many teens regularly forego posting selfies, videos or other updates of their lives to social media.
selfies and things only their closest friends would understand, but relatively few say they do this oftenSome 45% of teens say they often or sometimes post selfies on social media, with 16% saying they do this often. Similar shares of teens say they at least sometimes post things only their closest friends would understand (50%), updates on where they are or what they’re doing (42%) or videos they’ve recorded (41%). A smaller share of teens report regularly posting things that they want to go viral (29%). Notably, in each instance close to half or more of teens say they rarely or never share these types of posts on social media.
There is some demographic variation in the types of content teens say they post to social media. Girls are much more likely than boys to post selfies: Six-in-ten girls say they often or sometimes do this, compared with 30% of boys. And while two-thirds of black teens and about half (51%) of Hispanic teens report regularly sharing selfies on social media, that share drops to 39% among white youth. Black teens are also much more likely than whites to say they at least sometimes post things they want to go viral (41% vs. 25%).

Teens generally believe social media helps deepen friendships and are more likely to equate their social media use with positive emotions – but this positivity is far from unanimous

Most teens say social media better connects them to their friends' lives and feelings, but some also feel overwhelmed by the drama on these sitesA central conversation surrounding social media and young people is the impact these platforms may be having on the emotional well-being of teens. A majority of teens believe social media has had a positive impact on various aspects of their lives, the survey finds. Fully 81% of teens say social media makes them feel more connected to what’s going on in their friends’ lives, with 37% saying it makes them feel “a lot” more connected. Similarly, about seven-in-ten teens say these sites make them feel more in touch with their friends’ feelings (69%), that they have people who will support them through tough times (68%), or that they have a place to show their creative side (71%).
But although sizable shares of teens encounter positive experiences on social media, some report encountering drama or feeling pressure to present themselves in a certain way. Some 45% of teens say they feel overwhelmed by all the drama on social media, while roughly four-in-ten say they feel pressure to only post content that makes them look good to others or that will get lots of comments or likes. Others believe social media has had a negative impact on their self-esteem: 26% of teens say these sites make them feel worse about their own life. Still, just 4% of teens indicate these platforms make them feel “a lot” worse about their life.
Teens are more likely to say social media makes them feel more included and confident rather than excluded or insecureThe survey also presented teens with four pairs of words and asked them to choose the sentiment that most closely matches how they feel when using social media. In each instance, teens are more likely to associate their social media use with generally positive rather than negative feelings. By relatively large margins, teens indicate that social media makes them feel included rather than excluded (71% vs. 25%), confident rather than insecure (69% vs. 26%), authentic rather than fake (64% vs. 33%) and outgoing rather than reserved (61% vs. 34%).
Interestingly, there are few demographic differences on these questions. For example, teen boys and girls are similarly likely to view their social media use in these ways, as are older and younger teens.

Roughly four-in-ten teens say they regularly unfriend or unfollow people on social media – citing drama as their most common reason for doing so

44% of teens say they at least sometimes unfriend or unfollow people on social media …Just as relationships get forged and reinforced on social media, friendships can turn sour and require teens to prune their friend or follower lists. More than four-in-ten teens (44%) say they at least sometimes unfriend or unfollow people on social media, including 14% who say they do this often. But a somewhat larger share of teens say they engage in this behavior relatively sparingly. Just over half of young people report that they rarely (39%) or never (14%) unfriend or unfollow people on social media.
Teens who at least sometimes unfriend or unfollow people provide several reasons for deleting people from their friend lists on social media. But by far the most common reason (mentioned by 78% of teens who engage in this behavior) is that the person in question is simply creating too much drama.
In addition, more than half of these teens (54%) say they have unfriended or unfollowed someone because that person posted too much or too often, and a similar share disconnected from someone because the person bullied them or others.
A smaller share of these teens say they unfollow others because they act differently online than in person (43%) or post political views they disagree with (22%).
In general, girls are more active than boys at disconnecting from others on social media. Roughly half of girls (52%) say they at least sometimes unfriend or unfollow people, compared with 35% of boys. And girls are nearly twice as likely as boys to say they often unfriend or unfollow people on these platforms (18% vs. 10%). But among youth who do engage in this practice, boys and girls largely do so for similar reasons – with one exception. Boys are more likely than girls to say they’ve unfriended or unfollowed someone because that person posted too much or too often (67% of boys who regularly unfriend say this vs. 46% of girls).

Majorities of teens say social media helps them find different points of view and show support for causes, while fewer think of these sites as a source of trustworthy information

Majorities of teens say social media helps peers talk to a diverse group of people, support causes; fewer think it helps teens find trustworthy informationMajorities of teens believe social media helps people their age diversify their networks, broaden their viewpoints and get involved with issues they care about. Roughly two-thirds of teens say social networking sites helps teens at least some to interact with people from different backgrounds (69%), while a similar share credits social media with helping teens find different points of view (67%) or helping teens show their support for causes or issues (66%).
But much like older generations, relatively few teens think of social media platforms as a source of trustworthy information. Overall, 37% of teens think that social media helps people their age find trustworthy information – and only 7% think these sites help “a lot” in that respect.
Older teens are more likely than their younger peers to believe social media helps teens interact with people from various backgrounds. Fully 76% of 15-to 17-year-olds say this, compared with 59% of those ages 13 to 14. By a slightly lesser margin, older teens are more likely to say these platforms help people their age find diverse viewpoints (71% of older teens say this, vs. 60% of younger teens). Meanwhile, teens of all ages are similarly skeptical about social media’s role as a source of trustworthy information.

Only minorities of teens regularly restrict access to their social media posts to prevent parents or other people from seeing the content

Among teens, deleting or restricting their social media posts is relatively uncommonWhile some youth play an active role in controlling the content they see in their social media feeds and preventing various figures of authority from viewing what they post there, a large share of teens rarely curate their online presence in this way.
At a broad level, 46% of teens say they at least sometimes organize their feeds to only see certain types of content, although just 15% say they do this often. Indeed, 29% of teens say they never organize their social feeds in this way.
It is even rarer for teens to delete or restrict access to their posts because they might be seen by their parents or negatively impact them in the future. Just one-third of teens say they often or sometimes delete or restrict access to things they share on social media because they are concerned it could negatively impact them later in life. And about three-in-ten teens say they delete or restrict posts because they don’t want their parents to view them. In both cases, only around one-in-ten young people say they do this often – and a plurality says they never do so.
There are also few demographic differences in deleting or restricting social media posts because it could negatively impact them in the future or because they don’t want their parents to see what they’ve posted. But there are some age differences when it comes to taking steps to organize social media feeds. Older teens are more likely than their younger peers to say they regularly organize their feed in this way (51% of 15- to 17-year-olds do this vs. 37% of those ages 13 to 14).


Teens, friendships and online groups
Friendship is a crucial part of adolescence. Teens explore friendships to navigate their identity and their role in society. This survey finds that about half of U.S. teens (51%) see themselves as someone who tends to fit in “pretty easily” among their peers, while an almost identical share (48%) says they tend to stand out. But regardless of how they perceive their relationship with others their age, majorities of teens say they have at least one person they consider to be a close friend and keep in touch with a broader circle of friends regularly – both online and offline.
Meanwhile, about six-in-ten teens have at least one close friend of a different racial or ethnic background, or who is a different gender from them. Teens also identify online groups and forums as an important part of their social lives, and as spaces where they can meet new people and receive support to cope with tough times.

Majorities of teens have a close friend of a different gender or a different race or ethnicity

Roughly six-in-ten teens say they have a close friend of a different gender or a different race or ethnicityFully 98% of teens say they have one or more close friends: 78% say they have between one and five close friends, while 20% have six or more close friends. Just 2% of teens say they do not have anyone they consider a close friend.
Similar majorities extend across various demographic groups. However, there is some variation on this question based on household income. Teens from lower-income families (those earning less than $30,000 a year) are significantly more likely than teens in other income groups to report that they do not have any close friends (7% of lower-income teens say this, compared with 1% of teens from higher-income households). By the same token, teens from households earning more than $75,000 per year are more than twice as likely as low-income teens to say they have more than five close friends (24% vs. 11%).
Teens typically point to their school as an important venue for making friends – 87% say they have a close friend from their school. Today’s teens are a part of the most racially and ethnically diverse generation in American history, and this reality is reflected in the fact that six-in-ten teens report having a close friend who is of a different racial or ethnic background than they are. A similar share of teens (61%) identify someone of a different gender as a close friend, and close to half (46%) say they have a close friend of a different religion.
Despite the prominence of school as a venue for friend formation, teens’ friendships are not confined to school campuses or local neighborhoods. Around one-third (35%) of teens say they have a close friend who lives far away, while 15% say they have a close friend they first met online.
The likelihood of forming online friendships varies by the educational level of a teen's parentIn some cases, the nature of teens’ friendships varies little based on their demographic characteristics. For instance, white, black and Hispanic teens are equally likely to say they have a close friend of a different race or ethnicity. Similarly, comparable shares of boys and girls have a close friend of a different gender. But in other cases, these differences are more prominent. Most notably, white teenagers (52%) are significantly more likely than blacks (25%) to report that they have a close friend with a different religious background. And mixed-gender friendships are more common among older teens: 67% of teens ages 15 to 17 have a close friend of a different gender, compared with 52% of teens ages 13 to 14.
Looking specifically at the role of the internet in the formation of close friendships, the likelihood of a teen developing a close friendship with someone they first met online varies by a number of factors. Teens ages 15 to 17 are more likely than those 13 to 14 to say they have a close friend they first met online (18% vs. 11%). These online-first friendships are also more common among teens whose parent holds a high school diploma or less (24%) than among teens whose parent has a bachelor’s or advanced degree (9%). And teens who use the internet “almost constantly” are more likely than those who go online several times a day or less to have formed a close friendship with someone they first met online (23% vs. 9%).2 (For details on other demographic differences, see Appendix.)

Teens are more likely to spend time with their friends online on a daily basis than to do so in person

This survey explored the way teens interact with their friends apart from school activities or those directly related to school. Sizable majorities of teens spend at least one day per week with their friends online (88%) or in person (77%). But when it comes to daily interactions with their friends, teens are much more likely to report that those interactions take place online. Six-in-ten teens say they spend time with their friends online every day or almost every day, compared with 24% who spend time with their friends in person with the same frequency (not including school or school-related activities).
Six-in-ten teens spend time with their friends online on a daily or near-daily basisDespite the relative infrequency of their in-person interactions with friends, a majority of teens (57%) say they spend about the right amount of time with their friends face-to-face. But roughly one-third of teens (36%) think they have too little face-to-face time with their friends. A small share (just 7%) believe they spend too much time seeing their friends in real life.
The largest shares of teens in a variety of demographic groups indicate they spend about the right amount of time with their friends in person. Nonetheless, many teens who see their friends on a less-than-daily basis express a desire for more time together in person. Just 17% of teens who get together with friends on a daily basis say they spend too little time together – but that share rises to 42% among teens who get together with friends less often.
Some critics have argued that the internet and social media are to blame for teens’ diminishing real-life interactions with others. But teens themselves point to a variety of reasons for why they do not spend more time with their friends in person. The most common of these (cited by 41% of teens) is that teens themselves report they simply have too many other obligations to find time to hang out with friends. Meanwhile, 34% say their friends are too busy with their own obligations to find the time for friend activities, and 32% say the difficulty of finding transportation prevents them from seeing their friends more often. Still, the ease of digital communication ranks among the top reasons given by teens when asked why they do not spend more time with their friends in person – 33% of teens note that it is simply easier to connect with a friend online than to attempt connecting with them physically.
Roughly four-in-ten teens cite 'too many obligations' as a reason they don't spend more time with friendsHispanic teens are especially likely to say that several of these factors prevent them from seeing friends in person as much as they would like. While 46% of Hispanic teens say the ease of talking to their friends online or on their phone is a factor in not seeing their friends more often, just 30% of whites cite the same reason.3 Hispanic teens are also more likely than white teens to cite parental intervention as a barrier to seeing their friends in person (25% vs. 13%). By contrast, white teens are more likely than black teens to say that their friends’ busy schedules are a major factor preventing them from seeing friends more often (37% vs. 20%) and are more likely than Hispanics to point to transportation challenges as an issue (36% vs. 16%).
And although teens from a wide range of groups cite personal obligations as a factor preventing them from seeing friends in person more often, this is an especially common response from teens living in higher-income households. Nearly half (48%) of teens living in households with an annual income of $75,000 or more cite this as a factor, compared with 33% of those living in households that earn less than $30,000 annually.4

Nearly half of teens say they at least sometimes spend time in online groups or forums, and the types of forums they gravitate toward tend to vary by gender

Online groups that focus on hobbies or humor are most popular among teensOnline groups and forums allow teens and adults alike to interact with a broad pool of people who share common traits, interests and experiences. Teens and young adults in particular have access to a wide range of age-specific online forums where they can seek out health-related information, discuss political and social issues, play games with their friends or have a safe haven to explore their identity. This survey finds that around half of teens either often (12%) or sometimes (34%) spend time in online groups or forums, with another 31% indicating they rarely take part in these groups.
Different demographic groups take part in online communities at different rates. For example, a larger share of Hispanic teens (86%) than white (76%) or black (69%) teens say they have ever visited online groups or forums.
Teen boys and girls tend to spend time in different types of online groupsAnd although boys and girls are equally likely to ever join an online group, boys are twice as likely as girls to say they often spend time in these groups (15% vs. 8%).
Certain types of online groups are particularly popular among teens today. About four-in-ten teens (41%) report participating in online groups that center around hobbies such as gaming, and a similar share (40%) participates in groups with a focus on humor. Around one-quarter of teens say they spend time in groups talking about pop culture, sports or fashion. More modest shares – around one-in-ten – report being involved in online groups that focus on identity, politics or religion.
Participation in different types of online groups varies by gender; certain types of online groups are more appealing to boys than girls, and vice versa. Boys are roughly twice as likely as girls to visit online groups centered around hobbies, including gaming or sports, whereas girls are more likely than boys to visit online groups about fashion and health and wellness, as well as groups oriented toward people with specific characteristics (such as LGBT or people of color). At the same time, online groups that focus on humor and pop culture draw similar interests from boys and girls.

Teens credit online groups for introducing them to new people and making them feel more accepted

Majorities of teens who spend time in online forums say they play a role in exposing them to new peopleGirls who use online groups are especially likely to say they've helped them through tough timesTeens who are part of an online group tend to have positive attitudes about their experiences in these groups. Roughly three-quarters of online group participants (74%) say these groups play a role in exposing them to new types of people, including 31% who say online groups play a major role in this regard. Apart from meeting new people, majorities of teens who belong to an online group say these communities play a role in making them feel more accepted (68%), helping them figure out how to feel about important issues (65%) or helping them get through tough times in their life (55%).
Online group participants who are black are more likely than white participants to say these groups play a major role in introducing them to new people (46% vs. 28%). Meanwhile, online communities are particularly beneficial in helping certain populations get through tough times. For example, 24% of girls who belong to an online group say it plays a major role in this regard, compared with 14% of boy participants. Similarly, lower-income teens who visit online communities are around twice as likely as teens from higher-income families to say online groups play a major role in helping them through tough times (25% vs. 12%).

Image of Putin, Russia Suffers Internationally


At same time, Russia seen as gaining influence on world stage



Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to re-establish Russia as a consequential world power appear to have borne at least some fruit: The prevailing view in a new 25-country poll by Pew Research Center is that Russia plays a more important role in international affairs than it did a decade ago. But increased stature does not mean being better liked. The same survey finds that views of Putin and the Russian Federation are largely negative.

Globally, a median of just 34% express a favorable view of Russia, while about a quarter (26%) have confidence in Putin to do the right thing in world affairs. In only four countries – the Philippines, Tunisia, South Korea and Greece – do at least half have a positive view of Russia. By contrast, majorities in North America and much of Europe see Russia in a negative light. Attitudes toward Putin follow a similar pattern, with the Philippines and Tunisia the only countries where more than half express confidence in the Russian leader.

These views notwithstanding, many say Russia’s international stature is growing. A median of roughly four-in-ten (42%) believe Russia is playing a more important role in the world today compared with 10 years ago. A smaller share sees Russia holding its ground (28%), while just 19% say Moscow’s influence is waning. Russia’s increased influence in world affairs is felt more in Europe, North America and the Middle East than in the Asia-Pacific, Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa. Among the countries surveyed, Greeks and Israelis are especially likely to say that Russia’s global stature has grown.

These are among the findings of a Pew Research Center survey conducted in 25 countries among 26,612 respondents from May 14 to Aug. 12, 2018. One section of this report uses additional data from a Pew Research Center survey of 1,000 Russian adults conducted from May 22 to June 23, 2018. (For more on views within Russia, see “Russians Say Their Government Did Not Try to Influence U.S. Presidential Election.”)
Russia viewed unfavorably in other countries

Russia is viewed more unfavorably than favorably in 16 out of 25 countries surveyed. In only four countries do at least half of respondents express a positive view of Russia: the Philippines (63%), Tunisia (55%), South Korea (53%) and Greece (52%).

Views of Russia are especially negative in Europe and North America. In Europe, a regional median of 27% across 10 countries have a favorable opinion of Russia; in the United States the share is just 21%.

Views of Russia in other regions are more mixed. In Asia, ratings are mostly positive in the Philippines and South Korea but are negative by more than two-to-one in Australia (63% unfavorable vs. 29% favorable) and Japan (68% vs. 26%). Views of Russia diverge in the two Middle Eastern countries surveyed, with 55% of Tunisians expressing a positive view of Russia, compared with just 34% of Israelis who say the same.

In the sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries polled, many respondents do not offer an opinion about Russia. Favorable views are more common than unfavorable ones in Nigeria (41%) and Kenya (40%), while pluralities hold negative opinions in South Africa (44%) and Brazil (43%).

In 10 of 25 countries surveyed, young adults ages 18 to 29 have a more favorable view of Russia than those who are 50 and older. Some of the biggest differences by age are found in Tunisia, Australia and Japan, where there is at least a 20-percentage-point gap between the views of the youngest and oldest adults.
Few internationally have confidence in Putin

Confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs is generally low. Across the 25 countries surveyed, a median of only 26% have confidence in Putin to do the right thing vs. 63% who do not. (This stands in sharp contrast to the 81% of Russians who express confidence in Putin.)

Putin is not the only world leader whose international image currently suffers. The survey also asked about U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese Premier Xi Jinping: Both have generally low ratings around the globe. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel tend to fare better in the court of public opinion. (For further comparison of confidence in Putin and other world leaders, see “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.”)

In Europe, a median of only 21% express confidence in Putin. In no European country surveyed do even one-in-ten respondents express a lot of confidence, while at least half in Poland (58%), Spain (53%), the Netherlands (50%) and Sweden (50%) say they have no confidence at all in Putin.

Only in the Philippines (61%) and Tunisia (53%) does Putin enjoy the trust of more than half the population.

A poor international image is not new for Putin. In the Asia-Pacific, Putin’s favorability ratings have remained low in South Korea, Japan and Australia over the past decade. The notable exception is the Philippines. Since Pew Research Center first asked the question there in 2014, confidence in Putin has increased dramatically from 38% to 61% as the Philippines has established closer ties with Russia while distancing itself from the U.S.

Public trust in Putin has remained low in Western Europe over the past decade. Poles have shown even lower confidence in Putin, with no more than about one-in-five expressing confidence at any point over the past 10 years.

Over the same period, Americans’ confidence in Putin has eroded somewhat, from 30% in 2007 to 21% today. After differing by 11 percentage points in 2012, American and Western European views of Putin have tracked more closely in recent years.

In the U.S., Putin and Russia are not popular among backers of either major political party. That said, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents currently have almost twice as much confidence in Putin to do the right thing as Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (28% vs. 15%). A similar divide exists with respect to views of Russia: 27% of Republicans express favorable views of Russia, compared with 16% of Democrats.

In six European countries polled, those who look favorably on right-wing populist parties are more likely to trust Putin to do the right thing in world affairs. Some of the highest confidence levels in Putin are found among Alternative for Germany (AfD) supporters (51%) and backers of France’s National Rally, formerly known as the National Front (40%).
Russia seen as playing a more important role in world affairs

When asked if Russia is playing a more important, less important, or as important a role in the world compared with 10 years ago, a median of 42% across 25 countries surveyed say Russia is more influential today. A median of just 31% say the same about the U.S. Evaluations of both nations trail those of China, which a median of 70% say is now playing a more important role in world affairs. (For more comparisons between countries see “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.”)

Roughly six-in-ten or more in Greece, Israel and Tunisia see Russia’s influence as increasing, while about half in France, the Netherlands and the UK agree.

In the U.S., about half (52%) see Moscow’s influence as rising, but with a notable partisan division: 61% of Democrats see Russia as playing a more important role, while only 44% of Republicans agree.

How asking about your sleep, smoking or yoga habits can help pollsters verify their findings


Acharaporn Kamornboonyarush/EyeEm, Patrick Foto, Jupiterimages

Have you smoked at least 100 cigarettes in your life? Have you practiced yoga in the past year? On average, how many hours of sleep do you get in a day?

At face value, these questions are not directly related to the topics Pew Research Center is most committed to studying. Yet our researchers have been periodically asking questions like these for years. Why? These are examples of benchmarking questions, which the Center uses as a check to ensure that our surveys are accurate.

Why and how we use benchmarking questions

Determining the accuracy of a survey requires some sort of objective standard against which the survey can be compared. In election polls and other measures of voting intent, the standard is the outcome of the election. But for surveys that don’t ask about elections or voting intent, researchers need to find another way to benchmark their findings. This is often done with the help of other surveys – usually large, expensive, government surveys conducted with great attention to data quality.

Pew Research Center surveys occasionally include questions about economic, demographic and lifestyle characteristics for which government statistics are available as a benchmark. This not only helps us check the accuracy of our findings, it also helps us study how surveys themselves can be better conducted.

Take, for example, a Pew Research Center study from last year that examined what low response rates – many potential respondents being contacted but far fewer of them participating – mean for the accuracy of telephone surveys. To help answer this question, the study compared the results of a telephone survey by the Center with those of high-response, benchmark surveys by the federal government to see what, if any, differences existed.

The report found that Pew Research Center surveys were closely aligned with federal surveys on key demographic and lifestyle benchmarks. Across 14 questions about personal traits, the average difference between the government estimate and the Center’s telephone survey estimate was 3 percentage points. Differences on individual questions ranged from 0 to 8 points. The largest was on a measure asking respondents about their health status: The government found that 59% of people rated their health as very good or excellent, while the Center’s telephone survey found 51% doing so.

The other 13 items were quite close to the benchmarks, most with differences of 3 percentage points or less, which was generally within the margin of error. These questions included measures of family income, employment status, household size, citizenship, health insurance, length of residence at current address, marital and parenthood status, smoking frequency, place of birth (among Hispanics) and having a driver’s license. In other words, on these measures, the low-response telephone survey provided results quite comparable to those of the high-response government survey used as a benchmark.

Overall, the report showed that bias introduced into surveys due to low response rates remains limited in scope. And, critically, telephone poll estimates for party affiliation, political ideology and religious affiliation continue to track well with estimates from high-response-rate benchmark surveys.

However, as the Center and other survey researchers have discussed extensively, telephone surveys continue to yield large biases on measures of civic and, to a lesser extent, political engagement. This discrepancy is probably because of nonresponse bias – in which the kinds of people agreeing to participate in surveys are systematically different from those who can’t be contacted or refuse to participate. As found in previous work, the people who answer surveys are likely to be the same people involved in community life – they are joiners, and participating in surveys is a kind of pro-social behavior related to other kinds of behaviors such as volunteering. Fortunately for pollsters, civic engagement is not strongly correlated with political attitudes or most other measures researchers study in surveys.

Caveats about benchmarks

Although large government surveys are generally considered to have high data quality, they’re not immune to some of the same problems every survey researcher faces. For example, while government surveys tend to have very high response rates (on the order of 60% or more) compared with opinion polls conducted by other organizations, the risk of nonresponse bias still exists.

Government surveys, while carefully developed and tested, are also still subject to measurement error, which can arise from the way in which questions are asked (such as what questions come immediately before a particular question, whether the survey was conducted on the phone or online, etc.). Pew Research Center questionnaires that include benchmarking questions do not replicate the exact context in which the original questions were asked, particularly because the Center tends to focus on topics that are different from those in benchmark surveys. Benchmarks also are generally unavailable for questions about attitudes and behaviors that the government does not study.

All surveys can also face response bias issues, including social desirability bias, where respondents may modify answers to certain questions to present themselves more favorably. This is especially a risk when an interviewer asks sensitive questions: Respondents may, for example, overstate their voting frequency.

All of these factors can affect the comparability of seemingly identical questions asked on different surveys, including government surveys. That said, benchmarking questions continue to be a valuable tool for survey researchers checking and assessing accuracy. They are especially vital for the Center’s studies on survey methodology.

lunes, 3 de diciembre de 2018

Trump hails Roger Stone's 'guts' at start of dangerous Russia week





Some critics said a presidential tweet about Stone was witness tampering, as the White House braces for two new Mueller court filings by Friday.



President Donald Trump wasted little time after returning from a global summit in Argentina before lashing out at Robert Mueller, kicking off a week in which the special counsel’s Russia probe could bring major new headaches for Trump.

In a combative tweet Monday, Trump celebrated the defiance of his occasional political adviser, Roger Stone, who has faced mounting scrutiny from Mueller’s team over his possible contacts with Wikileaks during the 2016 election.


The tweet came ahead of two key court filings due from Mueller this week — including one detailing alleged lies by Trump’s former campaign chairman, Paul Manafort — which could shed important new light on the special counsel’s investigation into 2016 Russian election interference.

But on Monday, it was Trump’s longtime associate Stone who had his attention.

"'I will never testify against Trump.' This statement was recently made by Roger Stone, essentially stating that he will not be forced by a rogue and out of control prosecutor to make up lies and stories about 'President Trump,'" Trump wrote in the mid-morning tweet.
"Nice to know that some people still have 'guts!'" he added.


Within minutes, Trump’s critics accused him of using the social media platform to interfere with Mueller’s investigation.
“File under ’18 USC §§ 1503, 1512,’” wrote George Conway, the conservative attorney and frequent presidential critic who is married to White House counselor Kellyanne Conway. That was a reference to criminal statutes dealing with influencing a grand jury and tampering with a witness.

“George is right,” added Neal Katyal, the former Obama-era acting solicitor general. “This is genuinely looking like witness tampering.” He added that the Justice Department “prosecutes cases like these all the time. The fact it’s done out in the open is no defense.”

Trump’s tweet about Stone picked up where he left off when he left Washington last Thursday for the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires. Shortly before Trump’s departure, his former personal lawyer Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to lying to Congress about a Trump Organization real estate deal in Moscow that he pursued as late as mid-2016. Trump fumed about the plea to reporters before boarding Marine One at the White House, and he kept harping on the topic with a succession of tweets between meetings with world leaders in the South American capital.

Now back in the United States, Trump's obsession with the Mueller investigation is unlikely to be tempered.

Mueller is due to file a key pre-sentencing report Tuesday in federal district court outlining the extent of cooperation his office has received from Michael Flynn, the former Trump national security adviser who pleaded guilty last December for lying to the FBI.

On Friday, Mueller’s prosecutors are scheduled to file a more detailed assessment of what they believe Manafort lied about to investigators that led them to shred their recent plea agreement.



Some former prosecutors believe Mueller could use the opportunity to provide dramatic new details about his investigation, though it is possible the document will be limited in scope.

If recent history is a guide, the courtroom action will likely provoke Trump into more tweeting, which legal experts say could serve as a real-time resource for Russia investigators.

“They’re a gold mine,” former federal prosecutor Peter Zeidenberg said of the Trump Twitter archives in an interview last year.
But whether messages like the one Trump sent on Monday about Stone could really constitute grounds for criminal action remains subject to debate

Former federal prosecutor Renato Mariotti suggested in a Twitter thread Monday that the president's post exposes him to prosecution. But he added that would require Mueller "to prove, among other things, that Trump had 'corrupt' intent and acted with the intent to cause Stone to withhold testimony."

Sol Wisenberg, a former federal prosecutor who served on independent counsel Kenneth Starr’s team during its wide-ranging probe of President Bill Clinton, said it was “shameful” for Trump to be commenting at length about an ongoing investigation via social media. But he disputed that the tweet broke any criminal law.

“Could it be something they throw into impeachment? Hell yeah. But show me a case where it’d be witness tampering,” Wisenberg said.
Trump personal attorney Rudy Giuliani defended the president’s message on Monday. “He is praising Stone for telling the truth and not succumbing to the Special Counsel’s unrelenting pressure to lie,” the former New York mayor told POLITICO.


The president’s reference to Stone came on the heels of the longtime GOP operative’s Sunday appearance on ABC's "This Week," where he said that there's "no circumstance in which I would testify against the president."

Stone has denied multiple times that he had any direct knowledge that WikiLeaks was going to release hacked emails from Hillary Clinton's campaign. But legal documents show that Mueller believes otherwise.

Also Sunday, Stone said that he has not discussed a pardon for himself or for Manafort, who was convicted in a financial fraud trial brought by Mueller. The president told the New York Post last week that he has "never discussed" a pardon for Manfort, but "wouldn't take it off the table."

"I've had no discussion regarding a pardon," Stone said over the weekend.

Kicking off his Monday, Trump on Twitter lambasted Cohen for his guilty plea and urged the judge presiding in the case to give his former lawyer a “full and complete sentence.” The president also continued to denounce Mueller's investigation into whether Russia colluded with Trump's presidential campaign, claiming without evidence that the special counsel "only wants lies."

Stone during his Sunday interview claimed that Mueller wanted him to "bear false witness against" Trump, adding that he "would have to make things up."

"Bob Mueller (who is a much different man than people think) and his out of control band of Angry Democrats, don’t want the truth, they only want lies," Trump tweeted Monday. "The truth is very bad for their mission!"

‘Post-Millennials’ on Track to Be Most Diverse, Best-Educated Generation Yet


A demographic portrait of today’s 6- to 21-year-olds



(Mark Boster/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images)

As a new generation of Americans begins to take shape and move toward adulthood, there is mounting interest in their attitudes, behaviors and lifestyle. But how will this generation change the demographic fabric of the United States? A new Pew Research Center analysis of Census Bureau data finds that the “post-Millennial” generation is already the most racially and ethnically diverse generation, as a bare majority of 6- to 21-year-olds (52%) are non-Hispanic whites. And while most are still pursuing their K-12 education, the oldest post-Millennials are enrolling in college at a significantly higher rate than Millennials were at a comparable age.

The parents of post-Millennials are more well educated than the parents of Millennials and those of previous generations, and this pattern most likely contributes to the relative affluence of the households in which post-Millennials live. More than four-in-ten post-Millennials (43%) are living with at least one parent who has a bachelor’s degree or more education. Roughly a third (32%) of Millennials in 2002 had a parent with this level of education.

The high school dropout rate for the oldest post-Millennials (ages 18 to 20 in 2017) is significantly lower than that of similarly aged Millennials in 2002. And among those who were no longer in high school in 2017, 59% were enrolled in college – higher than the enrollment rate for 18- to 20-year-old Millennials in 2002 (53%) and Gen Xers in 1986 (44%).

The changing patterns in educational attainment are driven in part by the shifting origins of young Hispanics. Post-Millennial Hispanics are less likely than Millennial Hispanics to be immigrants – 12% of post-Millennial Hispanics were born outside the U.S., compared with 24% of Millennial Hispanics in 2002. Previous research has shown that second-generation Hispanic youth tend to go further in school than foreign-born Hispanic youth. That is borne out in this analysis, as 61% of second-generation Hispanics ages 18 to 20 who were no longer in high school were enrolled in college in 2017, compared with 40% of their foreign-born counterparts. Overall, the share of post-Millennial Hispanics enrolled in college is significantly higher than the rate for Millennials in 2002 (55% vs. 34%, among 18- to 20-year-olds no longer in high school).1

More broadly, the post-Millennial generation is being shaped by changing immigration patterns. Immigration flows into the U.S. peaked in 2005, when the leading edge of the post-Millennial generation was age 8 or younger. The onset of the Great Recession and the large decline in employment led to fewer immigrants coming to the United States, including immigrant children. As a result, the post-Millennial generation has fewer foreign-born youth among its ranks than the Millennial generation did in 2002 and a significantly higher number who were born in the U.S. to immigrant parents, though this may change depending on future immigration flows.

The generation labeled “post-Millennials” in this report – referred to elsewhere as Generation Z, the iGen or Homelanders – includes those born after 1996. Pew Research Center uses the label “post-Millennials” as a placeholder until more consensus emerges as to their name.

For purposes of this analysis, the post-Millennial generation spans 16 years, the same number of years as the Millennial generation (now ages 22 to 37). That may change as well, as this new generation – and the factors that shape it – come into sharper focus.

This report compares the post-Millennials in 2018 with earlier generations when they were ages 6 to 21, examining their demographic characteristics as well as those of their parents and households.

Other key findings:
The oldest post-Millennials are less likely than their predecessors to be in the labor force. Only 58% of today’s 18- to 21-year-olds worked in the prior calendar year; this compares with 72% of Millennial 18- to 21-year-olds in 2002. And employment among post-Millennials is less likely to be full-time compared with earlier generations. This is likely due, in large part, to the fact that these young adults are more likely than their predecessors to be enrolled in college.
The living arrangements of post-Millennial children are similar to those of Millennials when they were growing up. About two-thirds (65%) of today’s 6- to 17-year-olds live with two married parents, slightly lower than the share (68%) of Millennials in that age range who lived in this type of household in 2002. Roughly three-in-ten post-Millennials ages 6 to 17 (31%) live with a single parent, somewhat higher than the share of Millennials growing up with a single parent in 2002 (27%).2
The median household income of post-Millennials exceeds that of earlier generations when they were young. The typical post-Millennial in 2018 lives in a household with an annual income of roughly $63,700 after adjusting for household size. That is slightly higher than the income for the typical household in which Millennials grew up – $62,400 in 2002 in inflation-adjusted dollars – and it far surpasses the income of Gen X and Baby Boomer households when they were growing up. This is consistent with the relatively high education of the parents of post-Millennials.

Post-Millennials more metropolitan and racially and ethnically diverse, less likely to be foreign born

A bare majority (52%) of post-Millennials are non-Hispanic white. One-in-four are Hispanic, significantly higher than the share of Millennials who were Hispanic in 2002. The share of post-Millennials who are black (14%) is nearly identical to the share of Millennials who were black at a comparable age (15%). Black representation among the nation’s youth has changed little since the early Boomers in 1968.

Asians account for 6% of the post-Millennial generation, up slightly from the 4% of Millennials in 2002 who were Asian. The remaining 4% of post-Millennials are non-Hispanics of another racial identity, mainly youth of two or more races.

Though post-Millennials are more likely to be Hispanic and Asian compared with prior generations, they are not more likely, at this point, to be immigrants. Some 7% of post-Millennials are foreign born, as were 8% of Millennials in 2002. However, post-Millennials are more likely to be U.S. born of at least one foreign-born parent (22%) compared with Millennials in 2002 (15%).3

In terms of sheer numbers, the Millennial generation was shaped to a much larger extent by young immigrants than the post-Millennials have been. When Millennials were ages 6 to 21 in 2002, they numbered 65.3 million.4 Their ranks that year included 5.0 million immigrants. By contrast, only about 4.4 million of the 66.5 million post-Millennials are immigrants – a pattern that more closely mirrors the experience of Gen X.

Even with the diminished flow of immigrants into the U.S., the racial and ethnic diversity of the post-Millennial generation is expected to increase in future years as new immigrants join their numbers. Today’s 6- to 21-year-olds are projected to become majority nonwhite in 2026 (when they will be ages 14 to 29), according to Census Bureau projections.
Majority of post-Millennials are nonwhite in urban areas and Western states

The geography and mobility of post-Millennials differ from earlier generations. Reflecting broader national trends, post-Millennials overwhelmingly reside in metropolitan as opposed to rural areas. Only 13% of post-Millennials are in rural areas, compared with 18% of Millennials in 2002. By comparison, 23% of Gen Xers lived in rural areas when they were ages 6 to 21, as did 36% of early Boomers.

In the nation’s urban areas and in the Western region of the U.S., post-Millennials are at the leading edge of growing racial and ethnic diversity. Two-thirds of post-Millennials living in urban counties are racial or ethnic minorities, with a plurality (36%) being Hispanic. Among Millennials, 59% who live in cities are racial or ethnic minorities. In rural (non-metropolitan) counties, only 29% of 6- to 21-year-olds are nonwhite – still somewhat higher than the share of rural Millennials who are nonwhite (27%). Minorities constitute 43% of suburban post-Millennials. Among those living in suburban counties, 39% of Millennials, 34% of Gen Xers and 23% of Boomers are nonwhite.5

In the West, post-Millennials are just as likely to be Hispanic as non-Hispanic white (both 40%). This stands in contrast to older generations. Among those residing in the West, 45% of Millennials, 50% of Gen Xers and 64% of Boomers are non-Hispanic white. Minority representation among post-Millennials is lowest in the Midwest, where roughly a third (32%) of 6- to 21-year-olds are racial or ethnic minorities.

When it comes to geographic mobility, Americans are not moving as they once did, and post-Millennials are no exception. About 11% of post-Millennials in 2018 had a different address from a year earlier, implying that they had moved. By comparison, 17% of Millennials and 20% of Gen Xers and early Boomers had moved in the past year when they were the ages post-Millennials are today.
Post-Millennials more likely to be pursuing college and less likely to be in the workforce

While it’s still much too early to draw conclusions, initial signs suggest that post-Millennials are on track to become the most well-educated generation yet.

As of 2017 (the most recent year available with school enrollment information) 80% of post-Millennial 18- to 20-year-olds had finished high school.6 That represents a modest improvement from previous generations. At the same ages, 76% of Millennials and 78% of Gen Xers had completed high school. Some of the overall post-Millennial improvement stems from the leap in high school completion among Hispanic youth. In 2017, 76% of Hispanic 18- to 20-year-olds had finished high school, outpacing the 60% of Hispanic Millennials attaining this benchmark in 2002. Black high school completion has also improved: 77% of black post-Millennials ages 18 to 20 had finished high school, compared with 71% of black Millennials in this age group in 2002.

Since white post-Millennial high school attainment is no higher than among white Millennials, some of the long-standing racial and ethnic gaps in high school completion are narrower among the post-Millennials than was the case for prior generations.

The share of post-Millennials who have dropped out of high school is significantly lower than it was for Millennials. In 2017, 6% of 18- to 20-year-old post-Millennials had neither finished high school nor were enrolled in high school. By comparison, 12% of Millennial 18- to 20-year-olds had dropped out of high school in 2002, as had 13% of Gen Xers in 1986.

One indicator suggests that younger post-Millennials are behind where Millennials were in terms of their progress in K-12 education. In 2017, 30% of post-Millennials ages 6 to 17 were enrolled below the “modal grade,” which is the typical grade a child is enrolled in given his or her age. By comparison, a quarter of Millennials and Gen Xers were enrolled below the modal grade in 2002 and 1986, respectively. This indicator is of value because it can foreshadow subsequent dropping out of school, particularly if the student is behind in school due to grade retention. It’s unclear from this data whether students are behind grade-wise due to being held back in school or whether their parents elected to have them begin kindergarten at an older age.

Beyond K-12 education, post-Millennials are more likely than earlier generations to be pursuing college. In 2017, 59% of 18- to 20-year-olds who were no longer in high school were enrolled in college. Among Millennials and Gen Xers at similar ages smaller shares were pursuing college (53% and 44%, respectively).

Some of the post-Millennial gain stems from Hispanic youth. More than half (55%) of Hispanic 18- to 20-year-olds who were no longer in high school were enrolled in college last year. Less than half of their Millennial (34%) and Gen X (28%) peers were pursuing college at a similar age.

Black post-Millennials are also outpacing the previous generations of black youth in terms of college enrollment. Among blacks ages 18 to 20 who were no longer in high school, 54% were enrolled in college in 2017, compared with 47% of black Millennials in 2002 and 34% of Gen Xers in 1986.

Post-Millennial women are showing major strides in college enrollment. In 2017, 64% of women ages 18 to 20 who were no longer in high school were enrolled in college. That’s up from 57% of similarly aged Millennials in 2002 and up substantially from 43% of Gen Xers in 1986. The trend, while more modest, has been upward among men as well.

It’s important to point out that future immigration patterns may affect the educational outcomes of post-Millennials, so these generational comparisons represent a current snapshot.
Post-Millennials are slower to enter the labor force

Post-Millennials are entering adulthood with less experience in the labor market than prior generations. Roughly one-in-five 15- to 17-year-olds in 2018 (19%) report having worked at all during the prior calendar year, compared with 30% of Millennial 15- to 17-year-olds in 2002. Almost half of early Baby Boomers (48%) in the same age group worked in 1968. Among 18- to 21-year-olds today, 58% were employed during the prior calendar year. At the same age prior generations were much more likely to have been employed. Among Millennial 18- to 21-year-olds in 2002, 72% reported working in the prior year. Among Boomer 18- to 21-year-olds in 1968, 80% worked in the prior calendar year.

Post-Millennial workers are less likely to work full-time compared with prior generations. In 2018, only 15% of 15- to 17-year-old workers worked full-time, down sharply from the 26% of 15- to 17-year-old workers in 1968 who worked full-time. The pattern is similar among 18- to 21-year-olds.

Over the decades the earnings of American workers have increased modestly, and teens and young adults are no exception. If they worked full-time in 2017, a 15- to 17-year-old typically earned about $5,000 (the median). Adjusting for inflation, a similar early Millennial earned slightly less, $4,200. The median earnings for a full-time 18- to 21-year-old today is $19,000, somewhat higher than the median pay of a similarly aged full-time Millennial worker in 2002 ($16,700).

A common indicator of “at-risk” behavior in the transition to adulthood is the share of youth who are neither enrolled in school nor working. Youth who are detached from school and the workplace may not be acquiring valuable learning experiences and networking opportunities. Post-Millennials are less likely to be detached than earlier generations. The shift has been more significant among young women. Only 9% of 16- to 21-year-old post-Millennial women are detached in 2018. About 12% of Millennial women and 16% of Gen X women were neither in school nor working at a comparable age. Post-Millennial women who are detached are far less likely to be married than detached Gen X women were at a similar age (12% vs. 37%).

Post-Millennial women are more likely to be engaged in school and work than earlier generations in part because they have fewer parenting responsibilities. Teen births have been falling, even recently, and post-Millennial women are more likely to be childless than earlier generations. In 2016, 88% of women ages 18 to 21 were childless, compared with 79% of Millennials and 80% of Gen Xers at a similar age.
Post-Millennials’ family lives are similar to those of Millennials when they were young

Steady gains in college completion among U.S. adults are reflected in the households of post-Millennials. Fully 43% of post-Millennials ages 6 to 17 have at least one parent with a bachelor’s degree or more education. This compares with 32% among similarly aged Millennials in 2002, 23% among Gen Xers in 1986 and only 16% among early Boomers in 1968.

Roughly two-thirds (65%) of post-Millennials ages 6 to 17 live in a household with two married parents; fully 31% live with a single parent.7 The share of 6- to 17-year-olds living with two married parents is down slightly from the share of Millennials who were growing up with two married parents in 2002 (68%). Gen Xers were even more likely to live with two married parents – 73% did so in 1986. And for the early Boomers, this type of arrangement was very much the norm: 85% of early Boomers ages 6 to 17 were living with two married parents in 1968.

Of those children and teens who are living with two married parents, most live in dual-earner households. Slightly fewer post-Millennials have two working parents compared with Millennials in 2002 (63% vs. 66%). In 1986, 59% of Gen X youth (ages 6 to 17) with married parents had both parents in the labor force, up substantially from 37% among similarly aged Boomers in 1968.

Post-Millennials have the same number of siblings living with them as Millennials did at a similar age – 1.5, on average. This is down substantially from what the early Boomers experienced in their youth. Among those ages 6 to 17 in 1968, the average number of siblings was 2.6. By the time the Gen Xers came along, that number had fallen to 1.6 (in 1986).

Older post-Millennials appear to be postponing marriage even more than Millennials were at a similar age. Among those ages 18 to 21, only 4% of post-Millennials are married. Millennials in 2002 were nearly twice as likely to be married (7%), and the rate was higher still among Gen Xers in 1986 (12%). In 1968, 26% of early Boomers ages 18 to 21 were married.

Some measures of economic well-being indicate that post-Millennials are growing up in more affluent circumstances than previous generations did. The median or typical household income of 6- to 21-year-olds is $63,700. After adjusting for inflation the typical Millennial grew up in a household with a slightly lower income level ($62,400). The typical household income resources of Gen Xers ($52,800) and early Boomers ($42,000) growing up were significantly below these levels.8 By the official poverty measure, 17% of post-Millennials live in families that are below the poverty line.9 This may exceed the share of Millennials in poverty in 2002 (16%) but is below the share of Gen Xers in 1986 (19%).